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The research described in this computer science PhD thesis is positioned 
somewhere between computer science and psychology. It is about the influence of 
affect on learning. Affect is related to emotion; affect is about the positiveness and 
negativeness of a situation, thought, object, etc. We will define affect more 
precisely in Section 1.4, but for now this definition suffices. Affect can influence 
learning and behavior in many ways. For example, parents use affective 
communication to influence the behavior of their children (praise versus 
disapproval). Affect can also influence how individuals process information (e.g., 
positive affect favors creativity, negative affect favors critical thinking). The 
research described in this thesis uses computational modeling to study affective 
influence on learning. The goal has been twofold: first, understand more about 
potential mechanisms underlying relations between affect and learning as found in 
the psychological literature, and second, study if the concept of affect can be used 
in computer learning, most notably to control the learning process. Both aspects 
are considered of equal importance in this work. The topic is quite 
interdisciplinary and the individual chapters present the results of focused studies. 
However, in an attempt to clarify to a broader public what the research questions 
are and why these are of interest, the introduction is intentionally kept broad and 
is written so that it is understandable to readers with general knowledge of 
computer science and an interest in psychology. Readers that want to skip the 
introduction can read Section 1.5 for an overview of the thesis. 
1.1 Informal Introduction to the Topic 
This thesis is about affect and learning, a topic everyone is intuitively familiar 
with. We all know the effects of anger and sadness (two different negative 
affective states) or happiness and excitement (two different positive affective 
states) on our own functioning and decisions. Sometimes, we regret these 
decisions, while others worked out quite fine—better than expected—afterwards.  
In everyday life, we just accept that we have emotions and that our emotions 
influence our behavior. It is common sense knowledge that it is sometimes the 
head, sometimes the heart that decides our future and we rarely ask ourselves 
when and how affect exactly influences our decisions. Interestingly, it is quite 
difficult to reflect upon a decision, let’s say the last decision you made, and 
discriminate between the “affect” part versus the “rational thought” part that 
influenced that decision. Instead, affect and “rational thought” seem to be 
intertwined in many cases, a notion put forward by Antonio Damasio in his 
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seminal book Descartes’ Error (Damasio, 1994). It is by now generally accepted 
that “rational thought” does not exist, at least not in the sense we thought 
(hoped?) it did. Nothing is decided purely based on a logical evaluation of pros 
and cons of which the pros and cons are again (recursively) a result of a logical 
evaluation of their pros and cons of which the pros and cons … etc. This kind of 
recursive and analytic thought process is very rare, chess-like game play being 
perhaps a partial exception, and it is by no means necessary for normal 
functioning in society; other animals don’t need it either and are quite adaptive to 
their environment. What seems to be more the case is exemplified by the 
following “should I stay or should I go” scenario (also a nice song by The Clash 
showing human indecisiveness): 
I’m at work, writing the introduction of my thesis. Some chapters still have to be 
written, so quite some writing still has to be done. However, today actually is a 
local holiday called “Leids Ontzet” feasting the liberation of the city of Leiden (The 
Netherlands) ending the Spanish occupation of that city in the year 1574. The 
faculty is closed but I went in with my key to do some work. So, the decision is: 
should I stay the whole day and write as much as possible, or should I go home 
and do something else taking advantage of the fact that today is a local holiday. 
Now here’s my “rational choice”: I went to work this morning, because I am not 
originally from Leiden, so I do not really care about Leids Ontzet. My partner also 
went to work, because she works in The Hague (not in Leiden: thus no local 
holiday). I do care about playing video games in my spare time, and therefore I 
like having a day off. However, I do have a lot of work to do on my thesis, and I 
want my thesis to be finished in time. (Why? Because my supervisor wants me to? 
Because it is good for my future? Because it just feels like the right thing to do?). 
So, here am I, having to decide on two things: go home and play games (which I 
like), versus stay and write my thesis (which I like). It is a holiday, but my partner 
has to work. So, taking a day off now enables me to play games, but I won’t be 
able to work on my thesis, and it takes away my option to take another day off 
when my partner does have a day off. What do I do? I work in the morning on my 
thesis, write a fair part of the introduction, and take the afternoon off and play 
games. I get to do two things I like, and keep the option of taking half a day off to 
do nice stuff with my girlfriend later, which I also like. So isn’t this a win-win-win 
situation? It probably is, but the decision itself is not rational, it is emotional and 
social and there is no deep logical evaluation behind the value of the alternatives. 
The only thing that might be called rational is the process by which I generate the 
alternatives. However, the decision is made based on a “what feels best” criterion, 
and I just “weight” the values of the alternatives using social and emotional 
associations. One could even argue that I did not decide anything at all: none of 
the alternatives is excluded; instead I have chosen a mixture of things that feels 
good to me. Many decisions resemble this scenario, and I think we can agree that 
our life’s course is a long sequence of such decisions, none of them being 
exclusively rational, none exclusively affective.  
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The question seems to be how and when affect influences decision making, 
thought, learning, and the many other cognitive phenomena known in cognitive 
psychology. For example, psychologists like Joseph Forgas, Alice Isen and 
Gerald Clore have studied the influence of emotion and affect on human decision 
making for quite some time (for references see Chapter 2). Although much debate 
is going on, as discussed for example in Chapter 3, decades of research indeed 
converged into a general consensus that affect does influence cognition in 
important ways. These ways include affect manipulating how we approach 
problems—e.g., do we look at the details of a problem, or approach it from the 
top—, affect influencing what we think about objects and people, and affect 
influencing creativity and open-mindedness.  
Although much is known on the influence of affect on cognition, the 
mechanisms by which affect influences cognition are largely unknown. This is 
partly because it is very difficult to experimentally manipulate and subsequently 
measure affect, let alone affective influence on, for example, decision making and 
learning. This is exactly where the computer enters (fortunately, as this is a 
Computer Science PhD thesis, and some might at this point be wondering where 
the computer went). Computers enable scientists to develop computational 
models (programs) that can actually produce “new things”, based on the 
assumptions of the theoretical model (e.g., a psychological theory describing the 
influence of affect on learning) underneath the computer model. These “new 
things” are, in a very real sense, predictions of the psychological theory: they 
result from the computational model that is a highly detailed version, an 
implementation, of the psychological theory. As such, computational models help 
psychological theory development. As computer models need to “run”, they need 
to execute a sequence of commands and manipulate the results of these 
commands; computer models are particularly good at investigating mechanism, 
because they exist by the virtue of mechanism. Mechanism happens to be the 
thing that is notoriously difficult to investigate based on observation of behavior 
(whether that is body movement, data from brain scanners, facial expressions, or 
biochemical markers). We can thus conclude that computational modeling is a 
useful method to study potential mechanisms proposed by psychological and 
neurobiological theories, including theories about the influence of affect on 
learning.    
This thesis presents research on the influence of affect on learning by means 
of computational modeling. As such, both affect and learning need to be 
computationally modeled. A successful model for task-learning is reinforcement 
learning (RL). It has been applied to many computer learning problems, such as 
computers that learn to play games, steer cars, and control robots (see Sutton & 
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Barto, 1998). The RL paradigm is quite analogous to instrumental conditioning. 
Instrumental conditioning is a paradigm by which animals (including humans) 
can learn new behaviors, by trying new actions (exploration) and receiving 
rewards and punishments (reinforcement) for these actions. Rewards and 
punishments can transfer to the actions the animal chose to do just before the 
action resulting in the reinforcement, and to actions before that action, and before 
that action, etc. As a result, the animal learns to execute a sequence of actions in 
order to get to a reward or avoid a punishment; the animal is said to exploit its 
knowledge after a period of exploration of its environment. Reinforcement 
Learning is a detailed computational model that describes how reinforcement can 
propagate back to earlier actions (this process of propagation is also known as 
credit assignment), as well as how the values of actions need to be adapted to 
reflect the received reinforcement (Section 1.3). Recently, neuroscientists have 
found evidence that parts of the human brain (and brains of other animals) seem 
to be involved in exactly this process of reward processing. The basal ganglia (an 
important dopamine system in the brain responsible for the initiation of action) 
are involved in the selection of actions, and neurons in the basal ganglia seem to 
encode the reinforcement signal, i.e., the change that needs to be made to the 
value of an action. Neurons in the prefrontal cortex (responsible for planning and 
executive, reflective processing) seem to encode the value (i.e., the effective 
credit a certain action is responsible for) of actions in a certain context. In 
studying learning, Reinforcement Learning seems to be a good candidate model; a 
point of view that is detailed in Section 1.3.  
In Chapter 2 we introduce a measure for artificial affect that relates to a 
simulated animal’s relative performance on a learning task (let’s say, a simulated 
mouse in a maze searching for cheese). As such, artificial affect measures how 
well the simulated animal improves. Our animal learns by reward and 
punishment, thus, in our case, how “well” can be defined as the average 
reinforcement signal. Therefore the animal’s performance can be defined as the 
difference between the long-term average reinforcement signal (“what am I used 
to”) and the short-term average reinforcement signal (“how am I doing now”) (cf. 
Schweighofer & Doya, 2003). Artificial affect is a measure for how good or bad 
the situation of the agent is. 
In this thesis we explore, among other things, how affect can be used to 
influence learning by controlling when to explore versus exploit. As mentioned 
earlier, animals need to sometimes explore their environment, sometimes exploit 
the knowledge they have of that environment. Simulated animals also need to do 
so. To learn where the cheese is, learn different routes to the cheese, learn 
alternative cheese locations, adapt to new cheese locations, etc., a simulated 
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mouse sometimes needs to explore (to find new stuff) and sometimes needs to 
exploit (to eat cheese). Controlling exploration versus exploitation is an important 
problem in the robot learning domain. By using artificial affect to control 
exploration, and by coupling artificial affect to affect in the psychological 
literature, an important step is made towards autonomous control of learning 
behavior in a way compatible with nature. We show that in some cases it is indeed 
beneficial 1  to the learning simulated animal to control exploration and 
exploitation by means of artificial affect. 
A second aspect explored in this thesis is how affect can be used to control 
learning more directly, much like a parent that approves or disapproves of a 
child’s behavior. We study, using a simulated robot, the effect of a human 
observer parenting a robot “child”. The robot has to learn a certain task, and the 
human observer can approve or disapprove the robot’s actions by expressing 
emotional expressions to a camera. The expressions are analyzed in terms of 
positive and negative affect and fed to the learning robot. This reinforcement 
signal is used to train the robot, in addition to the normal reinforcement signals 
given to the robot by the environment it behaves in. We show that learning can 
improve2 if such social-based feedback is added to the learning mechanism. 
1.2 Computational Models, Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. 
Before entering the specifics of the research described in this thesis, a short 
introduction into the relation between computational models, psychology and 
artificial intelligence is useful. Computers can be used to model many different 
phenomena and systems. For example, weather forecasts in fact result from 
computational (mathematical) models that simulate interaction patterns between 
the different elements that constitute “the weather”, such as air pressure, wind 
speeds, land elevation, etc. So in essence, a weather forecast is a prediction of the 
“theory of the weather” by means of a computational model of that theory. In the 
same spirit, computational models exist that are inspired by, based on, or 
explicitly implementing psychological theories. Depending on the level of fidelity 
to the theory, the model can be used to gain insights into, and potentially predict 
consequences of the psychological theory. 
On the other hand, natural theories (such as psychological, economical and 
biological ones), once implemented, can be very useful in the computer science 
domain itself. Consider, for example, the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), a 
                                                 
1  Beneficial in terms of (1) effort involved (steps) in finding solutions, and (2) more 
rewarding solutions. 
2 Improvement in terms of quicker learning of the solution to the task at hand. 
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typical computational problem defined by finding the shortest route (or at least a 
route shorter than an arbitrary given length K) that visits all locations from a set of 
locations exactly once (e.g., a traveling salesman that wants to travel from city to 
city in the most efficient way). TSP is an NP-complete problem. In short, this 
means that to check if a given route is a solution to a certain instance of the TSP 
problem (meaning that the route addresses all locations and is shorter than length 
K), a polynomial number of calculations is needed3. Checking a solution is easy in 
terms of time needed for checking. However, finding the shortest route (or 
deciding if a route shorter than K exists) generally takes an exponential amount of 
calculations, so finding the best route is difficult. This is due to the fact that the 
number of possible routes that exist between a set of locations grows 
exponentially with the number of locations. The number of possible routes 
becomes extremely large even for a small number of locations. An exact solution 
(i.e., the best route) to this problem is often unnecessary for a real salesman, and 
for large sets of locations practically impossible. Biologists have studied the 
behavior of ants intensively and found that ants have an interesting way to find 
shortest routes to food by leaving scent trails that grow stronger every time an ant 
uses the same route and finds food at the end. By doing so, ant colonies as a 
whole have evolved a practical, approximate solution (a.k.a. heuristic) to the 
problem of finding shortest paths. Currently, much research is being done on ant-
colony-based heuristics to find practical solutions to, e.g., the Traveling Salesman 
Problem (Dorigo & Stützle, 2004). This example shows that natural theories can 
inspire the search for solutions to problems in computer science. 
Computational models can thus be used to simulate real-world phenomena, 
and theories about the real-world can inspire the search for solutions to computer 
science problems, a notion underlying natural computing in general (Rozenberg & 
Spaink, 2002). Let’s specifically look at the role of computational models in 
psychology, as well as the role of psychology in computer science. 
                                                 
3 Polynomial in this context means that the number of calculations needed is expressible in 
terms of a power over the size of the problem. So, given n locations, checking if a route 
addresses all locations could take, e.g., n2 calculations, denoted as O(n2), the complexity 
order is called quadratic. Note that for TSP, there are representations of the problem for 
which the order for checking a solution is actually O(n): compare if the route contains all n 
locations; sum over all route’s segments to obtain the route’s length L and compare if L < 
K. Note also that the size of a TSP instance is not measured in terms of the number of 
locations, but in terms of the number of possible location transitions (the potential to move 
from one city to another); it is not relevant to the complexity of the problem how many 
locations there are, but in how many ways one can address them all. A polynomial number 
of calculations is assumed to be tractable (“easy” to solve), while an exponential number of 
calculations (expressible as an exponent, not as a power) is intractable (“hard” to solve).  
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Psychological theories often establish relations (correlations, effects, 
causality) between different aspects of the human mind and observable behavior. 
Such relations are often found using sophisticated psychological tests that 
measure the relation between different constructs. A construct is a measurable 
theoretical abstraction for a certain characteristic, e.g., the construct “intelligence” 
measured with an IQ test representing the level of non-specific skills a person has. 
Relations between constructs can be shown in different ways. Most commonly 
used are the experimental approach aimed at: 
 causality; measure construct A, do something to construct B, than measure 
construct A again to find out if B influenced A in some way,  
 correlation; measure both A and B at the same time and try to find a 
correlation between both, and 
 longitudinal effects; measure A at intervals for a period of many years, 
manipulate B, and try to find trends in A over time. 
Of course, these approaches exist with or without control groups, with or without 
blind and double blind setups, and so on. 
Aimed at understanding the human mind, psychologists want to study not 
only relations between constructs but also want to understand the mechanisms 
responsible for these relations; a notoriously difficult goal, as experimenters 
cannot look in detail in a persons head. Clever experiment designs have by now 
been developed that aim at looking into the mind. An impressive example of this 
can be found in the cognitive psychology domain, e.g., in the domain of working 
memory and attention. To investigate a relatively simple question such as “can a 
person attend to, and process two different stimuli at the same time”, extremely 
complex experiment designs have been developed to answer it; not because this is 
fun, but because the answer must be interpretable in terms of an underlying 
mechanism. In concrete terms this means that, if the answer is, for example, “yes, 
persons can do that”, the following questions immediately pop up. How many 
tasks can we simultaneously execute? What task-load is permissible? What if one 
of the tasks is a heavy one and the other is not, and would performance on the 
latter be compromised? What if one of the tasks is personally relevant? What if 
one of the tasks was a task the person is trained on, and to what extent can tasks 
be executed simultaneously under the assumption that they are indeed trained? 
How much training is needed?  These questions are not so much questions about 
relations anymore, but in fact questions about mechanisms such as “how does 
working memory capacity function?”, “how is context switching executed by the 
human brain?”, and “how do we concentrate (what is concentration)?”. The 
experiment designs needed to study such questions are extremely complex, and 
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very hard to grasp in terms of their consequences for the conclusions (e.g., didn’t 
we forget to control for this or that phenomenon). This is what makes 
experimental psychology such a difficult and challenging scientific enterprise, for 
which strong research methods, many different theories and exact reporting of 
results are critical.  
Fortunately (especially for computer science graduates with a strong interest 
in psychology in search for a topic for their PhD thesis), psychology has added a 
new type of experiment to their research weapon arsenal, a weapon specifically 
targeted at understanding mechanism: computer simulation. Computational 
models need to be specified at a detailed level. As such, in order for a model to 
execute, mechanism details have to be filled in. If this filling in is done based on a 
psychological theory, the model becomes a more detailed version of that theory. 
By executing a computational model, it can provide insights into possible 
mechanisms underlying the relations between constructs. More importantly, if a 
psychological theory already proposes potential mechanisms, the computational 
model can predict consequences of these mechanisms, thereby helping to refine 
the theory. 
Interesting examples include neural network models of human working 
memory and attention (Dehaene, Sergent & Changeux, 2003), but also the many 
computational models of emotion based on cognitive appraisal theory that have 
been implemented in computer systems. Cognitive appraisal theory assumes that 
emotions result from an individual’s cognitive evaluation of the current situation 
in terms of his or her goals and knowledge. Evaluation is often assumed to be 
symbol manipulation. As computers are good at such systematic symbol 
manipulation, this type of theory has been immensely popular as basis for 
computational models of emotion in (simulated) robots. The development of 
computational models based on cognitive appraisal theory advances cognitive 
appraisal theory by refining them (Broekens & DeGroot, 2006; Wehrle & 
Scherer, 2001). Assumptions in the theory need to be made explicit when used in 
a computer program. 
On the one hand, computational modeling is useful to psychology, while on 
the other, as we will see now, psychology is useful to computer science, most 
notably to the field of artificial intelligence. 
Broadly speaking, Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Russell & Norvig, 2003) 
studies how computer programs can solve problems, inspired by how nature 
(including animals, cells, molecules, etc.) solves problems. Intelligence in AI is a 
vast concept. It includes reactive behavior of autonomous robots aimed at solving 
concrete problems (e.g., simulated ants in the traveling salesman problem 
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heuristic mentioned above), adaptive stock-price prediction software, and 
symbolic reasoning processes aimed at transport and military operations planning. 
In AI, a computer program (the mechanism used to simulate nature) is also 
defined in a broad way. A program in AI can range from a collection of 
preprogrammed algorithms that execute planning routines to find optimal 
planning solutions in advance (e.g., planning an optimal route for a transport 
company), to reward-based learning mechanisms that continuously adapt their 
input-output behavior such that the robot they are controlling is able to learn new 
tasks. So, AI is not exclusively about robots, nor is every robot intelligent. AI is 
not exclusively about putting loads of knowledge in a database and programming 
an algorithm that reasons over that knowledge, nor is every knowledge base 
intelligent. And, to do away with another common misconception: the grand aim 
of Artificial Intelligence is not about creating intelligence that is artificial as in 
“fake”, “dumber than real”, and “superficial”, it is about studying the processes 
and mechanisms of intelligence using artificial means, such as digital computers. 
If there is a common grand “creational” aim then this would be to develop 
intelligent, autonomous systems that are able to think and act for themselves, in a 
way that reflects the wit and cunning of natural intelligence.  
Many of the techniques used in AI directly come from other disciplines, such 
as neuroscience, psychology and biology. For example, artificial neural networks 
are based on the work by the neuropsychologist Donald Hebb (1904-1985), who 
described the learning process of neurons in terms of the correlation between pre- 
and post-synaptic firing, now called Hebbian learning. If two neurons are 
connected through a synapse, and both the pre-synaptic neuron A (exciting neuron 
B) and the post-synaptic neuron B (excited by A) activate (fire) at about the same 
time, the strength of the connection is increased, thereby increasing the 
probability that neuron A excites B in the future. This model underlies many of 
the learning mechanisms implemented in artificial neural networks, but also 
underlies connectionist learning models in general. 
Another, more specific, example is the application of Soar in the area of 
computer games research as well as medical image analysis. Soar (originally for 
State, Operator And Result) is a cognitive architecture aimed at problem solving 
through rule matching. It is based upon the idea of a unified theory of cognition, 
proposed by Newell (1990), integrating theories of cognition from many different 
disciplines. Key elements of Soar are its ability to plan for, reason about and act 
upon a situation using rule matching in recursive thought cycles. In every cycle, 
all rules that apply to the current situation activate. The activation strength of a 
rule depends on how well the rule matches the current situation. The most 
strongly activated rules are allowed to propose new “facts”, such as actions that 
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can be executed by the robot controlled by the Soar program. If no rules activate 
based on the current situation, a new “problem” is created, and Soar tries to 
recursively solve this problem. Once the problem is solved, Soar creates a new 
rule for future use, solving that problem more efficiently should it pose itself 
again. This architecture, proposed as a symbolic theory of cognition, has been 
used to build intelligent computer game agents that predict what other agents 
(e.g., the user) will do (Laird, 2001). In the medical domain it is currently being 
used in image analysis software agents: specialized programs responsible for 
analyzing a specific type of information in an image to coordinate, e.g., analysis 
of coronary plaque images (Bovenkamp et al., 2003). 
We have seen that computer science—specifically artificial intelligence—and 
psychology—specifically cognitive psychology—are fields that strongly 
influence each other in many ways. This influence dates from the very early 
1950’s. Alan Turing’s (1950) well-known paper on machine intelligence was 
published in Mind, a psychological and philosophical journal, at about the same 
time as the seminal papers that started the cognitive revolution in psychology. 
Donald Hebb (1949) presented such a clear description of how brains learn that 
this opened up an information processing view of the mind. The mechanisms he 
described have by now been applied in robotics and AI many times.  
Most important to this thesis are the concepts affect and instrumental 
conditioning. Instrumental conditioning underlies Reinforcement Learning (RL) 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998), a method that has proven to be critical for artificial task-
learning. As we have used RL as a model for learning in our research, it is one of 
the cornerstones of our approach. We devote the next section to it. We use 
artificial affect to influence learning. Therefore, affect is the second cornerstone. 
We devote Section 1.4 and Chapter 2 to the latter topic. 
1.3 Learning, Instrumental Conditioning, Reinforcement Learning. 
Animals learn behavior in a variety of ways, such as by imitation, by play, and by 
trial and error. Instrumental conditioning is the more formal name for learning 
behavior by trial and error. For example, rats learn to push buttons or pull levers 
in order to receive food. To learn this behavior they have to try actions before 
they know the result of that action. It could be that pushing a button results in the 
rat being punished. As there is no way to know this beforehand, the rat has to try 
to push the button, at least for the first time. After pushing it, the rat either 
receives food, or some kind of punishment (e.g., a loud sound). The animal learns 
to repeat the actions that lead to food, and avoid actions that lead to punishment. 
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This is called instrumental conditioning (see Anderson, 1995): learning to repeat 
or avoid actions in a certain situation, based on reward and punishment.  
Interestingly, many animals learn to execute sequences of actions. To take our 
rat example, the rat not only learns to push the button for food, it also learns to 
walk to the button after having looked around for the button after having entered 
the specific rat-maze room in which the button is located, etc. By reinforcing a 
certain situation-action couple, not only the last action is influenced, but also the 
sequence of environment-rat interactions leading to that reinforcement. Further, 
this sequence is better learned if it is repeated. So, repetition of a sequence of 
interactions ending with reinforcement enables the rat to learn that sequence 
better and better. The same mechanisms can account for many goal-directed 
behaviors of humans. We rarely do something without having received rewards, 
and by training we become better at it. Sometimes the reward is indirect, such as 
in the case of money. It is straightforward to argue that money has become a 
reinforcer by itself because humans have associated it with more natural 
reinforcers (Anderson, 1995), such as food (restaurants, candy), play (vacation, 
toys) and social interaction (having a drink with friends, going to the theatre or a 
rock concert, distributing candy at school). We learn to work (a long sequence of 
actions) for money, because money gives us naturally reinforcing stuff. 
Finally, discounting is a concept of critical importance: rewards and 
punishments in the future are perceived as less important than in the here and 
now. Animals discount the value of reinforcement, dependent upon the time 
passed between administration of the reinforcement and the action to be 
reinforced. As a result, reinforcement most strongly influences the action 
executed just before receiving the reinforcement.  
In this section we will see that the machine learning concept of Reinforcement 
Learning is a very good model for instrumental conditioning. 
1.3.1 Reinforcement Learning  
Strongly related to instrumental conditioning, there is a form of machine learning 
called Reinforcement Learning. Reinforcement Learning (RL) (Sutton & Barto, 
1998) is a computational framework describing how in an environment 
appropriate actions can be learned purely based on exploration and reinforcement. 
Actions are appropriate if they maximize some signal from the environment, say a 
reward. As such, RL, is a particular computational model of instrumental 
conditioning4. A formal description of RL is the problem of learning a function 
                                                 
4 Dayan (2001) and Kaelbling, Littman and Moore (1996) discuss some of its limitations. 
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that maps a state to an action, such that, given a certain history of state-action 
transitions, for all states this mapping results in an action that yields the highest 
cumulative future reward as predicted by that history of state-action transitions. In 
normal language this means that RL attempts to recognize the best possible action 
in a situation, given a certain amount of experience. 
We have used Reinforcement Learning as a basis for learning in this thesis. 
The main reason for this choice is that RL maps very well to animal task learning 
(instrumental conditioning). The second reason is that RL has proven to be the 
most successful paradigm for the machine learning of tasks composed of multiple 
actions that are not known in advance. Other forms of learning, such as 
supervised learning, need a human observer. RL does not, it learns by trial and 
error, providing a clear benefit: a RL system learns autonomously. This is 
important for, e.g., robot learning. By investigating the relation between RL and 
affect, we hope to advance a well known machine learning paradigm as well as 
shed some light on the potential relation between affect and learning.  
In essence, RL aims at solving the credit assignment problem (Kaelbling, 
Littman & Moore, 1996). That is, how much credit should an action get, based on 
its responsibility for receiving current and future rewards; in other words, how 
should an action in a certain situation be valued given its immediate reward as 
well as all rewards that might follow? Note that from now on we will talk about 
reward when we mean reinforcement. Reward can thus be positive and negative. 
A classical representation of a function that represents a solved credit assignment 
problem is a 2-dimensional table with cells representing the value of all actions in 
all possible states, rows representing states, and columns representing actions 
(Table 1.1). If this table is used for control, i.e., to select actions for execution by 
a simulated animal, the current observed state is used as row entry, and the action 
belonging to the cell with the highest value on that row is selected. For example, 
if the simulated animal would be in state choice (Figure 1.1), the best action to 
perform is left. When the action left is executed a state change occurs, and the 
next state is observed by the simulated animal; food in our case. Now the process 
of action-selection can be repeated. 
 Figure 1.1 The maze solved by the function depicted in 
Table 1.1. The cheese has a reward of +1, while the loud 
sound has a reward of −1. States are called food, choice, 
sound, start for “mouse at cheese”, “mouse at junction”, 
“mouse in sound room”, and “mouse at start”. This is a 
four-state problem. 
 





 Figure 1.2 A state-transition 
diagram for the maze presented in 
Figure 1.1. Arrows denote move 
actions. Probabilities are assumed 
to be equal to 1 (i.e., choosing, for 
example, up always results in the 
state pointed to by the up-arrow). 




Table 1.1 The classical representation of a 
function that solves a specific credit 
assignment problem, in our case food-finding 
in a simple maze (Figure 1.1). The discount 
factor, γ, equals 0.5. So the importance of 
future rewards drops with a factor of 2 for 
every step in between an action and a reward. 
States are called food, choice, sound, start for “mouse at food”, “mouse at junction”, 
“mouse in sound room”, and “mouse at start” respectively. We assume that when the 
mouse arrives at food or sound, it can not exit that place by itself. We further assume that
moving outside the maze does not result in a state change. This table presents the solution
to our four-state problem. 
 left right up down eat 
start 0.125 0.125 0.25 0.125 0 
choice 0.5 −0.5 0.25 0.125 0 
food 0 0 0 0 1 
sound −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 
 At an architectural level, the RL problem can be formally described as 
follows. It consists of a set of states, S, a set of actions, A and a transition function 
]1,0[: →×× SAST defining how the world changes under the influence of 
actions giving the probability T(s, a, s') that action a in state s results in state s', 
where the sum over all s' of T(s, a, s') equals 1. Further, a reward function 
ℜ→× ASR :  and a value function ℜ→SV : are defined. The states S contain 
representations of the world perceived by the agent, such as a start state, a food 
state etc. Note that from now on we use the term agent to refer to a simulated 
animal or robot. The actions A contain all possible actions the agent can execute, 
such as left, right, up, down and eat. The transition function defines the 
probability of ending up in one state, assuming a current state, s and action, a. So, 
the agent’s world is probabilistic5. The reward function defines the reward for a 
certain action, a, when executed in state, s. The value function maps a state, s, to a 
cumulative future reward. So, if an agent knows T and V the optimal next action 
can be selected using: 
                                                 
5 but stationary, i.e., the probabilities do not change (Kaelbling et al., 1996). 














γ , with γ the discount factor (1.1) 
The best action a* is the action with the highest sum of immediate reward R(s, a) 
and value predictions V(s’), over all possible next states s’ resulting from action 
a*, weighted according to their probability of occurrence T(s ,a ,s’). Note that the 
summation in formula (1.1) is needed as in a probabilistic world multiple states s' 
might result from action a. In our example, moving up in state start would be the 
best action, because R(start, up) + 0.5T(start, up, choice)V(choice) = 0 + 
0.5*1*0.5 = 0.25, which is the highest value (we assume that the probability of 
ending up in state choice after executing up in state start equals 1, so in our case 
we only have one possible next state s’ after executing action up in state s). 
However, to select this action we have to know both V(choice) and T(start, up, 
choice). 
Solving the credit assignment problem has thus become a question of learning 
the value function V, together with the transition function T. The main question is, 
how? The short answer is: by trial and error; try actions in states, record the 
received reward and the resulting state, and update both V according to the 
reward, as well as T according to the probability of arriving in that new state. The 












)'()',,(),(max)( γ   (1.2) 
which is equivalent to ( )*)( avalsV ← , with val(a*) the value of action a* 
The formula updates the value for state s with the immediate reward R(s, a) and 
discounted future values V(s’) for all s’ possibly resulting from action a weighted 
according to the probability T(s, a, s’) that transition s s’ occurs due to action a. 
Again, action a is chosen such that it is the best one possible. This enforces 
conversion of values to the highest possible value attainable by the agent. 
By now, many different version of RL exist that all solve the credit 
assignment problem in a slightly different way (for a dated but excellently written 
overview, see Kaelbling et al., 1996). In general there are two different types of 
RL approaches; model-based and model-free. Model-based approaches have (or 
learn) a model of the world that consists of a (probabilistic) state transition 
structure (Figure 1.2). Model-based approaches thus have a function T. The 
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research in Chapter 3 and 4 is based on model-based RL. Model-free approaches 
do not have such a world model. Model-free approaches thus need to learn V in a 
different way, as they do not possess the function T while this function is needed 
for value propagation as described in formula (1.2). The research in Chapter 6 is 
based on model-free RL. 
In the model-free case, V can be learned in the following way. It can be shown 
(Singh, 1993) that the following formula converges to an optimal value function 
V, if a sufficient and unbiased amount of exploration occurs during learning, and 
the learning rate α is gradually decreased from 1 (in the beginning of learning) to 
0 (at the end of learning):  
( ))()'()()( sVsVrsVsV −++← γα , with r the reward (1.3) 
It is quite well possible to intuitively grasp this without proof. If an agent has an 
infinite amount of time to keep trying things in a world, it eventually bumps 
infinitely many times into all possible situations that exist in that world. This 
means that it will see the transitions s s’,s’’,… for all s many times. Every such 
transition updates V(s) a little bit, so together V(s) accumulates the results of all 
these transitions. It correctly estimates the value of s by sampling a representative 
number of transitions resulting from s. So, an agent (or real animal for that matter) 
has to explore—i.e., sample a representative number from all possible interactions 
with the environment—to be able to learn a useful value function. After 
exploration, the agent can use the learned value function to act, i.e., the agent can 
exploit its knowledge. The exploration – exploitation tradeoff is a very important 
issue in Reinforcement Learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Without a good 
mechanism to decide when to explore versus exploit, RL cannot learn an optimal 
value function. 
It is important to note here that there are ways in which an artificial agent can 
learn an optimal interaction model (in terms of maximizing cumulative reward). 
One of these is to let the agent first explore a large amount of time, and then 
switch to an exploitation mode. However, this is not plausible from a natural point 
of view. No animal can afford to purely explore, as this is just too risky. In our 
learning models (Chapter 3 to 6), we take this into account. We have no separate 
exploration – exploitation phases; our agents learn the value and transition 
function while at the same time using these for action selection (called certainty 
equivalence, see Kaebling et al, 1996). Our agents thus assume that their world 
model is a correct estimation of the world they interact with. 
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1.3.2 Reinforcement Learning as a Model for Instrumental Conditioning 
As mentioned before, one of the main reasons for using Reinforcement Learning 
(RL) as learning mechanism in studying the interplay between affect and learning 
is that RL very well models instrumental conditioning. RL models instrumental 
conditioning in at least three important ways. 
 First, it associates rewards with the probability of execution of actions in a 
certain situation, as in instrumental conditioning. The simulated animal learns 
to repeat actions based on an association between reward and action. 
 Second, by repetition the learned association becomes more accurate, and as 
such the probability to execute actions that result in reward becomes larger 
(positive reward) or smaller (no reward, or punishment). 
 Third, the learned value for a situation can influence the execution of actions 
in earlier situations. We thus see that RL provides an answer to how 
sequences of actions can be learned by trial and error: propagate the reward 
through the sequence back to the beginning such that the right amount of 
credit is given to the individual actions in the sequence. 
Recently, the mechanism of Reinforcement Learning has been tied to neural 
substrates involved in instrumental conditioning. For example, there are strong 
links between dopamine brain systems and RL (Dayan & Balleine, 2002; 
Montague, Hyman & Cohen, 2004; Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997). It seems 
that neurons in these regions encode for the RL error signal, i.e., the change to 
the expected value of a situation, ΔV(s). More recently Foster and Wilson (2006) 
showed that awake mice replay in reverse order behavioral sequences that led to a 
food location; a crucial finding for the above mentioned link. It suggests that mice 
can replay sequences backward from the goal location to the start location. This is 
a mechanism that would be needed to speed up value propagation back to the 
beginning, and is highly compatible with the RL concept of eligibility traces 
(Foster & Wilson, 2006). An eligibility trace (for details see Sutton & Barto, 
1998) is a state sequence leading to a certain reward or punishment. In RL, 
eligibility traces can be used to speed up learning. The idea is to update the 
complete sequence based on that reward (such a sequence represents a trace of 
situations that is eligible for the resulting reward). In RL, updating the value of 
states in this trace can be done in any order. In nature, backwards is more 
plausible than forwards for the following reason. Assumed that the brain is a 
connectionist architecture primarily learning by means of Hebbian mechanisms, 
in order for two situation representations to transfer a characteristic (e.g., reward) 
between each other, both have to be active at the same time. If a state sequence is 
replayed backwards, pair-wise activation of two consecutive states, for all states 
in the sequence starting at the end, would in principle suffice to (partly) transfer 
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the reward to the start of the sequence. However, for any other order to get the 
same value propagation result, it would need either massive repetition of activated 
pairs of representations or activation of all pairs at the same time. So, activation of 
the state sequence from the end, back to the beginning seems more efficient than 
any other order6. It is therefore interesting to see that mice seem to indeed replay 
in reverse order the “states” they visited while walking towards the food. 
Finally, animal learning by trial and error closely matches RL in how 
experience of the world is built up: by means of a sufficient number of interaction 
samples to build up the value function. Trials are samples from all possible 
interactions with the environment; errors (rewards) change the value and reward 
functions learned by the animal. If an animal is a good explorer, it will be better at 
finding optimal solutions because it samples more possibilities from the 
environment, therefore the animal’s resulting value function has more chance to 
better estimate the real value function. On the other hand, exploration is risky: if 
you don’t know what the result will be, you could die. Animals that do not 
explore will stick to their current interaction pattern. This means that as long as 
the interaction pattern is appropriate for the environment they are in, they will do 
better than explorers: they don’t waste time exploring useless options while they 
have a good option available. However, as soon as the environment changes, they 
will die because of the useless option and the lack of exploration. To learn a good 
value function, a sufficient amount of exploration is needed. So, also in real life, 
the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation is important. Actually it is much 
more important in real life, as one stupid action can result in death or illness, 
while in a simulated world it only results in a negative reward. A second 
difference is that in real life one can not afford to have a pure exploration phase: 
this would most certainly result in at least one very stupid action, hence death. As 
a result, the exploration – exploitation tradeoff is even more important. Both have 
to be in balance for an agent to survive. In Chapter 3 and 4 we explore to what 
extent artificial affect can be used to control the exploration - exploitation 
tradeoff. We have based these studies on how affect influences learning in 
humans, a topic introduced in the next section, and in more detail in Chapter 2. In 
order to stay consistent with nature, we do not separate exploration - exploitation 
phases. 
Although from this description it seems that RL has been used primarily to 
simulate learning animals, this is not the case. RL has been widely used to learn 
computers to play games (e.g., Tesauro, 1994), to control cars to autonomously 
drive based on visual input (e.g., Krödel & Kuhnert, 2002) and to control robots 
(e.g., Theocharous, Rohanimanesh & Mahadevan, 2001). 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, value propagation in RL is in the same direction, that is, backwards. 
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1.4 Emotion, Affect and Learning 
In this thesis we specifically focus on the influence of affect on learning. Affect 
and emotion are concepts that lack a single concise definition, instead there are 
many (Picard et al., 2004). Therefore we first explain the meaning we will use for 
these terms. In general, the term emotion refers to a set of in animals naturally 
occurring phenomena including motivation, emotional actions such as fight or 
flight behavior and a tendency to act. In most social animals facial expressions are 
also included in the set of phenomena, and—at least in humans—feelings and 
cognitive appraisal are too (see, e.g., Scherer, 2001).  A particular emotional state 
is the activation of a set of instances of these phenomena, e.g., angry involves a 
tendency to fight, a typical facial expression, a typical negative feeling, etc. Time 
is another important aspect in this context. A short term (intense, object directed) 
emotional state is often called an emotion; while a longer term (less intense, non-
object directed) emotional state is referred to as mood. The direction of the 
emotional state, either positive or negative, is referred to as affect (e.g., Russell, 
2003). Affect is often differentiated into two orthogonal (independent) variables: 
valence, a.k.a. pleasure, and arousal (Dreisback & Goschke, 2004; Russell, 
2003). Valence refers to the positive versus negative aspect of an emotional state. 
Arousal refers to an organism’s level of activation during that state, i.e., physical 
readiness. For example, a car that passes you in a dangerous manner on the 
freeway, immediately (time) elicits a strongly negative and highly arousing 
(affect) emotional state that includes the expression of anger and fear, feelings of 
anger and fear, and intense cognitive appraisal about what could have gone 
wrong. On the contrary, learning that one has missed the opportunity to meet an 
old friend involves cognitive appraisal that can negatively influence (affect) a 
person’s mood for a whole day (time), even though the associated emotion is not 
necessarily arousing (affect). Eating a piece of pie is a more positive and 
biochemical example. This is a bodily, emotion-eliciting event resulting in mid-
term moderately-positive affect. Eating pie can make a person happy by, e.g., 
triggering fatty-substance and sugar-receptor cells in the mouth. The resulting 
positive feeling is not of particularly strong intensity and certainly does not 
involve particularly high or low arousal, but might last for several hours. 
We use affect to denote the positiveness versus negativeness of a situation. In 
the studies reported upon in this thesis we ignore the arousal a certain situation 
might bring. As such, positive affect characterizes a situation as good, while 
negative affect characterizes that situation as bad (e.g., Russell, 2003).  
Emotion plays an important role in thinking, and evidence is abundantly 
available. Evidence ranging from philosophy (Griffith, 1999) through cognitive 
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psychology (Frijda, Manstead & Bem, 2000) to cognitive neuroscience (Damasio, 
1994; Davidson, 2000) and behavioral neuroscience (Berridge, 2003; Rolls, 2000) 
shows that emotion is both constructive and destructive for a wide variety of 
behaviors. Normal emotional functioning appears to be necessary for normal 
behavior. 
Emotion7 influences thought and behavior in many ways. Emotion can be a 
motivation for behavior. Emotion is related to the urge to act (e.g., Frijda & 
Mesquita, 2000): run away when in danger, fight when trapped, laugh and play 
when happy. Specific emotions trigger specific behaviors (e.g., fight or flight). 
So, emotion is not only related to the urge to act, some emotions—when strong 
enough—make us really act. 
Emotion and feelings influence how we interpret stimuli, how we evaluate 
thoughts while solving a problem (Damasio, 1996) and how we remember things. 
A person's belief about something is updated according to emotions: the current 
emotion is used as information about the perceived object (Clore & Gasper, 2000; 
Forgas, 2000), and emotion is used to make the belief resistant to change (Frijda 
& Mesquita, 2000). Ergo, emotions are “at the heart of what beliefs are about” 
(Frijda et al., 2000). As shown by the “should I stay or should I go” scenario 
presented earlier in this introduction, we often decide to do something based on 
how that option feels to us. 
Finally, emotion influences information processing in humans; positive affect 
facilitates top-down, “big-picture” heuristic processing while negative affect 
facilitates bottom-up, “stimulus analysis” oriented processing (Ashby, Isen & 
Turken, 1999; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Forgas, 2000; Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005). As 
a result, positive affect relates to a “forest” or goal-oriented look (we interpret 
what we see in the context of our existing knowledge), while negative affect 
relates to a “trees” or exploratory look (we critically examine incoming stimuli as 
they are).  
Several psychological studies support that enhanced learning is related to 
positive affect (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Others show that enhanced learning 
is related to neutral affect (Rose, Futterweit & Jankowski, 1999), or to both 
(Craig, Graesser, Sullins & Gholson, 2004). Although much research is currently 
being carried out, it is not yet clear how affect is related to learning in detail. 
In this thesis we computationally address this issue: in what ways can affect 
influence learning. We do not model categories of emotions nor use emotions as 
                                                 
7 An emotion is different from a feeling. A feeling is in essence your mental representation 
of yourself having the emotion. 
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information in symbolic-like reasoning. So the research goal has not been to 
investigate how agents can reason “emotionally”, such as in the work by Marsella 
and Gratch (2001), or interact emotionally with humans (Heylen et al, 2003). 
1.5 Questions Addressed and Thesis Outline. 
To study the influence of affect on learning, in a Reinforcement Learning setting, 
we first have to evaluate whether affect can be used in this context: we have to 
define affect in a Reinforcement Learning context. In Chapter 2 we define 
artificial affect in detail. In Chapter 3 to 6 we study three different ways in which 
affect can influence learning, where learning in each chapter is modeled using a 
different variation of RL. 
In Chapter 3 we investigate how artificial affect can control exploration 
versus exploitation. As the amount of exploration strongly influences learning 
behavior, and as it has been found (e.g., in the studies mentioned earlier) that 
affect relates to broad (explore) versus narrow information (exploit, goal directed) 
processing, we have investigated how artificial affect can control exploration 
versus exploitation in agents. A simulated “mouse” in a grid-world maze can 
either search for “cheese” (eating cheese is its goal) by trying actions it does not 
know the consequences for (explore), or use its model of the environment it has 
built up so far in an attempt to walk to the cheese by trying actions it thinks it 
knows the consequences for (exploit). We couple artificial affect to exploration 
and exploitation in different ways, according to studies reported by Dreisbach & 
Goschke (2004) and Rose et al. (1999): positive affect increases exploration (and 
negative affect increases exploitation) and vice versa. In RL terms, we use 
artificial affect as meta-learning parameter (see also Doya, 2002) to control 
exploration versus exploitation by dynamically coupling it to the greediness of the 
action-selection function responsible for making this choice (the β parameter of 
the Boltzmann distribution, in our case). A meta-learning parameter is a 
parameter that influences learning, but does not contain information about the task 
to be learned per se, e.g., the choice to explore versus exploit, or the speed with 
which to forget knowledge you had acquired. We use a version of RL that is 
similar to Sarsa (Rummery & Niranjan, 1994; Sutton, 1996). The main findings 
are that (1) both negative affect and positive affect can be beneficial to learning, 
and (2) negative affect seems to be related to less selective decisions while 
positive affect is related to more selective decisions.  
In Chapter 4, we investigate the influence of affect on thought. Instead of 
studying the influence of artificial affect on action-selection in a purely reactive 
agent, we now study the influence of artificial affect on “thought selection” in a 
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more cognitive agent. In our study, we have defined thought as internal 
simulation of potential behavior, according to the Simulation Hypothesis, 
proposed by Hesslow (2002) and Cotterill (2001). This process of simulation uses 
the same brain mechanisms as those used for actual behavior. For example, if I 
consciously think of going home and play games, I, in a sense, go home and do so 
without moving my body. Simulating going home thus enables me to evaluate 
how I feel about going home by triggering the same brain areas and processes that 
would have been triggered if I went home and started playing. This again enables 
me to decide whether I should do it or not, showing that simulation could be 
useful for decision making and action selection. We have developed a variation to 
the model-based RL paradigm, called Hierarchical State Reinforcement Learning, 
which enables us to study this question. We computationally investigate, again 
using a grid-world setup, the influence on learning efficiency when artificial 
affect controls the amount of internal simulation. Artificial affect is dynamically 
coupled to the greediness of the simulation-selection mechanism responsible for 
selecting potential actions for internal simulation. As such we model affective 
modulation of the amount of thought during a learning process. The main findings 
are that (1) internal simulation has an adaptive benefit and (2) affective control 
reduces the amount of simulation needed for this benefit. This is specifically the 
case if positive affect decreases the amount of simulation towards simulating the 
best potential next action, while negative affect increases the amount of 
simulation towards simulating all potential next actions. Thus, agents “feeling 
positive” can think ahead in a narrow sense and free-up working memory 
resources, while agents “feeling negative” are better off thinking ahead in a broad 
sense and maximize usage of working memory.  
In Chapter 5 we discuss related and future work in the context of the studies 
presented in Chapter 3 and 4. 
In Chapter 6, we investigate how affect can be used to influence behavior of 
others. Emotion and affect are important social phenomena. One way in which 
affect is important socially is that it enables effective parenting. Affect 
communicated by a parent can be seen as a reinforcement signal to a child. In this 
chapter we investigate the influence of affect communicated through facial 
expressions by a human observer on learning behavior of a simulated “child”. We 
thus investigate the effect of parenting a simulated robot using affective 
communication. Two important differences exist between the study in this chapter 
and those in Chapters 3 and 4. First, we use a continuous (non-discrete) grid-
world setup, use real-time interaction between the robot and the human “parent”, 
and use a specifically developed neural-network approach to Reinforcement 
Learning applicable to this context. This has been done to match real-world 
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learning problems more closely. Second, we use affect in a different way. In 
Chapter 3 and 4, we use artificial affect as defined in Chapter 2; i.e., a long-term 
signal originating from the simulated agent, used by the simulated agent to control 
its own learning-parameters. In contrast, in the experiments reported in Chapter 6, 
we use affect as a short-term signal related to emotion, originating from an 
observing “parent” agent, used to influence the reinforcement signal received by 
the simulated robot. The main finding is that the simulated robot indeed learns to 
solve its task significantly faster (measured quantitatively) when it is allowed to 
use the social reinforcement signal from the human observer. As such, this 
chapter presents objective support for the viability and potential of human-
mediated robot-learning.  
In Chapter 7, we take a theoretical approach towards computational modeling 
of emotion. We present a formal way in which emotion theories can be described 
and compared with the computational models based upon them. We apply this 
formal notation to cognitive appraisal theory, a family of cognitive theories of 
emotion, and show how the formal notation can help to advance appraisal theory 
and help to evaluate computational models based on cognitive appraisal theory: 
the main contributions of this chapter. Although this chapter is quite different 
from the others, it fits within the general approach: that is, the use of 
computational models to evaluate emotion theories.  
1.6 Publications 
A revised version of Chapter 3 has been published in (Broekens, Kosters & 
Verbeek, 2007). Parts of Chapter 4 have already been published earlier (Broekens, 
2005; Broekens & Verbeek, 2005), while Chapter 4 is a slightly revised version of 
the article by Broekens, Kosters & Verbeek (in press). Chapter 6 has been 
published in (Broekens & Haazebroek, 2007), while an extended and revised 
version has been published as a book chapter in (Broekens, 2007). Earlier 
versions of the work in Chapter 7 have been published (Broekens & DeGroot, 
2004c; Broekens & DeGroot, 2006), while a revised version of Chapter 7 is 
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In this chapter we present the rationale for the concept of emotion used in the 
studies reported upon in Chapter 3 and 4, that is, positive and negative affect. We 
first review different findings on the interplay between emotion and cognition, 
after which we describe several ways in which affect influences learning, the 
main phenomenon investigated computationally in this thesis. Finally we 
introduce a measure for artificial affect, and argue for its validity in the context of 
Reinforcement Learning. 
2.1 Emotion and Behavior Regulation 
Emotion influences thought and behavior. For example, at the neurological level, 
malfunction of certain brain areas not only destroys or diminishes the capacity to 
have (or express) certain emotions, but also has a similar effect on the capacity to 
make sound decisions (Damasio, 1994) as well as on the capacity to learn new 
behavior (Berridge, 2003). These findings indicate that these brain areas are 
linked to emotions as well as “classical” cognitive and instrumental learning 
phenomena. 
Emotion is related to the regulation of adaptive behavior and to information 
processing. Emotions can be defined as states elicited by rewards and 
punishments (Rolls, 2000). Behavioral evidence suggests that the ability to have 
sensations of pleasure and pain is strongly connected to basic mechanisms of 
learning and decision-making (Berridge, 2003; Cohen & Blum, 2002). These 
studies directly relate emotion to Reinforcement Learning. Behavioral 
neuroscience teaches us that positive emotions reinforce behavior while negative 
emotions extinguish behavior, so at this level of information processing one type 
of emotional regulation of behavior has already been established, i.e., approach 
(rewarded behavior) versus avoidance (punished behavior). 
At the level of cognition, emotion plays a role in the regulation of the amount 
of information processing. For instance, Scherer (2001) argues that emotion is 
related to the continuous checking of the environment for important stimuli. More 
resources are allocated to further evaluate the implications of an event, only if the 
stimulus appears important enough. Furthermore, in the work of Forgas (2000) 
the relation between emotion and information processing strategy is made 
explicit: the influence of mood on thinking depends on the information processing 
strategy used.  
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Emotion also regulates behavior of others. Obvious in human development, 
expression (and subsequent recognition) of emotion is important to communicate 
(dis)approval of the actions of others. This is typically important in parent-child 
relations. Parents use emotional expression to guide behavior of infants. 
Emotional interaction is essential for learning. Striking examples are children 
with an autistic spectrum disorder, typically characterized by a restricted 
repertoire of behaviors and interests, as well as social and communicative 
impairments such as difficulty in joint attention, difficulty recognizing and 
expressing emotion, and lacking of a social smile (for review see Charman & 
Baird, 2002). Apparently, children suffering from this disorder have both a 
difficulty in building up a large set of complex behaviors and a difficulty 
understanding emotional expressions and giving the correct social responses to 
these. This disorder provides a clear example of the interplay between learning 
behaviors and the ability to process emotional cues 
To summarize, emotion can be produced by low-level mechanisms of reward 
and punishment, and can influence information processing. As affect is a useful 
abstraction of emotion (see Section 1.4), these aspects inspired us to study (1) 
how artificial affect can result from an artificial adaptive agent’s reinforcement 
signal, and (2) subsequently influence information processing in a way 
compatible with the psychological literature on affect and learning. In the next 
section we present some of the psychological findings related to the latter. In 
Section 2.3 we introduce the measure of artificial affect we have used in the 
studies reported upon in Chapter 3 and 4. 
2.2 Learning is Influenced by Positive and Negative Affect 
The influence of affect on learning is typically studied with the following 
psychological experiment. Take two groups, one control group and one 
experimental condition group. Induce affect (positive or negative) into the 
subjects belonging to the experimental condition group by showing them 
unanticipated pleasant images or giving them small unanticipated rewards, or 
violent, ugly images and punishment if negative affect is to be induced in the 
subject. Measure the subjects’ affect. Let the two groups do a cognitive task. 
Finally, compare the performance results between both groups. If the 
experimental condition group performs better, affect induction (positive or 
negative change in a subject’s affect due to, e.g., presented images) is assumed to 
be responsible for this effect, ergo; affect influences the execution of the cognitive 
task. 
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Some studies find that non-positive affect enhances learning. For instance, 
Rose, Futterweit and Jankowski (1999) found that when babies aged 7 - 9 months 
were measured on an attention and learning task, neutral affect correlated with 
faster learning. Attention mediated this influence. Neutral affect related to more 
diverse attention, i.e., the babies’ attention was “exploratory”, and both neutral 
affect and diverse attention related to faster learning. Positive affect resulted in 
the opposite of neutral affect (i.e., slower learning and “less exploratory” 
attention). This relation suggests that positive affect relates to exploitation and 
neutral affect relates to exploration. Additionally, Hecker and von Meiser (2005) 
suggest that attention is more evenly spread when in a negative mood. This could 
indicate that negative affect is related to exploration. 
Interestingly, other studies suggest an inverse relation. For instance, 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) found that mild increases in positive affect related 
to more flexible behavior but also to more distractible behavior. The authors used 
an attention task, in which human subjects had to switch between two different 
“button press” tasks. In such tasks a subject has to repeatedly press a button A or 
a button B based on some criteria in a complex stimulus. After some trials, the 
task is switched, by changing several stimulus characteristics. The authors 
measured the average reaction time of the subjects’ button-press just before and 
just after the task switch. The authors found that increased positive but not neutral 
or increased negative affect relates to decreased task switch cost, as measured by 
the difference between pre-switch reaction time and post-switch reaction time. So, 
it seems that in this study positive affect facilitated a form of exploration, as it 
helped to remove the bias towards solving the old task when the new task had to 
be solved instead. 
Combined, these results suggest that both positive and negative affective 
states can help learning but perhaps at different phases during the process, a point 
explicitly made by Craig et al. (2004). Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis address 
exactly this issue. We use simulated adaptive agents to study the influence of 
artificial affect on learning performance, by controlling several learning 
parameters. In Chapter 3 artificial affect controls the amount of exploration versus 
exploitation used by the agent: affect controls the greediness of the action-
selection mechanisms. In Chapter 4 artificial affect controls the greediness of its 
thoughts. In the latter study, an agent can internally simulate a number of 
interactions before actually executing these. Internal simulation can increase or 
decrease the likelihood of choosing a particular action, as it biases the value of the 
next actions (much like a person who imagines the potential results of a certain 
action, and who decides not to do it because of the imagined consequences).  
Some of these anticipated possibilities seem good, others do not. Affect is used to 
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control the extent to which the selection of these simulated interactions is biased 
towards simulating only the positive ones (narrow, greedy “optimistic” thoughts) 
or towards simulating all anticipated possibilities (broad, evenly distributed 
thoughts). 
2.3 Artificial Affect 
To model the influence of affect on learning, we first need to model affect in a 
psychologically plausible way. Our agent learns based on Reinforcement 
Learning, so at every step it receives some reward r. Here we explain how our 
agent’s artificial affect is linked to this reward r. 
Two issues regarding affect induction are particularly important. First, in 
studies that measure the influence of affect on cognition, affect relates more to 
long-term mood than to short-term emotion. Affect is usually induced before or 
during the experiment aiming at a continued, moderate effect instead of short-
lived intense emotion-like effect (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Forgas, 2000; 
Rose et al., 1998). Second, the method of affect induction (explained earlier) is 
compatible with the method used for the administration of reward in 
Reinforcement Learning. Affect is usually induced by giving subjects small 
unanticipated rewards (Ashby et al., 1999; Custers & Aarts, 2005). The fact that 
these rewards are unanticipated is important, as the reinforcement signal in RL 
only exists if there is a difference between predicted and received reward. 
Predicted rewards thus have the same effect as no reward. It seems that reward 
and affect follow the same rule: if it’s predicted it isn’t important.  
The formula we use for artificial affect is:  
ltarltarltarstarp ffrre σσ 2))(( −−=   (2.1) 
Here, ep is the measure for affect. If ep=0, we assume this means negative1 affect, 
if ep=1 we assume this means positive affect. The short-term running-average 
reinforcement signal, starr , with star defining the window size in steps, is the 
quicker-changing average based on the agent’s reward, r, as unit of measurement 
at every step. The long-term running-average reinforcement signal, ltarr , with ltar 
                                                 
1  Low and high values of ep should not be interpreted as depressed and elated 
respectively. We assume that we model moderate levels of positive and negative affect, as 
induced by typical psychological affect-induction studies. Clinical depression and 
elatedness have different influences on behavior that are out of scope, and are too 
complex for our current modeling approach. 
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again defining the window size in steps, is the slower-changing average taking 
rstar as unit of measurement every step. The standard deviation of rstar over that 
same long-term period ltar is denoted by σltar, and f is a multiplication factor 
defining the sensibility of the measure. 
Obviously, artificial affect behaves differently for different values of f, ltar 
and star. In general, for ltarr  to be a good estimate of what the agent is “used to”, 
ltar must be considerably larger than star. In the studies presented we have varied 
ltar, star and f across a wide range of values. 
Our measure for artificial affect reflects the two issues mentioned above. 
First, starr  uses reinforcement signal averages, reflecting the continued effect of 
affect induction related to mood not emotion. Second, our measure compares the 
first average starr  with the second longer-term average ltarr . As the first, short-
term average, reacts quicker to changes in the reward signal than the second, 
long-term average, a comparison between the two yields a measure for how well 
the agent is doing compared to what it is used to (cf. Schweighofer & Doya, 
2003). If the environment and the agent’s behavior in that environment do not 
change, ep converges to a neutral value of 0.5. This reflects the fact that 
anticipated rewards do not influence affect. 
By defining artificial affect purely in terms of rewards and punishments, one 
could argue that we interpret affect in a too narrow sense, thereby hollowing out 
the concept. We do not agree. Our meaning of artificial affect is still the same as 
the meaning of affect: it defines the goodness/badness of a situation for the agent. 
Further, it is quite compatible with certain theories of emotion (e.g., Rolls, 2000) 
that emphasize that emotion is fundamentally grounded in (the 
deprivation/expectancy of) reward and punishment. Finally, as rewards and 
punishments define what behavior an artificial agent should pursue and avoid, 
reinforcement is the definition of good and bad for such agents. We therefore 
believe our measure for artificial affect is firmly grounded. 
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Recent studies show that affect influences and regulates learning. We report on 
a computational study investigating this. We simulate affect in a probabilistic 
learning agent and dynamically couple affect to its action-selection mechanism, 
effectively controlling exploration versus exploitation behavior. The agent’s 
performance on two types of learning problems is measured. The first consists of 
learning to cope with two alternating goals. The second consists of learning to 
prefer a later larger reward (global optimum) to an earlier smaller one (local 
optimum). Results show that, compared to the non-affective control condition, 
coupling positive affect to exploitation and negative affect to exploration has 
several important benefits. In the Alternating-Goal task, it significantly reduces 
the agent’s “goal-switch search peak”. The agent finds its new goal faster. In the 
second task, artificial affect facilitates convergence to a global instead of a local 
optimum, while permitting to exploit that local optimum. Our results illuminate 
the process of affective influence on learning, and furthermore show that both 
negative affect and positive affect can be beneficial to learning. Further, our 
results provide evidence for the idea that negative affect is related to less selective 
decisions while positive affect is related to more selective decisions. 
3.1 Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter 1 and 2, emotions influence thought and behavior in 
many ways. In this chapter we focus on the influence of affect on learning and 
adaptation. The main question we address here is: how is an agent’s learning 
performance influenced if artificial affect is used to control exploration versus 
exploitation. Based on findings from the affect-cognition literature (Craig, 
Graesser, Sullins & Gholson, 2004; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Rose, Futterweit 
& Jankowski, 1999) as discussed in Chapter 2, we hypothesize two types of 
relations between affect and exploration. The first type relates positive affect to 
exploitation, and negative affect to exploration. The second type uses the inverse 
relation of the first type, i.e., positive affect relates to exploration while negative 
affect relates to exploitation. We contrast these two dynamic settings to a non-
affective control group of agents that use a static amount of exploration. 
We investigate the relation between affect and learning with a self-adaptive 
agent in a simulated grid world. The agent acts in the grid world—in our case a 
simulated maze that represents a psychological task—and builds a model of that 
world based on perception of its surroundings and received rewards. Our agent 
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autonomously influences its action-selection mechanism—the agent’s mechanism 
that proposes next actions based on the learned model. The agent uses artificial 
affect, as defined in Chapter 2, to control the randomness of action selection. This 
enables the agent to autonomously vary between exploration and exploitation. 
Our agent learns (adapts) using a simple form of Reinforcement Learning. 
The agent learns by constructing a Markov Decision Process (MDP), of which the 
state-value pairs are learned using a mechanism based on model-based 
Reinforcement Learning (Kaelbling, Littman & Moore, 1996). We investigate the 
hypothesized relations between affect and exploration using two different learning 
tasks (modeled as discrete grid worlds). In the first task the agent has to cope with 
a sudden switch from an old goal in one arm of a two-armed maze to a new goal 
in the other arm. We call this task the Alternating-Goal task. The second task 
consists of learning to prefer a later larger reward (global optimum) to an earlier 
smaller one (local optimum). We call the second task the “Candy task”; candy 
represents the local optimum being closest to the agent’s starting position, while 
food represents the global optimum being farther away from its starting position. 
From a learning and adaptation point of view, these tasks represent two 
significant problems for an agent. The Alternating-Goal task exposes an agent to a 
changing set of goals. The agent has to modify its behavior in order to reflect a 
change in this set of goals. It has to be flexible enough to give up on an old goal 
and learn a new one, while at the same time it has to be persistent enough to 
continue trying an active goal in order to actually learn the path to the goal 
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). In other words, to cope with alternating goals, the 
agent has to decide when to explore its environment and when to exploit its 
knowledge; a.k.a. the exploration-exploitation problem or tradeoff (Kaelbling, 
Littman, & Moore, 1996). In our task, failure to solve this problem results in huge 
goal-switch cost (if the agent does not explore the environment after the goal-
switch has taken place) and/or slow/unstable convergence (if, after exploration, 
the agent does not exploit its learned new model of the environment).  
The Candy task represents searching for a global optimum, while exploiting a 
newly found local optimum. This ability is important for adaptive agents as it 
enables them to survive with the knowledge they have, while trying to find better 
alternatives. Failure to do so results in getting stuck in local optima or slow 
convergence. This again represents a tradeoff between persistence and flexibility, 
but different from the tradeoff in the first task. Now, the agent has to 
autonomously decide that the current goal might not be good enough and search 
for a better goal. In contrast, in the previous task the old goal attractor (high 
reward) is removed and the agent should react to this by searching for a new goal. 
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In this study we use artificial affect as defined in Chapter 2, that is, artificial 
affect is a measure for how well the agent is doing compared to what it is used to, 
based on an analysis of the difference between a long-term and a short-term 
reinforcement signal average. In the next section we explain our experimental 
method, i.e., how we implemented the two different relations between affect and 
action selection mentioned earlier, the grid-world setup, the tasks, the agent’s 
learning mechanism and our experimental setup. In Section 3.3 we present 
experimental results. Section 3.4 discusses these results in a broader context. 
3.2 Method  
To investigate the influence of affect-controlled exploration, we did experiments 
in two different simulated mazes. Each maze represents a task, and we compared 
affect-controlled dynamic exploration to several control conditions with static 
amounts of exploration. 
3.2.1 Learning Environment. 
The first task is a two-armed maze with a potential goal at the end of each arm 
(Figure 3.1a). This maze is used for the Alternating-Goal task, i.e., coping with 
two alternating goals: find food or find water (only one goal is active during an 
individual trial, goal reward r = +2.0). The second maze has two active goal 
locations (Figure 3.1b). The nearest goal location is the location of the candy (i.e., 
a location with a reward r = +0.25), while the farthest goal location is the food 
location (r = +1.0). This maze is used for the Candy task. The walls in the mazes 
are “lava” patches, on which the agent can walk, but is discouraged to do so by a 
negative reinforcement (r = −1.0). 
 Figure 3.1. Mazes used in the experiments; (a) 
the Alternating-Goal task, (b) the Candy task; the 
‘s’ denotes the agent’s starting position, ‘f’ is food,
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 Figure 3.2. Example of a Markov Decision 
Process. Nodes are agent-environment states. 
Edges are actions with the probability p that 
executing the action results in the state to which 
the edge points. Nodes contain rewards (r; local 
reinforcement) and values (v; future 
reinforcement). In this example γ=1 (see text). 
The agent learns by acting in the maze and by perceiving its direct 
environment using an 8-neighbor and center metric (i.e., it senses its eight 
neighboring locations and the location it is at). An agent that arrives at a goal 
location is again placed at its starting location. Agents learn a probabilistic model 
of the actions and their values possible in the world. Mathematical details of this 
process follow; however, the most important part of our method is explained in 
Section 3.2.2. Agents start with an empty model of the world and construct a 
Markov Decision Process (MDP) as usual (i.e., a perceived stimulus is a state s in 
the MDP, and an action a leading from state s1 to s2 is an edge in the MDP; see 
Figure 3.2; for details see Sutton & Barto, 1998). The agent counts how often it 
has seen a certain state s, N(s). It uses this statistic to learn the value function, V(s) 
(comparable to model-based Reinforcement Learning, see, e.g., Kaelbling et al., 
1996). This function learns to predict a cumulative future reward for every 
observed state. This V(s) is learned in the following way. A reward function, R(s), 
learns to predict the local reward of a state: 
))(()()( sRrsRsR −⋅+← α   (3.1) 



























)( γ   (3.2) 
So, a state s has two reinforcement-related properties: a learned reward value R(s) 
and a value V(s) that incorporates predicted future reward. The R(s) value 
converges to the local reward for state s with a speed proportional to the learning 
rate α. The final value of s, V(s), is updated based on R(s) and the weighted 
predicted rewards of the next states reachable by actions ai. In Reinforcement 
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Learning, the discount factor γ defines how important future versus current 
reward is in the construction of the value function, V(s). If the discount factor, γ, 
is equal to 1, future reward is important (no discount), while γ = 0 means that only 
local reward is important for the construction of the value of a state as expressed 
by V(s). In the Alternating-Goal task the learning rate α and discount factor γ are 
respectively 1.0 and 0.7, and in the Candy task respectively 1.0 and 0.8. 
3.2.2 Modeling Action Selection. 
Most relevant to the current study is that our agent uses the Boltzmann 
distribution to select actions based on learned values of predicted next states. This 
function is often used in Reinforcement Learning and is particularly useful as it 




















β   (3.3) 
Here, p(a) is the probability that the agent chooses action a, and V(sa) is the value 
of a next state predicted by action a. |A| is the size of the set A containing the 
agent’s potential actions 1 . Importantly, the inverse temperature parameter β 
determines the randomness of the distribution. The larger the β  the more this 
distribution adopts a greedy selection strategy (thus little variation in deciding 
what action to perform in a certain state). If β is zero the distribution function 
adopts a uniform random selection strategy, regardless of the predicted reward 
values (thus high variation in deciding what next action to perform in a certain 
state). 
De facto, the β parameter can be used to vary the adaptive agent’s processing 
strategy between exploration and exploitation. Note that we define exploration as 
generating new learning experiences by selecting actions that are non-optimal 
according to the current model the agent has learned, while exploitation is defined 
as selecting optimal actions according to the currently learned model. Therefore, 
if we assume, for simplicity, that the model is a tree with the agent’s starting state 
as root and edges as different actions to different next states, exploration 
generates different paths through the tree at different runs, while exploitation 
                                                 
1 Note that for notational simplicity we assume that an action in one state leads to a 
determined next state, i.e., the world is deterministic and completely observable. However, 
our first world is not deterministic as we introduce a for the agent non-predictable goal-
switch.   
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retries the same paths at different runs. In a lazy value propagation mechanism as 
ours, exploration is needed to find solutions, while exploitation is needed to 
internalize solutions. Exploitation thus models animal learning by repetition, 
while exploration models animal search. 
Key in our study is that our agent uses its artificial affect ep to control its β 
parameter. Affect directly and dynamically controls exploration versus 
exploitation. This approach is compatible with viewing emotion as a mechanism 
for meta-learning (Doya, 2000; Doya, 2002; Schweighofer & Doya, 2003). 
3.2.3 Type-A: Positive Affect Relates to Exploitation 
To investigate how affect can influence exploration versus exploitation, we 
hypothesize the following two relations. First, type-A agents model positive affect 
related to increased exploitation: 
minminmax )( ββββ +−×= pe   (3.4) 
If affect ep increases to 1, β increases towards βmax and as ep decreases to 0, β 
consequently decreases towards βmin. So positive affect results in more 
exploitation, while neutral and negative affect results in more exploration, as 
suggested by the study by Rose et al. (1999), detailed in Chapter 2. This is also 
compatible with the idea that positive mood relates to top-down processing 
(Gasper & Clore, 2002), i.e., in our case to the agent using its learned model to 
control its behavior. A selective mode of action selection uses this model to drive 
behavior, while a less selective mode could be said to use more diverse behaviors 
(whether or not this also models bottom-up processing is unclear). 
3.2.4 Type-B: Negative Affect Relates to Exploitation 
The second relation is the inverse of the first one. Type-B agents thus model 
positive affect related to increased exploration. Positive affect favors detaching 
actual behavior from existing goals (as suggested by the results of the study by 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004): 
minminmax )()1( ββββ +−×−= pe   (3.5) 
As affect ep increases to 1, β decreases towards βmin and as ep decreases to 0, β 
consequently increases towards βmax. So, positive affect results in more 
exploration, while negative affect results in more exploitation. 
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Of course, cognitive set-switching and attention are not equivalent to learning. 
Both are a precursor to learning, specifically explorative learning. Divided 
attention and flexible set-switching enable an individual to faster react to novel 
situations by favoring processing of many external stimuli. So, in the study by 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) positive affect facilitated exploration, as it helped 
to remove bias towards solving the old task thereby enabling the subject to faster 
adapt to the new task. However, in the study by Rose, Futterweit and Jankowski 
(1999) neutral affect facilitated exploration as it related to defocused attention. 
3.2.5 Experimental Procedure 
To investigate the influence of affect-controlled exploration, our experiments are 
repeated with agents of type-A and type-B as well as a control condition of agents 
that use static levels of exploration versus exploitation (fixed β). In the 
Alternating-Goal task agents first have to learn goal one (food). After 200 trials 
the reinforcement for food is set at r = 0.0, while the reinforcement for water is 
set at r = +2.0. The water is now the active goal location (so an agent is only reset 
at its starting location if it reaches the water). This reflects a task-switch, of which 
the agent is unaware. It has to search for the new goal location. After 200 trials, 
the situation is set back; i.e., food becomes the active goal. This is repeated 2 
times resulting in 5 phases, i.e., initial learning of food goal (phase 0), then water 
(phase 1), food (2), water (3), and finally food (4). This (5 phases, a total of 1000 
trials) represents 1 run. We repeated runs to reach sufficient statistical power. All 
Alternating-Goal task results are based on 800 runs, while Candy task results are 
based on 400 runs. During a run, we measured the number of steps needed to get 
to the goal (steps needed to end one trial), resulting in a learning curve when 
averaged over the number of runs. We also measured the average β (resulting in 
an “exploration-exploitation” curve), and we measured the quality of life (QOL) 
of the agent (measured as the sum of the rewards received during one trial). The 
problem for the agent is to exploit the goal but at the same time “survive” a goal 
switch, i.e., keep the switch-cost as low as possible. So, the learning curve of the 
trials just after the task-switch indicate how flexible the agent is.  
The setup of the Candy task experiment is simpler, and we measured the same 
(steps, β and QOL). The agent has to learn to optimize reward in the Candy maze. 
The problem for the agent is to (1) exploit the local reward (candy), but at the 
same time (2) explore and then exploit the global reward (food). This relates to 
opportunism, an important ability that should be provided by an action-selection 
mechanism (Tyrell, 1993). Average QOL curves will thus show to what extent an 
agent has learned to exploit the global reward. 
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Our independent variable is the type of exploration-exploitation control. We 
have several different settings of type-A (“dyn” in Figure 3.3-3.11) and type-B 
(“dyn inv” in Figure 3.3-3.11) affect-controlled exploration. For example, “AG 
dyn 3-6” means that the agent was tested in the Alternating-Goal task using affect 
controlled exploration of type-A (positive affect relates to exploitation) with 
exploration-exploitation varying respectively between βmin=3 and βmax=6 (see also 
Figure 3.3). The artificial affect parameters star and ltar defining the short-term 
period and the long-term period over which artificial affect is measured were set 
at 50 and 375 steps respectively. As a control condition we used agents with 
different static amounts of exploration (“static” in Figure 3.3-3.11). High static β 
values model low exploration and high exploitation while low values denote high 
exploration and low exploitation. The legend of Figure 3.7 shows all different 
agents used in the Alternating-Goal task. Figures 3.3-3.6 show relevant subsets of 
these agents. The legends of Figures 3.8-3.11 show all agents used in the Candy 
task, excluding static agents with β=5 and β=7. The results from these two agents 
did not add anything to the analysis and are therefore omitted. 
3.3 Results 
We now discuss the results of the experiments. A discussion in a broader context 
is presented in Section 3.4. 
3.3.1 Experiment 1: Alternating-Goal Task 
Our main finding is that type-A (positive affect relates to exploitation, negative to 
exploration) results in the lowest switch cost between different goals, as measured 
by the number of steps taken at the trial in which the goal switch is made (Figure 
3.7). This is an important adaptation benefit. As shown, all goal-switch peaks 
(phases 1-4) of the 4 variations of type-A (i.e., dotted lines labeled AG dyn 3-6, 3-
7, 3-9 and 2-8) are smaller than the peaks of the control (straight lines labeled AG 
static 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and type-B (i.e., striped lines labeled AG dyn inv 3-6, 3-7, 
3-9 and 4-9). Initial learning (phase 0) is marginally influenced by affective 
feedback and by static β settings (Figure not shown). Closer investigation of the 
first goal switch (trial 200; phase 1; Figure 3.4) shows that the trials just after the 
goal-switch also benefit considerably from type-A. When we computed for all 
settings an average peak for trail 200, 201 and 202 together, and compared these 
averages statistically, we found that type-A performs significantly better (p<0.001 
for all comparisons, Mann-Whitney, n=800). Closer investigation of the fourth 
goal-switch (trial 800, phase 4; Figure 3.5), reveals a different picture. Only the 
trial in which the goal is switched benefits significantly from type-A (p<0.001 for 
all comparisons except those mentioned shortly, Mann-Whitney, n=800). 
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Comparison between type-A (AG dyn 3-6, 3-7 and 3-9) and AG static β=6 
showed significant smaller peaks for type-A with p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.01 
respectively. So it seems that a high static amount of exploration performs slightly 
better at later goal switches but worse at earlier goal-switches as compared to 
affective control over exploration. One reason for this is that the agent has built 
up a very good model of both arms of the maze in these later phases. This means 
that in later phases, less exploration is needed anyway, because the agent only 
needs to relearn to take the right choice at the T-junction, but not learn the new 
arm in the maze. This limits the potential gain of affective control. This 
explanation is supported by the peak curves in Figure 3.7. Here, higher β values 
perform worse than lower at the peaks of earlier phases but better at the peaks of 
later phases. Note that for the first phase, this is also true, but as we plot only the 
first trial after the goals-switch in Figure 3.7 this is not shown (it is shown in 
Figure 3.4, where we detail the peak of the first phase, high β values show higher 
peaks than do low β values). 
All other comparisons between peaks revealed significantly (p<0.001) smaller 
peaks for type-A. This effect is most clearly shown for the peaks of phase 3 and 4, 
where the peak-height difference between type-A peaks and static peaks is a 
factor 1.25 to 2. This means that the type-A model of affective control of action 
selection can result in up to a 2-fold decrease of search investment needed to find 
a new goal. As expected, the smallest difference between control and type-A is 
when β is small (3 or 4) in the control condition (small β = much exploration = 
less tied to old goal). However, small β’s have a classical downside: less 
convergence (Figure 3.6). The agent is less able to exploit its model of the world 
and thus does not learn the solution well, while type-A curves in Figure 3.6 show 
that the agent does converge to the minimum number of steps needed to get to the 
goal (i.e., 4 steps). 
For completeness we show the β curves for the complete phase 1 of the 
control group agents, one type-A agent and one type-B agent (Figure 3.3). These 
curves confirm the expected β dynamics. For type-A, the goal switch induces high 
exploration (β  near βmin) due to the lack of reinforcement (“it is going worse than 
expected”), after which β quickly moves up to βmax, and then decays to average. 
For type-B this behavior is exactly the opposite. 
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 Figure 3.3. Alternating-
Goal task; plot of the mean 
Boltzmann β for phase 1 
(n=800). High β represents 
exploitation, low β
represents exploration. The 
values of β for three static 
and two dynamic agents 
are shown. In all graphs, 
the trials are on x-axis, and 
means are based on the 5-
95% percentile. Here, 
mean β is on the y-axis. 
 
 Figure 3.4. Alternating-
Goal task; mean learning 
curves for phase 1 peak 
(n=800). The mean number 
of steps (y-axis) needed to 
find the goal is plotted per 
trial for two static, two 
dynamic and two inverse-
dynamic agents (see text 
for explanation). 
 Figure 3.5. Alternating-
Goal task; mean learning 
curves for phase 4 peak 
(n=800). The mean number 
of steps (y-axis) needed to 
find the goal is plotted per 
trial for two static, two 
dynamic and two inverse-
dynamic agents (see text 
for explanation). 
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 Figure 3.6. Alternating-
Goal task; convergence 
plots of all learning phases 
(n=800), phases start at 0, 
200, etc. 800. The mean 
number of steps (y-axis) 
needed to find the goal is 
plotted per trial for two 
static, two dynamic and two 
inverse-dynamic agents 
(see text for explanation). 
 
 Figure 3.7. Alternating-
Goal task; mean peaks of 
phases 0 to 4 (steps 
needed at respectively trail 
0, 200, 400, 600 end 800) 
(n=800). Phase is on x-axis
(only the integers); mean 
number of steps is on y-
axis. The graph shows an 
overview for all agents of 
the mean number of steps 
needed to find the goal at 
the goal switch. 
3.3.2 Experiment 2: Candy Task 
Type-A agents have a considerable adaptation benefit compared to both control 
and type-B agents as shown by the following. In general, type-A agents have the 
same speed of finding the candy as exploiting agents (agents with a high static β), 
as shown by the learning curves of the complete task (Figure 3.8) and by the 
detailed learning curves of the start of the Candy task (Figure 3.10). In both 
figures the learning curves of β=6, and β=10 and dyn 2-8 overlap considerably. 
Interestingly, the quality of life curves show that in the beginning the QOL of the 
type-A agent quickly converges to the local optimum (candy, 0.25) comparable to 
that of the high β control agent (Figure 3.11, left “knee”). At the end of the task 
(later trials) the QOL of the type-A agent steadily increases towards the global 
optimum (food, +1.0; Figure 3.9). This shows that type-A affective feedback 
helps to first exploit a local optimum, while at a later stage explore for and exploit 
a global optimum. This is a major adaptation benefit resulting from type-A 
affective control of exploration. A playful way to think about this, is that the 
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agent “gets bored” with the local optimum and as a result starts to search for other 
things, thereby increasing the chance of finding the global optimum.  
The control agent with β = 4 does converge to the global optimum just like the 
type-A agent (Figure 3.9). However, due to continuous high randomness in this 
agents action-selection mechanism this agent consistently needs more steps to get 
to that global optimum as compared to the type-A agent (Figure 3.8). Also due to 
this high randomness this agent does not learn the local optimum consistently 
enough to quickly exploit it (Figure 3.11). High static exploration (smaller βs) 
results in a major delay in arriving at the same level of QOL as compared to the 
larger βs and the type-A agent (compare “candy static 4” curve with “candy dyn 
2-8” curve in Figure 3.11). The type-B agent does not perform well at converging 
or at quickly exploiting the local optimum (Figure 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11). 
 Figure 3.8. Candy task 
complete, mean learning 
curves (n=400). The mean 
number of steps (y-axis) 
needed to find the goal is 
plotted per trial for three 
static agents, one dynamic 
and one inverse-dynamic 
agent (see text for 
explanation). 
 
 Figure 3.9. Candy task 
complete, mean Quality of 
Life curves (n=400). The 
mean QOL (y-axis) as it 
varies per trial is plotted for 
three static agents, one 
dynamic and one inverse-
dynamic agent (see text for 
explanation). 
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 Figure 3.10. Candy task 
starts learning, mean 
learning curves (n=400).
The mean number of steps 
(y-axis) needed to find the 
goal is plotted per trial for 
three static agents, one 
dynamic and one inverse-
dynamic agent (see text for 
explanation). 
 
 Figure 3.11. Candy task 
starts learning, mean 
Quality of Life curves 
(n=400). The mean QOL 
(y-axis) as it varies per trial 
is plotted for three static 
agents, one dynamic and 
one inverse-dynamic agent 
(see text for explanation). 
 
3.4 General Discussion 
Our results show that coupling positive affect to exploitation and negative affect 
to exploration provides two important benefits to learning and adaptation in the 
particular case of the grid worlds we have tested. Agents that use affect to control 
exploration in this way show significantly reduced task-switch cost and exploit a 
local optimum while being able to search for a global one. 
3.4.1 Results Related to Other Learning Parameters 
First, we briefly discuss the relation between learning and the proportion of local 
versus global optimum in the Candy task. If local and global optima are very 
similar, even a type-A agent cannot learn to prefer a global optimum, as the 
difference becomes very small. So, the candy and food reward have to be 
significantly different, such that the average β can exploit this difference once 
both options have been found. This has been confirmed in preliminary 
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experiments we conducted, and is quite plausible: “you don’t walk a long way for 
a little gain.” 
Second, we discuss the relation between discount factor and learning. This 
relates to the previous; a small γ results in discarding rewards in the future and 
therefore the agent is more prone to fall for the nearer local optimum. So, γ should 
be set such that the agent is at least theoretically able to prefer a larger later 
reward for a smaller earlier one, which is also the reason why we incremented γ to 
0.8 in the Candy task, as compared to 0.7 in the Alternating-Goal task. 
3.4.2 Results Related to Psychological Findings 
Our results illuminate several psychological findings. First and foremost, they 
show that to understand the relation between affect and learning, the process of 
affective influence on learning is important. Only by coupling affect to 
exploration versus exploitation were we able to show that both positive and 
negative affect are useful for learning, but at different phases in the learning 
process. Negative affect induces exploration in those phases that need it, while 
positive affect induces exploitation of the learned model when needed. This is an 
important result providing empirical evidence (albeit simulated) for the idea that 
both negative and positive affect can relate to faster learning (Craig et al., 2004). 
It also provides evidence for the claim that some aspects of negative emotions are 
useful mechanisms for adaptation (Hecker & Meiser, 2005). More specifically, 
negative affect can defocus attention and thereby favor less selective decision 
making (Hecker & Meiser, 2005) (in our study modeled as a more random choice 
of action). Our results show that the dynamic coupling of affect and decision-
making can increase adaptive potential of an agent if (1) negative affect relates to 
less selective decision making and (2) positive affect relates to more selective 
decision making. 
Our results seem incompatible with the results by Dreisbach and Goschke 
(2004). They (and others) find that positive affect is related to more flexible, more 
distractible behaviors. In short, they argue that positive affect decreases selectivity 
(by increasing flexibility and distractibility) while negative affect increases 
selectivity (by decreasing flexibility and decreasing distractibility). However, 
closer investigation of their empirical results allows for a plausible alternative 
interpretation that relates to normal conditioning (Reinforcement Learning) 
effects. We discuss this is in detail, as our alternative explanation potentially is 
relevant to many affect induction tasks that measure reaction time and that allow 
for subjects to get accustomed to the task while it is being performed. 
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Dreisbach and Goschke (2004) measure the difference between reaction time 
(RT) before a task switch and after a task switch. This difference is interpreted as 
switch cost. So, if a task takes 600 ms at trials before a change in the 
characteristics of a task and 700 ms after that change, than this difference (100 
ms) is the switch cost. The experimental setup is as follows. During a set of trials, 
subjects have to perform a simple cognitive task proposed in the target color (e.g., 
red). At the same time they see a different instance of the same cognitive task in 
the distracter color (e.g., blue). The subject’s task is to react only to the task in the 
target color. Half way, there is a task switch. Now, two situations are possible, 
perseverance and learned irrelevance. In the perseverance condition, the target 
task is presented in a new color (e.g., yellow) and the distracter task is presented 
in the old target color. The subject’s challenge is to not continue solving the task 
in the old target color. In the learned irrelevance condition the target is presented 
in the old distracter color (blue), while the distracter task is presented in a new 
color (yellow). The challenge here is not to be hindered by the novel color yellow 
or be inhibited by the old distracter color blue that has become the target color. 
The main thrust for Dreisbach and Goschke’s conclusion that positive affect 
reduces perseveration (= continuation on an old goal) but increases flexibility (= 
potential to switch to a new cognitive set) is (1) the relative lack of switch cost in 
the perseveration condition and (2) the increase of switch cost in the learned 
irrelevance condition.  They argue that this is a specific effect of affect on 
perseveration versus flexibility. We will now present an alternative explanation 
based on standard learning and conditioning effects. 
Affect can be interpreted as an unattributed reinforcement signal. First, it is 
generally accepted that floating (objectless) positive and negative affect is a signal 
to the organism defining the general goodness versus badness of the situation 
(e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002). Second, we have argued and shown experimentally 
that reinforcement and affect are strongly related. Third, affect is coupled to the 
dopamine system (Ashby et al., 1999)—a system that is also highly related to 
Reinforcement Learning, a point explicitly made by, and one that underlies 
Dreisbach and Goschke’s (2004) approach. 
Therefore affect induction can alternatively be understood as unconscious 
reinforcement of trials. So in, e.g., the study by Dreisbach & Goschke (2004) 
positive affect induction can be seen as conditioning upon a certain task, 
specifically as the trials are repeated many times before the task switch is 
introduced. This means that subjects actually learn differently when affectively 
induced as compared to control or non-affective situations. This is an important 
point underlying our alterative interpretation. 
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Consider the following. When positive affect is induced, the subject is 
actually reinforced to respond to the task presented in the target color red and not 
to respond to the task presented in the distracter color blue. After the switch to the 
perseveration condition, the new color yellow is introduced (and the subject is 
explicitly made aware of this change). Now, there are two tasks. A new, neutral—
non-reinforced—colored task and an old positively-reinforced colored task. 
Consider the switch to the learned irrelevance condition. Again the subject is 
first reinforced on the target color red, and the task switch introduces the new 
color yellow. However, the distracter is presented in yellow, while the new target 
is presented in the old distracter color blue. This means that in the first condition 
the subject learns to react to a new stimulus (yellow), while in the second it has to 
perform reversal learning (blue meant no action, but now it means action). 
Reversal learning is generally considered more difficult than learning new 
behavior. According to this explanation, in the perseveration condition one would 
expect slightly better learning of the post-switch condition due to the generic 
effect of positive reinforcement during learning. In the learned irrelevance 
condition one would expect a much worse learning of the post-switch condition 
due to unlearning (reversal learning). This is almost exactly what has been found, 
if the results are combined with a generic negative influence of positive affect on 
RT. First, all positive affect situations have slightly higher RTs than the control 
(and pre-) tests, reflecting a negative influence of positive affect on performance 
on this specific task. Second, the perseveration condition has lower post-switch 
cost in the positive affect situation compared to the control (and pre-) test, 
reflecting enhanced learning due to positive affect. Third, the learned irrelevance 
condition has a major increase in switch cost as compared to the control (and pre-) 
tests, reflecting difficulty unlearning the previous association between distracter 
color and irrelevance.  
This alternative explanation is plausible, albeit speculative. The main message 
of this elaborate discussion is that many affect induction studies could be 
measuring confounded dependent variables. The measured total effect can be a 
combination of both a learning-related effect (conditioning) and a top-down 
executive control effect that is not specifically related to learning (working 
memory, etc.). This is particularly important as these studies are done to measure 
the second effect. If part of the total effect attributed to top-down influences is in 
fact due to bottom-up influences, it is highly important to control for the bottom-
up effect. The results of our—quite unusual—bottom-up approach to model a 
phenomenon that is typically considered top-down, shows that reasonably simple, 
and arguably low-level effects can be responsible for part of the flexibility effect. 
An additional experimental problem arises when attempting to separate these two 
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effects, as both affect and reward seem to be mediated by the same dopamine 
system (Ashby et al., 1999). To summarize, our results cannot, at least not 
without further study, be considered as contrasting to results such as the ones 
discussed. 
Current discussion on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) highly relates to our 
alternative explanation for the Dreisbach and Goschke study given here. The IGT 
(Bechara et al., 1997) measures the extent to which subjects learn to prefer to 
select cards from good decks versus bad decks. Good decks have many cards with 
low immediate monetary gain and some cards with low monetary loss. Bad decks 
have many cards with high immediate monetary gain but some cards with even 
higher loss. Overall, selecting cards from bad decks results in an average loss, 
while selecting cards from good decks results in an average gain. Subjects are 
unaware of the difference between decks and are asked to maximize gain by 
selecting cards from 4 decks (2 good, 2 bad). 
In a sense, the IGT measures task-switching behavior. Up until the first bad 
card is selected from a bad card deck, these decks appear good, as they propose 
higher immediate monetary rewards than the good decks. After having selected 
the first bad card, subjects should re-evaluate (either consciously or 
unconsciously) their selection bias, ideally resulting in card-selection behavior 
directed at good decks. As subjects do not have any knowledge of the decks, we 
can easily interpret selecting the first bad card as a rule change that changes the 
current task. Prefrontal patients have difficulty learning to select cards from good 
decks instead of bad decks (Bechara et al., 1997). Alternatively, one could say 
that these patients are unable to switch to the new task of selecting from a good 
deck after having been reinforced to select from a bad deck. This interpretation 
suggests that prefrontal patients have difficulty switching to a new task in a 
Reinforcement Learning setting, which is quite plausible as the prefrontal cortex 
is often associated with executive control. Such control is needed for exactly this 
kind of task switches. This task-switch deficit might result from a lacking somatic 
marker signal (Damasio, 1994). However, in a recent review (Dunn, Dalgleish & 
Lawrence, 2006) it is argued that a reversal learning deficit can provide an 
alternative explanation. In a broad sense, this indicates that reversal learning is an 
important phenomenon to consider in all experiments that use (1) a learning task 
with potential involvement of reinforcement or affect, and (2) a, to the subject 
unknown, task switch due to a rule change. In a narrow sense, reversal learning is 
important in affect-induction cognitive-set switching experiments. 
A comparison between the IGT and the Candy task is in place. The IGT has 4 
decks of which 2 are good and 2 are bad. Every deck has a distribution of gain 
Affect and Learning: Affect and Exploration 
 52 
and loss cards. In terms of Reinforcement Learning one could say that a subject 
needs exploration to build a model of the average gain of the decks and 
subsequently needs exploitation to continue selecting cards from the good decks. 
Three main issues are thus involved in learning the IGT: (1) build a model of the 
goodness of a deck, (2) vary between decks such that all decks are covered, and 
(3) exploit the knowledge gained. 
The Candy task is different (and simpler). There are no changing rewards. 
There is a local and a global maximum. The agent has to learn, through 
exploration, that a global maximum exists, and then exploit this maximum. 
Exploration-exploitation is controlled by affect in our studies. Key difference 
between the Candy task and the IGT thus is that the rewards in the Candy task are 
deterministic, i.e., once the agent has found the reward, it knows that this is the 
correct reward for that location in the maze. In the Candy task only the second 
and third issues are important (exploration-exploitation). Since the varying 
rewards in the IGT are a key characteristic of that task, our Candy task cannot be 
considered analogous to the IGT. Future work includes measuring the behavior of 
agents that use affect to control exploration-exploitation in a simulated IGT.  
Of course alternative explanations for our experimental results are possible. 
Our model for affect could, for example, be interpreted as a model for flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). If reward is consistently better than expected, we are in 
a state of flow and therefore continue to do what we do (model-based decisions). 
If reward is consistently worse than expected, we are out of flow, and engage in 
more random, search-like behavior. 
However, our model of affect does seem to have face-validity, specifically in 
the context of adaptation. If things go well, don’t change. If things go bad, 
explore alternatives. This kind of underlying principle is quite plausible, but in 
stark contrast to the following: if positive affect indicates goodness, we can afford 
to explore, and if negative affect indicates badness, we should be very selective 
regarding our behavior (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Which relation between 
affect and adaptation is right? Probably both, and the question is when and in 
what tasks? Only more elaborate process-oriented experimental and simulation 
studies will be able to show. 
3.4.3 Results Related to Exploration and Exploitation in Machine Learning 
The merit of using artificial affect as controller for exploration versus exploitation 
behavior has to be seen in light of adaptive agents in potentially changing 
environments. Such agents ideally decide autonomously when to explore versus 
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exploit. It is in this context that we propose affect as signal to guide the learning 
process. 
In contrast, standard methods exist that are far better at optimizing a solution 
to an arbitrary and static credit assignment problem. These methods stem from, 
e.g., operations research. Consider, for example, learning the optimal solution to 
the Candy task. This is merely a question of exploring enough in the beginning, 
and then gradually decreasing the amount of exploration; a process called 
simulated annealing. Given enough exploration and a smooth transition from 
exploration to exploitation, any RL mechanism is able to learn the optimal 
solution. 
For an adaptive agent in a changing world, a gradual decrease in exploration 
is not what is needed mainly for two reasons. First, consider an autonomous robot 
that has to decide where to go. If that robot is purely exploring, it might choose 
actions that are lethal to it. In a simulated environment this is no problem, 
however, in a real environment this is. Second, consider a changing environment. 
In this case the problem is not static, and credit assignment can thus never reflect 
the optimal solution; it always reflects the current optimal solution. If a change 
occurs, the agent has to solve two problems that do not need to be solved for static 
problems. These are (a) how to detect the change, and (b) how to move back to 
exploration (in contrast to gradually moving from exploration to exploitation). 
The problem we address with affect as meta-learning signal is not that of 
finding an optimal solution given an arbitrary problem. It is the problem of 
guiding the learning process such that the agent can autonomously decide when 
and how to explore versus exploit. 
3.5 Conclusion 
We have introduced a computational method of studying the relation between 
affect and probabilistic learning. Based on experimental results with learning 
agents in simulated grid worlds, we conclude that, at least in the task we have 
experimented with, coupling positive affect to exploitation and negative affect to 
exploration has two important adaptation-related benefits: 1) It significantly 
reduces the agent’s “goal-switch search peak” when the agent learns to adapt to a 
new goal. The agent finds this new goal faster. 2) Artificial affect facilitates 
convergence to a global instead of a local optimum, while permitting to exploit 
that local optimum. Our results illuminate the process underlying the relation 
between affect and learning, and, we argue, is thereby a valuable addition to the 
existing affect-cognition literature. The results provide evidence for the idea that 
negative affect is related to less selective decisions while positive affect is related 
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to more selective decisions. Further, our reinforcement-learning based analysis 
showed a potential problem with affect-induction techniques: the measured total 
effect of positive affect can be a combination of both a learning-related effect 
(conditioning) and a top-down executive control effect that is not specifically 
related to learning (working memory, etc.). However, as we have experimented 
with (only) two different types of worlds, our conclusions can not be generalized. 
More research is needed. 
From a machine learning perspective, we have shown that in some cases 
artificial affect can be useful to guide exploration versus exploitation. However, 
more experiments should be done, specifically in different, and larger, worlds, 
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In this chapter we study affective control of the amount of simulated anticipatory 
behavior in artificial adaptive agents. Artificial affect is positive when an agent is 
doing better than expected and negative when doing worse than expected, as 
defined in Chapter 2 and used in the study in Chapter 3. Our approach is based on 
model-based Reinforcement Learning (although we use a different model than the 
one used in Chapter 3) and inspired by the Simulation Hypothesis (Cotterill, 2001; 
Hesslow, 2002). In contrast to the research described in Chapter 3, where we used 
affect to control the exploration – exploitation rate directly, in an adaptive agent 
that has a purely reactive architecture (no internal simulation of interaction), here 
we study the adaptiveness of an artificial agent, when action-selection bias is 
induced by an affect-controlled amount of simulated anticipatory behavior. To 
this end, we introduce an affect-controlled simulation-selection mechanism that 
selects anticipatory behaviors for simulation from the agent’s Reinforcement 
Learning model. 
Based on experiments with adaptive agents in two nondeterministic partially 
observable grid worlds we conclude that (1) internal simulation has an adaptive 
benefit and (2) affective control reduces the amount of simulation needed for this 
benefit. This is specifically the case if the following relation holds: positive affect 
decreases the amount of simulation towards simulating the best potential next 
action, while negative affect increases the amount of simulation towards 
simulating all potential next actions. Thus, agents “feeling positive” can think 
ahead in a narrow sense and free-up working memory resources, while agents 
“feeling negative” must think ahead in a broad sense and maximize usage of 
working memory. Our results are consistent with several psychological findings 
on the relation between affect and learning, and contribute to answering the 
question of when positive versus negative affect is useful during adaptation. 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter we study affective control of the amount of information 
processing in artificial adaptive agents. In order to model affective control of 
information processing, we use the measure for artificial affect, as defined in 
Chapter 2, which relates to an adaptive agent's relative performance on a learning 
task. Artificial affect measures how well the agent improves. Our adaptive agent 
learns by reward and punishment. Thus we define “wellness” based on averages 
over reinforcement signals. As such, the agent’s performance is defined by the 
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difference between the long-term average reinforcement signal (“what am I used 
to”) and the short-term average reinforcement signal (“how am I doing now”) (cf. 
Schweighofer & Doya, 2003). Our measure of artificial affect thus relates to 
natural affect in the sense that it characterizes the situation of the agent on a scale 
from good to bad. Further, as our measure is based on average reinforcement 
signals, it relates more to mood than emotion. 
We have developed a variation to the model-based Reinforcement Learning 
(RL) paradigm (Sutton & Barto, 1998). This variation enables us to view 
information processing in light of the Simulation Hypothesis (Cotterill, 2001; 
Hesslow, 2002). The Simulation Hypothesis states that thinking is internal 
simulation of behavior using the same sensory-motor systems as those used for 
overt behavior (Hesslow, 2002). The main reason for adopting the Simulation 
Hypothesis is that it argues for evolutionary continuity between agents that 
consciously think and agents that do not. We believe that evolutionary continuity 
is a critical aspect in studying behavior, emotions, consciousness and cognition. 
In this chapter, we refer to simulation as described by the Simulation Hypothesis. 
An important current issue is how simulation of interaction is integrated with 
real interaction while using the same mechanisms (see models by, e.g., Shanahan, 
2006; van Dartel & Postma, 2005; Ziemke, Jirenhed & Hesslow, 2005). Our 
agents are able to internally simulate anticipatory behavior using their RL model. 
The agent thinks ahead by selecting one or more potential next action-state pairs 
for internal simulation. This action-state and its associated value are fed into the 
RL model as if these were actually observed. This introduces a bias to predicted 
values. Our action-selection mechanism uses these biased values to select the 
agent’s next action. Subsequently, the values are reset to the original values 
before simulation. Thus, internal simulation temporarily biases the predicted 
values in the RL model, thereby biasing action selection. 
In this chapter we report on a study on the adaptiveness of an artificial agent, 
when action-selection bias is induced by an affect-controlled amount of simulated 
anticipatory behavior. Thus, the main contributions of this chapter to the affect-
learning and Simulation Hypothesis literature are: 
 The introduction of an affect-controlled mechanism for the selection of 
internally simulated behavior instead of actual behavior; we define this 
mechanism as simulation selection. 
 A study into the influence of affect on learning, when used to control the 
amount of internally simulated interactions, where simulated interactions bias 
actual action selection. As we use internal simulation as a model for 
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information processing, we investigate affect as a modulator for the trade-off 
between internal versus external information processing effort (Aylett, 2006). 
In Section 4.2 we review the relation between internal simulation and our 
approach in more detail. In Section 4.3 we present our computational model and 
how it implements artificial affect, internal simulation of behavior and learning. 
In Section 4.4 we describe our experimental setup. In Section 4.5 we present 
experimental results. In Section 4.6 we discuss our approach in a broader context. 
4.2 Internal Simulation of Behavior as a Model for Thought 
Our approach towards anticipatory simulation is inspired by the Simulation 
Hypothesis stating that conscious thought consists of “simulated interaction with 
the environment” (Hesslow, 2002). Thoughts consist of internally simulated 
chains of interaction with the environment and evaluation of those simulated 
interactions. As such, thoughts are virtual versions of real interactions. For this to 
be possible, a brain must be able to internally simulate actions, perceptions and 
evaluations of action-perceptions in an off-line manner. That is, the brain has to 
simulate potential interaction with the environment while simultaneously 
controlling the body such that it is able to successfully interact with the 
environment. Hesslow (2002) and Cotterill (2001) provide extensive evidence for 
the biological and psychological plausibility of such a simulation process. 
4.2.1 Thought and Internal Simulation of Interaction 
In addition to being plausible, internal simulation of behavior is also a convenient 
model for thought, especially in the context of adaptive behavior and evolutionary 
continuity. First, if an agent is able to internally simulate a certain interaction, this 
simulation can reactivate the value of that interaction and thereby (1) influence 
decision making with predictions based on previous experiences and (2) enhance 
learning by propagating the value of that interaction to other related interactions. 
Second, the Simulation Hypothesis is said to provide a bridge between species 
that consciously think and those that do not (Hesslow, 2002): no additional 
mechanisms are needed for thought, apart from those that enable off-line 
simulation of interaction. 
Recently, strong evidence for a link between internal simulation, adaptive 
behavior and evolutionary continuity has been presented. Foster and Wilson 
(2006) showed that awake mice replay in reverse order behavioral sequences that 
led to a food location; a crucial finding for the above mentioned link. First, it 
suggests that mice are able to internally simulate interaction with the 
environment, showing that simulation mechanisms need not be restricted to 
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humans. This supports the possibility of evolutionary continuity of the human 
thought process. Second, internally replaying a sequence of interactions can 
potentially increase learning in mice in the same way as eligibility traces can 
enhance learning in Reinforcement Learning (Foster & Wilson, 2006). An 
eligibility trace (see Sutton & Barto, 1996) can be seen as a sequence of recent 
interactions with the environment. Delayed reinforcement is distributed over all 
the interactions stored in the trace. This mechanism can dramatically increase 
learning performance of simulated adaptive agents, and therefore provides a 
plausible argument for an immediate benefit of internal simulation (different from 
benefits related to complex cognitive abilities such as planning). 
4.2.2 Working Memory, Simulation Selection and Internal Simulation of 
Behavior 
If a thought is an internally simulated interaction, and working memory (WM) 
contains the thoughts of which we are consciously aware, then WM contains a set 
of currently maintained internally simulated interactions—specifically the 
episodic buffer that is a multi-modal limited-capacity storage buffer (Baddeley, 
2000). Further, for a specific thought to enter WM, it is often assumed that the 
thought has to be active above a certain threshold (exemplified by a 
computational neuronal model by Dehaene, Sergent and Changeux (2003)).  
The “internal simulation thought process” would go like this. An agent in a 
specific situation starts to pay attention to several situational aspects. These 
aspects start entering the central executive of working memory (Baddeley, 2000) 
and are thereby above threshold. Now, the central executive pushes a multi-modal 
simulation of future (or related) interactions from long term memory to the 
episodic buffer, where it is maintained. As the episodic buffer has limited 
capacity, the interaction can reside in the buffer until being replaced (pushed 
away) by new simulated interactions. Thus, filling the buffer depends (among 
other things) on how critical the filter (central executive) is in passing information 
to the buffer. The episodic buffer is filled with those internally simulated 
interactions that are attended to with sufficient intensity. Therefore, the higher the 
simulation-selection threshold, the smaller the amount of internally simulated 
behaviors maintained in the episodic buffer.  
Interestingly, if thought is internal simulation of behavior using the same 
sensory-motor mechanisms as real behavior, then the selection of those thoughts 
should resemble the selection of behaviors. Action-selection has been defined as 
the problem of continuously deciding what action to select next in order to 
optimize survival (Tyrell, 1993). “Thought selection”, to which we refer as 
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simulation selection, can therefore be defined in a similar way. Simulation 
selection is the problem of continuously selecting behaviors for internal 
simulation such that action selection is assisted, not hindered. The latter is critical 
as, according to the Simulation Hypothesis, action selection and simulation 
selection should be tightly coupled: both use the same mechanisms. Errors in 
simulation selection can directly influence action-selection and thereby be 
responsible for actions that are erroneous too. In our computational model we 
introduce a simulation-selection component based on precisely these principles. 
Moreover, the simulation-selection threshold in our model is dynamically 
controlled by artificial affect (Section 4.3.2, 4.3.3). 
4.3 Model 
In this section we explain the computational model used to study the main 
question. We use adaptive agent based modeling. Our agents “live” in grid 
worlds. Figure 4.1 shows the overall architecture of our computational approach.  
The affect mechanism calculates artificial affect based on how well the agent 
is doing compared to what it is used to. The simulation-selection mechanism 
selects next interactions for simulation, using a threshold controlled by artificial 
affect. The threshold filters which potential next interactions are simulated and 
which not. Selected interactions are fed into the RL model (as if they were real). 
This biases predicted values of states in the RL model. The action-selection 
mechanism selects an action based on these biased values using a greedy 
algorithm. The action is executed, and the agent perceives the next state. Our 
approach is related to Dyna (Sutton, 1990). In the general discussion we explore 
some of the similarities and differences. 
We first discuss the components of the model and the way it learns using RL 
principles. Then we explain how we have implemented the Simulation Hypothesis 
on top of our model. Subsequently we explain how artificial affect is used to 
control the amount of internal simulation the agent uses to bias the predicted 
values employed by its action-selection mechanism. Finally, we explain how the 
action-selection mechanism integrates everything. 
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Figure 4.1. Overview of the different components in our model. Components are detailed 
below. 
4.3.1 Hierarchical State Reinforcement Learning (HS-RL): A Variation of 
Model-Based RL 
Our model is a combined forward (predictor) and inverse (controller) model for 
learning agent behavior (Demiris & Johnson, 2003). The model learns to predict 
the next state given the current state and an action, enabling forward simulation of 
interaction. At the same time it learns to predict the values for potential next 
actions, enabling agent control. Basically, the agent's memory structure is a 
directed graph that is learned by interaction with the environment. Two types of 
nodes exist: (1) nodes that encode <a, s> tuples, where s is an observed state and 
a the action leading to that state, and (2) nodes that encode (hl, <a’, s’>) tuples. 
Here, hl is a history of observed action-state pair transitions <at-l, st-l><at-l+1, s t-
l+1>…<at-1, st-1> with l the history length not greater than a maximum length k, 
and <a’, s’> = <at, st> the action-state pair predicted by history hl at time t. The 
existence of type 1 nodes depends on the states experienced by the agent. The 
existence of type 2 nodes, and the connectivity between type 1 and type 2 nodes 
depend on observed transitions from <a, s> to <a’, s’>. Thus, the memory is 
initially empty and is constructed while the agent interacts with its environment; 
our agent learns online. We thus assume certainty equivalence. This is closer to 
real life than a forced separation between exploration and exploitation phases, 
even though the model might be highly suboptimal at the start (Kaelbling, 
Littman & Moore, 1996).  
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The model is constructed as follows. The agent selects an action, a∈ A, from 
its set of potential actions, A, using the action-selection mechanism (Section 4.4). 
It executes the action and perceives the result, s. A type 1 node <a, s> is created if 
and only if there does not exist such a node <a, s>. Consider, for example, an 
agent that has chosen some action ã and experiences some state σ . Because its 
model does not yet contain a node that represents <ã, σ> it is created (e.g., s1 in 
Figure 4.2a). Note that we use si (indexed) to refer to <a, s> tuples (type 1 nodes) 
instead of s to refer to observed states. Now the agent selects and executes a new 
action, resulting in a new situation s2=<ã’, σ’>, giving a new node that represents 
s2 (Figure 4.2b). To model that s2 follows s1 (s1 predicts s2), the previous situation, 
s1, is now connected to the current situation, s2, by creating a new type 2 node, 
defined as an interactron (sic!), connected to s1 and s2 with edges as shown in 
Figure 4.2c. This node I1 thus encodes (h1, s2) with h1 being the history of length 1 
before the transition to action-state pair s2,, in our example h1=s1. This process 
continues while exploring and the process is applied hierarchically to all active 
nodes. A type 1 node is active if the current situation <at, st> equals the <a, s> 
tuple encoded by that node. A type 2 node (hl, <a’, s’>) is active if and only if hl 
equals the most recent observed history <at-l, st-l><at-l+1, s t-l+1>…<at-1, st-1> and 
the prediction <a’, s’> equals <at, st>. For example, node I1 and s2 in Figure 4.2c 
are active. An additional example is presented in Figure 4.2d and 4.2e. If situation 
s2 is followed by a new situation s3, the resulting memory structure is shown in 
Figure 4.2d, with active nodes s3, I2 and I3. If, on the other hand s2 is followed by 
s1, the resulting structure is shown in Figure 4.2e, with active nodes s1, I2 and I3. 
Note that the maximum length of a history encoded by a node is bounded by k, 
therefore the maximum number of active type 2 nodes is k (for computational 
reasons k = 10 in this study; for more on k see below and Broekens & DeGroot, 
2004b). 
 
Figure 4.2a-e. Examples of the agent’s memory structure 
Every node (hl, <a’, s’>) has three properties r, v, and υ, with r the reward and 
v the value (a.k.a. Q-value) of the tuple (hl, <a’, s’>), and finally υ is a statistic for 
the transition probability between hl and <a’, s’>. If at a later time the sequence of 
situations hlsi is again observed by the agent, then the statistic υ of the type 2 node 
encoding the tuple (hl, si ) is incremented⎯ υ is a counter that is initially zero and 
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represents the usage of an interactron. Thus, υ can be used to calculate the 










)|( υυ ,  (4.1) 
where y is a node encoding (hl-1, <a, s>) with hl=hl-1sy and sy=<a, s>, and x∈ Xy. 
Here Xy ={x1,…,xn} is the set of interactron nodes that encode (h, <a’, s’>) tuples 
and are predicted by y, x is the node (hl, si) of which we want to know the 
transition probability p(si | hl), and υx and 
ix
υ  are the counters belonging to x and 
xi respectively. This function calculates the conditional probability of observing 
an action-state pair <a, s> after a history of action-state pairs hl using the most 
recent model of the world. 
Furthermore, we define a global threshold called the forgetting rate, θ, 
representing the minimal “survival probability” for an interactron. If p(x | y)<θ, 
the corresponding interactron x is forgotten and removed from the memory, 
including all of its predictions. In this manner the stability of an agent’s long-term 
memory is modeled, and it corresponds to Bickhard’s (2000) notion of interaction 
(de)stability based on consistent confirmation of predicted interactions. The 
relation between interaction (de)stability and our learning model is explained in 
more detail in (Broekens & DeGroot, 2004b). In our experiments we use θ  to 
vary the speed with which the agent forgets knowledge. 
To learn based on reinforcement, every interactron has a value v, with: 
nextvrv γ+= , with v maxed-out such that ),max(),min( nextnext vrvvr ≤≤    (4.2) 
where r is the learned reward for a certain interactron, γ the discount factor (equal 
to 1.0 in all our experiments, see below for why this does not pose a problem in 
our approach) and vnext is a back-propagated value from next predicted future 
states. As multiple nodes can be active at the same time, these nodes learn 
simultaneously. Several steps are involved. First, all k active interactrons are 
reinforced by a signal from the environment, rt, at time t. For every such 
interactron y, its learned reward r(y) is adapted according to the formula: 
))(()()( 1 tt
tt yrryryr −+=+ α ,  (4.3a) 
where α is the agent’s learning rate. Second, for every interactron y, vnext(y) is 
calculated as follows: 














1 )|()|()( , (4.3b) 
where v(xi | y)t is defined as the value of interactron xi, with xi predicted by y. This 
indirect part of an interactron’s value is thus the weighted average of the values 
belonging to the interactrons Xy that represent the situations that y predicts, where 
the weighting is according to the probabilities p(xi | y)t  at time t over all i. Note 
that only active nodes y are updated, i.e., we use lazy propagation. 
In an agent control setting, the model can be summarized as follows. At every 
step, all active interactrons predict potential next situations, at most k of these 
interactrons can be active, and the 1st to kth interactron predicts potential next 
action-state pairs <a’, s’> using a history of length 1 until k respectively (e.g., I3 is 
a k=2 interactron with history s1s2). As such, this memory learns 1st…kth order 
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) in parallel. This property enables it to cope 
with partially observable worlds in which the partial observability can be resolved 
using at most a history of length k. At most k MDPs are active at the same time, 
with some of them predicting the future based on little history and some 
predicting the future based on a history of length at most k. The predictions 
consist of estimated future values for next action-state pairs, as usual. However, k 
of these MDPs are active at the same time, so action selection integrates not over 
the predictions of 1 such MDP but over the predictions of k such MDPs. How 
action selection integrates over these parallel predictions is explained in the 
section on action selection below. Note that our model underuses the Markov 
property, as it keeps track of, and constructs nodes for, all history up to k steps 
back all the time, not only when a certain history is actually needed to solve the 
partial observability of the world. For an interesting approach that relates to ours 
and that proposes some solutions for better using the Markov property see 
McCallum’s (1995) utile suffix memory. 
An important difference between our approach and many other model-based 
RL approaches is that our MDPs have a maximal length of k steps and nodes only 
propagate values to their own history. On the one hand this is a benefit in that 
reward/value propagation is never cyclic. Values are propagated back through 
multiple, partially overlapping k-finite MDPs. This makes our model particularly 
robust in cyclic learning tasks (even for cycles smaller than k steps): our world 
model forces values to propagate from a well-defined end with a long history to a 
well-defined beginning with no history, the values are not recursive. As a result, 
in our model the discount factor can be equal to 1.0. On the other hand this 
characteristic also poses a problem, as values further than k steps away cannot be 
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propagated back, resulting in the need for regular reward intervals. This could be 
resolved (at the expense of cyclic-task robustness) by allowing values to 
propagate not only to nodes encoding for a shorter history at the previous timestep 
but also to nodes encoding for a history of equal length at the previous timestep, 
effectively making values recursively defined. That is, a node s1hl-1st encoding for 
a situation st with a history s1hl-1 of length l not only propagates its value to a node 
s1hl-2st-1 with hl-1=hl-2st-1, but also to a node s0s1hl-2st-1. Other limitations, 
experimental convergence results as well as several choices for the world model 
itself are discussed in more detail in Broekens & DeGroot (2004b). 
To summarize; with every step of the agent, our model updates (1) the world 
model, (2) its statistics and rewards, and (3) the values. A maximum of k nodes is 
updated at every step. Every node encodes the current action state, an action-state 
history equal to the most recent action-state history, a reward, a value and a usage 
statistic. In the ideal (policy unbiased) case, the value of every such node 
converges as is usual for Q-values in RL. 
4.3.2 Internal Simulation of Behavior: a Temporary Bias to Predicted 
Action-State Values 
We now explain how internal simulation of action-state pairs (a.k.a. 
interactions/situations) temporarily biases the predicted value of next actions, and 
thereby influences action selection. Instead of action selection, the following steps 
are involved: 
1. Simulation selection: at time t select a subset of to-be-simulated interactions 
(action-state pairs) from the set of interactions predicted by all k active 
interactrons.  
2. Simulate: use a selected interaction from that subset as if it was a real 
interaction. The agent’s memory advances to time t+1. As this is a simulation 
step, we lack the reinforcement signal rt that accompanies real interactions. 
Instead, rt is simulated using the value, v, of the simulated interaction. We 
simulate a predicted interaction and its associated value as if they were both 
real. 
3. Reset state: to be able to select an appropriate action in Step 4, reset the 
memory's state (the active nodes) to the previous timestep, i.e., time t. The net 
effect of Step 2 and 3 is that, due to the value propagation mechanism, a 
temporary bias—based on future predictions at t+1—is introduced to the 
value of predicted next interactions. Step 2 and 3 are repeated for every to-be-
simulated interaction. These biased values are reset in Step 5 (after action-
selection in Step 4). If we would keep this bias after action selection, it would 
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break our model (in RL the reward r must be used to make the value v 
converge; using vt+1 to converge v introduces a problem of cumulative 
prediction errors). 
4. Action selection: select the next action using the mechanism explained in 
Section 4.3.4. Thus, the propagated values of the simulated predicted 
interactions directly bias action selection. Our anticipation mechanism is best 
understood as state anticipation (Butz, Sigaud & Gerard, 2003). 
5. Reset values: reset the reinforcement related variables v, r and vnext of the 
interactions that were changed at Step 2 (simulation) to the values of v, r and 
vnext of these interactions before Step 2. 
In the studies reported in this chapter, simulation is bounded to a depth of 1, 
i.e., anticipation is just one step ahead. However, our simulation mechanism can 
easily support the simulation of multiple time steps ahead by processing Step 1 to 
3 backwards from t+d to t+1 in all possible branches of potential next 
interactions, with d the simulation depth. Now, action selection at time t is biased 
by accumulated simulated values of interactions up to d steps ahead. A potential 
problem is the build-up of small prediction errors. This invalidates the values of 
next actions, and action selection could be severely compromised. To enable 
multi-step simulation, accumulation of prediction errors during multi-step 
simulation should be investigated (e.g., Hoffmann & Möller, 2004). 
Step 1 is the simulation-selection mechanism and selects predicted 
interactions to be simulated. This is a critical component in our simulation 
mechanisms as it defines the amount of internally simulated information per time 
step. In our experiments we use four static simulation-selection mechanisms and 
several dynamic ones (also referred to as simulation strategies): 
 Static simulation selection: sort anticipated interactions according to their 
predicted value. Select a number of the best anticipated states for simulation. 
The selected interactions are sent to the model for simulation (Step 2). 
 Dynamic simulation selection: again, anticipated interactions are sorted 
according to their predicted value. In contrast to static selection, here affect is 
used to control the amount of predicted interactions that are selected from the 
sorted list. We explain this in Section 4.3.3.  
In essence, simulation selection is controlled by a simulation-selection 
threshold, ts, of a ts-Winner-Take-All (WTA) simulation selection ranging from 
infinite (no simulation) to zero (select and simulate all predicted action-state 
pairs).  This threshold is used by the simulation-selection mechanism to filter the 
set of predicted interactions that are simulated, i.e., to select potential next 
behaviors for processing in working memory. Our simulation-selection 
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mechanism uses ts in the following way: ts defines the percentage of predicted 
best next interactions that should be internally simulated (so in a sense it is an 
inverse threshold). If ts < 0 (overly selective threshold), no simulation is done. If  
ts ≥ 0 (selective threshold) only the interaction with the highest predicted value is 
simulated, if ts ≈1.0 (non-selective threshold) all interactions are simulated. The 
final result of simulation can be summarized as follows: anticipatory simulation 
introduces a bias to the values of the set of predicted next possible action-state 
pairs, thereby influencing the result of action selection. In the next section we 
explain how artificial affect is used to dynamically set the threshold ts, instead of 
statically (Broekens, 2005). 
4.3.3 Affective Modulation of WM Content: Affect Controls the Amount of 
Internal Simulation 
Using the measure for artificial affect, ep, introduced in Chapter 2, it has now 
become straightforward to model affective control of the amount of internal 
simulation (i.e., affective control of working memory content), the basis of our 
study. Control can be modeled in several, equally plausible, ways. By equating 
the simulation-selection threshold, ts, to 1− ep, it varies between 0 and 1 
depending on affect being positive or negative respectively. This reflects the 
hypothesis that positive affect decreases the amount of internal simulation 
favoring narrow, exploitative thoughts (i.e., only action-state pairs with a high 
value are internally simulated), while negative affect increases the amount of 
simulation favoring broad thoughts, including explorative ones (i.e., action-state 
pairs with low values are also simulated). This relates to results found by Rose et 
al. (1999). In our model this means that happy agents (i.e., performing better than 
expected) simulate positive thoughts, while a discontent agent simulates many 
thoughts including negative ones. So: 
ps et −=1    (4.5) 
Second, we hypothesize the inverse relation, that is, negative affect decreases 
the amount of simulation while positive affect increases the amount of action-
state pairs that can enter working memory for simulation: 
ps et =     (4.6) 
Now, positive affect increases the thought-action repertoire (Ashby et al., 1999). 
This relates to results found by Goschke and Dreisbach (2004). 
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A third hypothesis is that the intensity of affect controls the amount of 
simulation, instead of the positiveness and negativeness of affect. Here, intense is 
either negative affect (ep≈0) or positive affect (ep≈1) while not intense is neutral 
(ep≈0.5). If affect is intense, simulate a lot (reflecting the fact that significant 
changes occurred that might need extra processing (Scherer, 2001)). If affect is 
not intense, do not simulate a lot. Note that intensely positive or negative does not 
necessarily mean arousing, arousal is considered out of scope for this thesis. The 
simulation-selection threshold is: 
)5.0(2 ps eabst −×=    (4.7) 
And, as a control condition, the inverse relation is: 
)5.0(21 ps eabst −×−=   (4.8) 
In Section 4.5 we report on the results of a systematic study that investigated 
the influence of internal simulation on the adaptiveness of artifical agents, when 
the amount of simulation is modulated by affect. Modulation is according to the 
hypotheses mentioned above.  
4.3.4 Integrating Everything:  Greedy Action Selection over Biased Value 
Predictions 
In our approach, action selection must integrate over the predictions of at most k 
MDPs in parallel: action selection integrates over the action-state values as 
predicted by all k active nodes, each node representing a possible “current state”. 
This is an important difference with standard model-based RL as such models 
typically use the values for next actions as predicted by one “current state” (see, 
e.g., Kaelbling, Littman & Moore, 1996). As a result, our action-selection 
mechanism is slightly different. It is inspired by parallel inhibition and excitation 
of actions in the agent’s set of actions, A. The inhibition/excitation originates 

















,  (4.9) 
where l(a)t is defined as the level of activation of an action a∈A at time t, and yi 
an active interactron at time t. Further, xij must predict action a. Therefore,    
xij=(h, <a, s>) with iyi syhh )(=  and iyi ysyh i =)),((  and >=<
tt
y sas i , . This 
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clause enforces that any of the action-state pairs that are predicted by any of the k 
active interactrons should inhibit (negative value) or excite (positive value) the 
corresponding action, but not other actions. 
Finally the action a to be executed is such that: 
( )tAtt alalal )(,...,)(max)( ||1=   (10) 
If there are only bad actions (i.e., l(a)t<0 ) a weighted stochastic selection based 
on l(a1)t,…,l(a|A|)t is made instead; the action with the highest activation has 
proportionally the highest chance of being chosen resulting in a probabilistic 
Winner-Take-All action-selection. As such, action selection uses a super-
threshold greedy selection with sub-threshold linear weighted stochastic selection.  
Further, depending on when the action-selection mechanism is invoked it 
either uses unbiased (before simulation) values to select the next action, or biased 
(after simulation) values to select actions. This allows us to address the main 
question of our study: what happens if action-selection bias is induced by an 
amount of simulated anticipatory behavior, and if this amount is dynamically 
controlled by artificial affect? 
To wrap up this section on the computational model consider the following. 
The number of thoughts that occupy working memory is often interpreted as an 
indicator of the intensity of information processing. As a thought equals an 
internally simulated behavior in our model, and the number of thoughts that 
occupy working memory equals the amount of internally simulated behavior, it is 
now clear that we indeed study affective-control of information processing. 
4.4 Method 
To investigate the influence of affect-controlled anticipatory simulation of future 
action-state pairs, we have set up a grid-world environment consisting of walls, 
roadblocks, cues, food and empty spaces. We use two non-deterministic (i.e., 
changing), partially-observable grid worlds. Common to our two grid worlds is 
that the agent can walk on walls, but is discouraged to do so, which is why we 
call our “wall” “lava” (reinforcement r=−1.0). The agent moves around by 
selecting an action a from the set of possible actions A={up, down, left, right}, 
and observing its immediate surroundings (not its position) using a four-neighbor-
plus-center metric just after executing the action. This is an <a, s> tuple as 
defined in the model (Section 4.3). 
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The first grid world is taken from (Broekens & Verbeek, 2005), and aims to 
test how well agents using different simulation strategies can cope with a sudden 
change in both reward and world structure (Figure 4.3). In this world, the agent 
(black square) learns to cope with two alternating goal and start locations 
(‘f’=food, reinforcement r=1.0). Alternation is random and after every trial. A 
trial ends when the agent has found the goal: the agent is put back at a randomly 
chosen start location after having reached the randomly chosen goal location. The 
total number of trials to learn a task is 500. We define such sequence of 500 trials 
as a run. Additionally, at trial 250, the world is changed in the following way. 
Two negatively reinforced roadblocks (‘b’=block, r=−0.5) are placed in front of 
the goal locations, and the food reward is increased to 1.75 to compensate for the 
roadblocks. As a result, both the world and the reward structure of that world 
change. The agent is, of course, unaware of this change, and, as our model learns 
lazily, no value updates or world-model changes are made. The agent has to learn 
these new characteristics of the world. We call this grid world the switch-to-invest 
grid world, as it is constructed to measure how an agent copes with a change in 
the environment that introduces an investment to be made before an otherwise 
easily obtainable goal. 
 
 
                          before trial 250  
                                                            after trial 250  
Figure 4.3. Switch-to-invest 
task. Potential start locations 
are alternated between the 
top-left and bottom-left arms, 
goal locations are alternated 
between the top-right and 






                                 before trial 250  







Figure 4.4. Cue-inversion 
world. The left and right 
pictures show the possible 
worlds before and after the 
cue inversion at trial 250 
respectively; ’f’ is food, ‘c’ is 
cue, black square is the 
agent. 
 The second world is based on a typical psychological method in which 
subjects have to learn to cope with a cue-meaning inversion (see, e.g., Goschke & 
Dreisbach, 2004). This type of method is used to investigate the effect of an 
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memory flexibility by measuring reaction time just after the cue-meaning 
inversion. It is also used to measure adaptation speed to the new cue-meaning 
relation after having learned the old relation. In the case of our simulated grid 
world, a cue is coupled to a specific food location, while the absence of that cue is 
coupled to a different food location. At trial 250, the locations are inversed. This 
means that whereas before trial 250 the cue indicated to the agent that food is at 
location 1, after trial 250 the cue (‘c’ in Figure 4.4) indicates that food is at 
location 2. We call this world the cue-inversion world. In contrast to the switch-
invest task, the agent is also reset to its (fixed) starting position when it arrives at 
the non-goal location (e.g., when the agent has misinterpreted the cue). The non-
goal location (empty arm) has a negative reinforcement of r=−0.5. 
To test our three hypotheses, we vary the simulation-selection mechanism and 
analyze how an artificial agent copes with these two worlds. Our agent employs 
the learning and simulation mechanisms as described in Section 4.3. In total, we 
define four static simulation-selection mechanisms: 
1. No simulation; simulation is off (called nosim in the experiments). 
2. Simulation of the best predicted action-state pair; ts=0 (simbest). 
3. Simulation of the best half of predicted action-state pairs, i.e., ts=0.5 
(simbest50). 
4. Simulation of all predicted action-state pairs, i.e., ts=1 (simall). 
 We also define four dynamic simulation mechanisms, introduced in 
Section 4.3.3. These are: 
1. Positive affect = little simulation (select best predicted action-state pairs), and 
vice versa (dyn). 
2. Negative affect = little simulation, and vice versa (dyn inv). 
3. High intensity of affect = little simulation, and vice versa (dyn intensity). 
4. Low intensity of affect = little simulation, and vice versa (dyn intensity inv). 
In the switch-to-invest experiments we have used all four static simulation 
strategies and only the first two dynamic ones. In the cue-inversion experiments 
we have used all eight simulation strategies. As mentioned earlier, our measure of 
affect has three parameters that define its behavior. We varied these three 
parameters, i.e., we varied f (sensitivity of affect), ltar (the window size of the 
long term averaged reward that defines “how well is usual”), and star (the 
window size of the short term average reward that defines “how am I doing”). 
In our switch-to-invest grid-world experiments we varied these according to 
Table 1, resulting in 30 different affect-parameter settings. In our cue-inversion 
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grid-world experiments we varied these only according to the f=1 column in 
Table 1, resulting in 10 different affect-parameter settings.  
Further, in our switch-to-invest experiments we varied the learning rate, α = 
[0.8, 0.9, 1.0], and the rate at which the model forgets information about the 
world as defined by the forgetting rate of nodes, θ = [0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03]. In the 
cue-inversion experiments α and θ  are not varied but fixed at 1 and 0 
respectively. 
Table 4.1.  Possible ltar, star, 
and f combinations as they are 
used in the first set of 
experiments with the agent in the 
switch-to-invest  task. 
 
f: 1  1.5  2  
star: 50  100 50  100 50  100 
ltar: 200 400 200 400 200 400 
 250 500 250 500 250 500 
 375 750 375 750 375 750 
 500 1000 500 1000 500 1000 
 750 1500 750 1500 750 1500 
4.5 Experimental Results 
We first describe the results obtained with the switch-to-invest grid world, after 
which we describe the results obtained with the cue-inversion grid world. Data 
was analyzed as follows. To investigate the effect of learning rate, α, forgetting 
rate, θ, and simulation strategy we compare between results of different <α ,θ, 
simulation strategy> configurations. Static simulation strategies have been 
executed 200 times per <α ,θ, simulation strategy > configuration, e.g., the 
simulate-best strategy has been executed 200 times for every <α ,θ> combination. 
These 200 runs are the basis for further analysis. Dynamic simulation strategies 
have been executed 15 times per <α ,θ, f, ltar, star, simulation strategy> 
configuration. For every <α ,θ, simulation strategy> configuration, the resulting 
runs for all of its <f, ltar, star> settings is aggregated. For example in the switch-
to-invest experiments, for α = 1, θ = 0, and strategy=dyn we aggregated all 15 x 
30 (nr of runs times nr of affect-parameter settings, respectively) runs into 450 
runs. These runs are the basis for further analysis. 
In the cue-inversion experiments the same aggregation protocol was used, but, 
as mentioned above, here we use only one <α ,θ> configuration and we vary only 
star and ltar (not f). Further, we used 50 runs per <α ,θ> configuration resulting 
in 50 x 10 runs = 500 runs being aggregated for only one setting (α = 1 and θ = 0).  
We aggregated the data as our goal is to investigate the effect of affective 
control of simulation selection in general, not to find specific values that “work” 
for the agent. We did not seek to optimize any parameter but to investigate 
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different relations between affect and simulation selection. Between simulation 
strategies we compare: 
 A measure for the behavioral effort involved in completing a run (i.e., 
learning the complete task) for each specific simulation strategy. Effort is 
calculated by first averaging trial-length in steps over all trials for each run, 
resulting in an effort for that run. This is our unit of measurement for 
statistical analysis (e.g., if there are 450 runs for one strategy, we have 450 
measures of effort to use in our statistical analysis for that strategy). To 
display the average effort for a certain simulation strategy, we average over 
the measure of effort for all runs for that strategy. For example in a static 
selection mechanism (α = 1 and θ = 0), the displayed effort equals the mean 
number of steps needed for one trial over all 500 trials in all 200 runs 
resulting in, e.g., 20 steps. For a dynamic simulation mechanism the average 
is constructed in the same way using aggregated runs for every <α ,θ> 
configuration instead. The Wilcoxon ranked-sum test (non-parametric, we 
cannot assume normality) is used to compare effort between simulation 
strategies. Comparison is based on sets of effort measures (Switch-to-invest: 
n=450; Cue-inversion: n=500). For static strategies 450 samples (Switch-to-
invest) or 500 samples (Cue-inversion) are pooled from the 200 runs that are 
available. 
 A measure for the total simulation effort involved in completing a run, i.e., the 
same as above but using a trial-length counted in terms of internally simulated 
action-state pairs. This represents “mental effort” during a task, and as such is 
linked to energy consumption used to maintain and focus on information in 
working memory. Again, the Wilcoxon test is used to compare simulation 
strategies. 
To give an informal idea of the learning behavior of the agent, several 
learning curves of agents are plotted. Learning curves are plots of the average 
number of steps taken per trial and smoothed using a sliding mean (window size 
= 10) to improve readability. 
4.5.1 Results of Experiment 1: Switch-to-invest Task 
Results in this specific grid world show that simulation in general has a stable 
positive effect on learning. This trend is shown by the learning curves1 in Figure 
                                                 
1 Note that we do not use error bars in Figure 5. To validate our claims, we statistically 
compare between simulation strategies the effort involved in completing a run. This is 
appropriate; a small overall benefit can be considered important, regardless of the 
standard deviation over trails. 
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4.5, and more formally in Figure 4.6 showing that nosim uses more effort to 
complete a run than any other simulation strategy (p<0.001). The larger the 
amount of internally simulated interactions, the better the learning result (simall 
costs less effort than simbest, p<0.05 for all settings except α=1 & θ∈{0, 0.01}, 
Figure 4.6). When affect is used to control this amount, performance is better than 
the static simulation mechanism that simulates the best strategy (a significant 
difference between dynsim and simbest, p<0.05 for all settings except α=1 & 
θ∈{0, 0.01}, Figure 4.6). Interestingly, the size of the effect interacts with the 
learning rate and forgetting rate. As θ increases, the benefit of simulation also 
increases, and as α decreases the benefit of simulation increases (Figure 4.6). In 
terms of size, we did not find important differences between (1) the dynamic 
strategy that relates negative affect to more simulation and (2) the dynamic 
strategy that relates positive affect to more simulation. Even though the strategies 
are each other’s inverse, the difference in effort was at most about 5% (Figure 
4.7a, shown only for α=0.8 & θ=0.03). However, for all <α ,θ> settings, the 
average amount of simulation effort was considerably less for dyn than for dyn inv 
(p<0.001). Further, both strategies simulated considerably less than simall 
(p<0.001), while dyn used less simulation effort than simbest50 (p<0.001) (Figure 
4.7b, shown only for α=0.8). Finally, results for α=0.9 are not shown, as these 
appeared to be an interpolation between the results for α=0.8 and α=1.0. 
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Figure 4.5. Learning curves (smoothed) of non-, best, and all-simulating agents in the 
switch-to-invest world for α=0.8, θ=0.03. Curves of other strategies are approximately in-




Figure 4.6a. Effort for 
different simulation strategies 
in the switch-to-invest task
with a learning rate, α, equal 
to 1.0 
 Figure 4.6b. Effort for 
different simulation strategies 
in the switch-to-invest task
with a learning rate, α, equal 
to 0.8 
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Rate of forgetting, θx10-2 
Simulation effort switch-to-invest, α=0.8 
 Figure 4.7a. Small difference 
in effort between dynamic 
and inverse-dyn simulation 
strategies.  
 
 Figure 4.7b. Difference in 
simulation effort between 
simulation strategies. 
4.5.2 Discussion of the Switch-to-invest Task Results 
The fact that more simulation results in better performance is not surprising. 
Internal simulation as an anticipatory heuristic can use more knowledge if it 
selects more potential next interactions. Thereby, it influences final action 
selection in a more balanced way. Interestingly, there is an interaction effect 
produced by learning rate, forgetting rate and simulation. Regarding the learning 
rate this effect is easily explained. As internal simulation enables the agent to 
“look ahead” one step, predicted values can be temporarily propagated back. Even 
though the model does not learn based on simulation (i.e., nodes, their value, 
reward and statistic are not permanently updated due to simulation), simulation 
has an immediate benefit for action selection, as more information is temporarily 
available. If the learning rate is high (α≈1.0), this effect is minimized: at every 
step the agent takes, the lazy update rule propagates future values back in full, so 
simulation cannot add a lot of future value information. However, if the learning 
rate is small(er) (e.g., α=0.8), the future value is not propagated in full. Now, 
internal simulation can temporarily propagate values that were not yet propagated 
in full, and the action-selection mechanism can benefit from the extra information 
provided by simulation. This phenomenon causes a performance increase due to 
simulation in lower learning rate settings. 
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It is not yet clear from our experiments what causes the interaction between 
forgetting rate and simulation, although it is clear that it can not be simulation per 
se, as simulation does not change the model’s statistics. A possible explanation is 
that simulation in general forces the agent to use known interaction patterns more 
often than new or less-tried patterns. As such, simulation actually reduces the 
probability of forgetting useful interactions. This could help solving the maze 
with a forgetful long-term memory. This requires further investigation in future 
research. 
The fact that the two dynamic simulation strategies tested (a) do not differ in 
terms of learning performance, (b) perform at about the same level as the static 
simulation strategy that simulates all potential next interactions, and (c) use a 
considerably reduced amount of simulation compared to this static simall strategy, 
indicates two things: (1) dynamic adaptation is beneficial as it reduces simulation 
needs (an interesting result), and (2) it does not matter if positive affect implies 
more simulation or less, as the two dynamic simulation strategies result in less 
simulation and better learning performance. If the latter is indeed the case, this 
implies one of the two following possibilities: (I) affect has nothing to with the 
result. Instead, the average amount of simulation is responsible for the increase in 
learning performance. This possibility is supported by our results, as the dyn 
inverse strategy uses more simulation than dyn (Figure 4.7b) and seems to 
perform slightly better than the latter (Figure 4.7a). On the other hand, it could 
also imply that (II) affect does have to do with the result, but both relations—i.e., 
positive-affect = more-simulation and positive-affect = less-simulation—are 
wrong. This is possible if the relation instead is: higher-intensity-affect=more-
simulation. We study this in the second experiment, and use the intensity-of-affect 
based simulation strategies. In this experiment we use the second grid world, i.e., 
the cue-inversion world. 
4.5.3 Results of Experiment 2: Cue-inversion Task 
Results in this grid world show the following. The simbest static simulation 
strategy does not have a large positive effect (even though the effect is significant 
p<0.01), contrary to the results in the first experiment where the effect was more 
pronounced. However, simall, simbest50 as well as all dynamic simulation 
strategies do have an important positive effect (p<0.001); effort is reduced with 
0.6 to 1 step per trial. Thus, a moderate positive influence of simulation on 
learning performance exists. Note that the smaller effects of simulation in general, 
as compared to the previous experiment, are due to the fact that in this experiment 
α=1 and θ=0. This confirms our explanation of interaction effects between 
simulation, α and forgetting rate in the discussion of the previous experiment. 
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Again, dynamic strategies are quite close to the simall strategy in terms of 
learning performance (Figure 4.8a): the only significant difference in effort is 
between simall and dyn intensity (p<0.01). However, dynamic strategies use 
considerably less simulation effort to get to this increased level of performance 
(Figure 4.8b, all strategies use less simulation than dynall, p<0.001). An 
important difference in effort exists between the two intensity-based dynamic 
simulation strategies. The dyn intensity inverse strategy (i.e., if affect is neutral, 
0.5, simulate a lot, while if affect is extreme, 0 or 1, simulate little) has a better 
performance than dyn intensity (p<0.001, Figure 4.8a), but also uses a lot more 
simulation (p<0.001). 
Last, we plot the average behavior (over 50 runs) of our measure for artificial 
affect as it is influenced by ltar and star. A large long term window to calculate 
the agent’s measure of comparison based on reward (i.e., “what I am used to”) 
results in less noisy affect (Figure 4.10). A small short term average (i.e., “how 
am I doing”) results in a faster affective reaction to the cue-inversion (inset). 
 
Figure 4.8a. Difference in effort 
between dynamic and static 
simulation strategies. Error bars 
show 95% confidence interval. 
 
 Figure 4.8b. Difference in 
simulation effort between static 
and dynamic strategies. Error 
bars show 95% confidence 
interval. 
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 Figure 4.9. Gain of simulation 
strategies (details in text). Error 





Figure 4.10. Depicted are affect curves for different settings (not smoothed). Inset is a 
detail of artificial affect at the cue inversion. Note that star=50 has the “dip” earlier than 
star=100. 
4.5.4 Discussion of the Cue-inversion Task Results 
The fourth dynamic control strategy based on the inverse intensity of affect (dyn 
intensity inv) results in a better performance than the third, intensity based, control 
strategy. Again, this inversed version (i.e., neutral affect results in a lot of 
simulation and extreme affect in a little) uses more simulation on average. Thus, 
this result does not rule out the possibility that the average amount of simulation 
is responsible for the learning performance increase as opposed to affective 
Prototypical curves of artificial affect influenced by its parameters ltar and star 
Trial number
A
rtificial affect, high is positive, low
 is negative 
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control. We need to control for the average amount of simulation. To do so, we 
defined the gain ratio, a measure that calculates how much effort reduction a 
strategy gives relative to no simulation, weighted by the amount of simulation 
effort:  
( ) ( )iiinoni efforteffortsimefforteffortgain /_/−=   (4.11) 
where efforti equals the effort for a certain simulation strategy i, effortnon equals 
the effort of the nosim strategy and sim_efforti equals the simulation effort for a 
certain strategy i.  Such a gain factor is a plausible measure to evaluate and 
compare simulation strategies: one is interested in the efficiency of simulation, 
not just the absolute result. As simulation—i.e., information maintenance in 
working memory—costs resources, the question is which strategy uses these 
resources best. When we compared the gains for the different simulation 
strategies, a different picture emerged (Figure 4.9). Simulating all is not very 
efficient compared to dynamic strategies. Interestingly, our original coupling of 
affect and amount of simulation seems most promising (as proposed, but not yet 
confirmed in Broekens and Verbeek, 2005). This is the only strategy of which the 
gain confidence interval does not overlap with either simall or simbest50. This 
means that, although the relation “positive affect equals less simulation and 
negative affect equals more simulation” is not the best one in terms of effort 
reduction, it is the optimal one in terms of relative gain when considering the 
amount of simulation needed for that effect. 
4.6 General Discussion 
We now discuss our approach in a broader context. We first ground our approach 
more firmly, and relate our work to the work of others. Finally we present some 
directions for future research. 
4.6.1 Model Grounding 
Our findings are compatible with psychological findings that show that both 
positive and negative affect influence learning in a beneficial way (Craig et al., 
2004; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Rose et al., 1999). We found that learning 
benefits the most when positive affect relates to less simulation and negative to 
more simulation. As such, our findings indicate that positive affect is associated 
with less diverse thoughts when a task has successfully been learned, while 
negative affect is associated with diverse thoughts when a task is confusing or 
changing. Our findings support the studies by Rose et al. (1999) who find that 
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broad attention is associated with faster learning and neutral but not positive 
affect, when a new task has to be learned. Our findings are also consistent with 
the relation that has been found between subclinical depression and defocused 
attention (von Hecker & Meiser, 2005). In agreement with these authors, we 
would like to stress that our results do not necessarily argue for a “positive affect 
equals reduction of capacity” view. More selective maintenance of information is 
not the same as a reduction of capacity. Selectivity of maintenance in Working 
Memory (WM) that depends on affect can be an adaptive strategy to cope with the 
changing world around us, without enforcing any capacity constraints. 
In our approach, internal simulation influences action-selection in a way that 
is compatible with the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) (Damasio, 1994). In 
short, the SMH states that somatic (i.e., of the body) signals are coupled with 
representations of situations and thereby function as a value signal that enables 
the organism to filter potential behaviors. As a result, some of these potential 
behaviors are selected for conscious contemplation in working memory while 
others are not. Our threshold determines how discriminating our simulation-
selection mechanism is, thereby selectively allowing some anticipated behaviors 
to enter working memory and influence future behavior. Of course we do not 
argue that we have an embodied approach; our agent is quite disembodied. 
However, our action-state value v can be interpreted as a simulated marker, as it 
accumulates future values of potential situations. As such, it is an abstraction of 
the somatic signal that, in an embodied modeling approach and in nature, is 
grounded in the body. We argue that our mechanism of simulated interaction 
selection, and thus selection of WM content, is compatible with the mechanism 
by which somatic markers are used to prune large amounts of thoughts. Both 
mechanisms prioritize different anticipated behaviors based on a comparison of 
their markers. Only potential behaviors (thoughts) that have highly positive 
markers—or strong markers, if the intensity of artificial affect is used as 
simulation-selection threshold (cf. Section 4.3.3)—are able to influence future 
behavior by temporarily transferring a portion of their own marker value to the 
marker value of considered actions (see also Damasio, 1994). In our model, 
transfer of marker values is a natural consequence of simulating a particular future 
interaction (see Step 1 – 5, Section 4.3.2). 
Concerning the relation between our model and the Simulation Hypothesis, 
several similarities are particularly important. Hesslow (2002) states that 
fundamentally new mechanisms should not be needed for internal simulation of 
behavior. The only mechanism we introduce is an interaction feedback loop to the 
RL model. We do not introduce a conscious reasoning process or a central 
intelligence that enables planning. Compared to such measures, our addition is 
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just a minor change to the overall agent architecture, and comparable with the 
addition of a feedback connection in neural network models that investigate 
internal simulation (van Dartel & Postma, 2004; van Dartel, Postma & van den 
Herik, 2005). Further, our mechanism for simulation selection is very similar to 
that of action selection: the RL model is used in the same way in both the 
simulation (cognitive) and non-simulating (reactive) setting; simulation selection 
uses the action-selection component; and the representations used for simulation 
are the same as those used for action. 
Hesslow (2002) also states that internal simulation of behavior uses the same 
sensory-motor mechanisms as actual behavior, and therefore uses similar sensory-
motor encoding. Our interactions encode features of the world coupled with 
actions, and our model uses these same interactions for simulation. More 
importantly, in our model, simulation influences action indirectly: an influence 
that results only from making use of the same mechanisms needed for action. This 
is very compatible with the Simulation Hypothesis stating that simulation and 
action are tightly coupled. Our mechanism for influencing action selection is 
therefore a useful addition to the Simulation Hypothesis by postulating a potential 
mechanism by which internal simulation could influence action: i.e., simulation 
temporarily biases next actions because the simulation mechanism and action 
mechanism overlap and therefore simulation activates potential next actions to 
some extent, resulting in the “markers” of the simulated consequences to be 
temporarily attached to these next actions. 
4.6.2 Related Work 
To show that simulation in our model can indeed be seen as an instantiation of 
simulation as meant by the Simulation Hypothesis we compare it with the models 
by van Dartel and Postma (2005), van Dartel et al. (2005) and Ziemke, Jirenhed 
and Hesslow (2005). These models use a genetic algorithm to train a neural 
network to produce predictions of future states one time step ahead. These 
predictions are used to bias perception of the current state (van Dartel), or 
explicitly used as input to the neural network controller to enable “’blindfolded’ 
corridor following behavior” based on these simulated next states (Ziemke). 
Although our action-state encoding and learning mechanism are different, our 
overall architectural approach is similar, especially to the work of van Dartel and 
colleagues. Simulation in the latter work is modeled as follows. A copy of the 
output layer (encoding actions) of the neural network is projected to the input 
layer. This output copy consequently influences perception, and influences action 
selection. The feedback from this copy to the input represents a simulated next 
state as predicted by the model (van Dartel & Postma, 2005). These authors 
Affect and Learning: Affect and Thought 
 84 
explicitly suggest that in their model internal simulation “serves the function of 
building up sufficient activation in the neurocontroller to produce a certain 
move”. This is equivalent to what happens when in our model future interactions 
are simulated, as these simulated interactions bias the “markers” of current 
potential actions and as such can help certain actions to be executed. The work of 
Ziemke et al (2005) is a bit different. They train an “input prediction layer” to 
predict the next observed state based on the current one. This prediction is used as 
input to an already trained sensory-motor network responsible for collision-free 
corridor following behavior. The predicted state is used as real input to the 
sensory-motor network such that the agent as a whole walks through the corridor 
based on mental simulations of interaction with the corridor, i.e., it is walking 
“blind-folded”. The characteristic difference between this model and our model is 
that Ziemke et al. use the predicted next state as input for action-selection, while 
in our model the simulated input is used as a bias, as in the model by van Dartel. 
However, from an architectural point of view, the three models are all 
instantiations of the Simulation Hypothesis: the models internally simulate 
predicted interaction with the environment in order to influence actual interaction, 
while using the same encoding and the same mechanisms for both real and 
simulated interaction. 
Simulation in our approach is to some extent similar to planning in Dyna 
(Sutton, 1990). However, several important differences exist. First, our model 
learns multiple MDPs in parallel and uses all of these MDPs in action selection. 
Second, anticipatory simulation in our model (cf. planning in Dyna) is always a 
one-step forward simulation from the current state, not a simulation of a random 
state. This reflects our choice of basing the model on anticipatory simulation of 
behavior, and not on planning or dynamic programming in general. As a result, 
the potential of simulation in our model is more limited. Third, our model can 
only simulate actions it has tried already, effectively restricting the exploration 
potential of broad simulation. This is the most important reason why simulating 
all potential next action-states is not really equivalent to exploration. Our agent 
cannot really explore mentally, it can only consider the many known future 
options, in contrast to Dyna in which untried actions can be simulated. However, 
in order to do so, Dyna requires a non-empty world model to start learning 
(Sutton, 1990). We have chosen to start learning with a completely empty model. 
Therefore we could not simulate untried actions, at least not without making 
major changes to the representations of action-state pairs and transitions between 
them. Finally, simulation in our model has a temporary effect by biasing the 
predicted values of next states and thereby influencing action selection. In Dyna, 
planning can actually change the evaluation and policy functions. 
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Notwithstanding these differences, our method of internal anticipatory simulation 
of states replicates some of the results obtained with Dyna (Sutton, 1990), of 
which the most relevant in the context of the presented results is that simulation 
(and more simulation rather than less) has a positive effect on learning speed. 
Our results show that internal anticipatory simulation of just one step ahead is 
beneficial to artificial adaptive agents, even if simulation does not alter the long-
term knowledge of the agent. The influence of simulation is mediated by the 
action selection mechanism of the agent. Simulation introduces a temporary bias 
to the values predicted by the model. This approach is similar to the one proposed 
by Gadanho (2003). In her RL based adaptive system, however, stochastic action-
selection is biased by a fixed value produced by a rule-based cognitive system. In 
contrast, in our system this value is dependent on the predicted states and the 
cognitive process is not separated from the adaptive system. We did not separate 
these systems as the Simulation Hypothesis is underlying our approach. As 
internal simulation of behavior is based on existing sensory-motor mechanisms, it 
made sense to investigate the benefit of anticipatory simulation using as many 
functions as possible already provided by our RL model.  
4.7 Conclusion  
Using a computational model based on Reinforcement Learning, we have 
investigated affective control of anticipatory thoughts, where thoughts are defined 
as internal simulation of potential next behavior (Cotterill, 2001; Hesslow, 2002). 
We have introduced a simulation-selection mechanism that is controlled by affect 
and selects anticipatory behaviors for simulation from the predictions of the RL 
model used by the agent. The selected anticipatory behaviors are used to bias the 
predicted values of next action-state pairs. Action selection is over these biased 
pairs, thereby influenced by the simulated anticipations. Based on experiments 
with adaptive agents that learn two nondeterministic partially observable grid 
worlds we conclude that (1) anticipation has an adaptive benefit and (2) affect can 
be used to control the amount of simulation. The results show that affective 
control reduces the amount of simulation needed to get a performance increase 
due to simulation. 
The positive effect of internal simulation has been shown to exist for two non-
deterministic partially observable worlds, and already has been shown to exist in 
other worlds (Broekens, 2005). However, selecting all possible next action-state 
pairs for simulation provides quite some computational overhead, or, in more 
biological terms, consumes a considerable amount of energy to maintain stable 
representations in working memory (WM) that can be used to construct 
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anticipatory associations. In this study we have shown that affect can regulate the 
amount of anticipatory simulation in such a way that learning is still improved 
considerably. Although it is difficult to generalize from computational 
experiments that contain many variables, in terms of WM-affect relation our 
results indicate that affective control of the amount of anticipatory thoughts in 
WM enables an adaptive agent to make more efficient use of WM. 
The most beneficial relation between affect and internal simulation is 
observed when positive affect decreases the amount of simulation towards 
simulating the best potential next action, while negative affect increases the 
amount of simulation towards simulating all potential next actions. Ergo, agents 
“feeling positive” can think ahead in a narrow sense and free-up working memory 
resources, while agents “feeling negative” must think ahead in a broad sense and 
maximize usage of working memory. Our results are consistent with several 
psychological findings on the relation between affect and learning, and contribute 
to answering the question of when positive versus negative affect is useful during 
adaptation. Furthermore, our results show that simulation selection is a useful 
extension to action selection, specifically in the context of the Simulation 
Hypothesis (Hesslow, 2002). 
5 
Affect and Modulation 
Related and Future Work 
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In this chapter we discuss other approaches towards computational modeling of 
affect as well as directions for future work. 
5.1 Related Work 
The work described in the previous two chapters relates to emotion and 
motivation based control/action-selection. We explicitly define a role for emotion 
in biasing behavior-selection as do Avila-Garcia and Cañamero (2004), Cos-
Aguilera and others (2005) and Velasquez (1998). The main difference is that in 
these studies emotion directly influences action selection (or motivation(al 
states)), while we have studied the indirect effect of emotion-controlled 
information processing influencing action selection, either by biasing simulation 
selection (Chapter 4) or by biasing the greediness of action selection (Chapter 3). 
A recent variation of this type of research has been presented by Blanchard 
and Cañamero (2006). In this study, artificial novelty and affect are coupled to 
exploration behavior of a robot that has to autonomously explore different 
possible distances to a box. Familiarity (non-novelty) modulated by positive 
affect is coupled to exploration. The authors argue that their study reproduces 
behaviors observed in nature. However, their concept of exploration (in contrast 
to ours) is limited to the single behavioral choice of whether or not the robot 
should approach the box. This strongly narrows down the meaning of exploration, 
which is also acknowledged by the authors. Our approach thus contributes to this 
research by systematically investigating how affect can be used to modulate 
(mental) exploration in a broader sense. 
Two fairly different approaches—different from ours and different from each 
other—towards studying the relation between affect and adaptive behavior are the 
work by Lahnstein (2005) and the work by Salichs and Malfaz (2006). Lahnstein 
shows how the emotive episode (i.e., the short term onset and decay of an 
emotion) can result from anticipation of reward in the first phase of approaching a 
reinforced object, while in the second phase the emotive episode is taken over by 
an evaluation of the actual reward received from that object. There is no space 
here to do justice to this approach that is important to the process of emotion 
elicitation in adaptive agents in the spirit of, e.g., Rolls (2000). However, we do 
want to point out the main difference between Lahnstein’s approach and ours, i.e., 
we use affect in the “mood” (long term) sense as influence on the broadness of 
mental exploration, while Lahnstein focuses on the process of elicitation of the 
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short term emotive episode produced by mental anticipation (and reward 
evaluation). It would be interesting to integrate Lahnstein’s result (i.e., the form 
and elicitation of an emotive episode) with ours, such that our measure of long-
term affect is based upon averages over the positive/negative aspect of Lahnteins 
short-term emotion.  
Salichs and Malfaz (2006) introduce an interesting way in which affect can be 
embedded into the value function Q of a standard Reinforcement Learning 
method. They enhance Q-learning so that the reward is based on the 
happiness/sadness of the agent, where happiness and sadness are derived from the 
agent’s wellbeing. Wellbeing is a function over the extent to which the agent’s 
drives are met. So, the more drives met, the happier the agent. This means that 
their agent is intrinsically motivated by affect, and strives to “maximize 
happiness” (Salichs & Malfaz, 2006). They use fear, modeled as a parameter that 
dynamically modulates to what extent the agent chooses—in a world with a 
stochastic reward function—a risky but optimal policy versus a conservative 
policy. Fearless agents emphasize actions that are potentially good, while fearful 
agents more strongly consider the effect of actions that are potentially bad. Their 
approach thus differs from ours, but, again, both approaches could be integrated 
such that wellbeing based on drives provides the reward signal and thus our 
measure for artificial affect is based upon wellbeing averages.  
Strongly related to our approach to affect-modulated exploration is research 
by McMahon et al. (2006), Morgado and Gaspar (2005) and Gadanho (1999; 
2003). We discuss this work in more detail in the rest of this section. 
McMahon et al. (2006) show how the discrete choice between exploration and 
exploitation trials can be controlled by a probability value that is derived from 
measures inspired by affect. This probability uses two measures: one derived from 
the accuracy of prediction for the upcoming reward as given by the learning 
mechanism that learns to predict values for future states; the other derived from 
the actual rewards received. As a result, the probability to explore is high when 
rewards are low and errors are made in the value prediction, while exploitation is 
high when rewards are high and prediction errors are low. In this manner they 
show that agents learn a grid-world problem faster when using this probability 
value to control exploration. Several interesting differences between their 
approach and ours should be noted. First, our artificial affect dynamically 
modulates the amount of mental exploration that influences action selection, 
while their probability is used for a discrete choice between whether a trial is an 
exploration or an exploitation trial. Second, their reward-related measure of affect 
is based on a scaled value for the current reward, where scaling is based on the 
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min and max rewards obtained in the environment. This means that this measure 
is unable to model “boredom” (McMahon et al., 2006). Our measure of affect—
also related to (the history of) rewards—addresses this issue and is a useful 
extension to the work of McMahon and colleagues. When our agent has acted in 
the same environment for a long time, the long and short term averages will 
converge to the same value and as such artificial affect will be lower, even though 
the agent might receive huge rewards. In our first hypothesis, low artificial affect 
results in higher (mental) exploration. This is “boredom” in exactly the same 
nature as proposed in (McMahon et al., 2006). Third, we have extended the 
analysis of the psychological plausibility of reward-related measures for artificial 
affect, which is an issue of future work in (McMahon et al., 2006). 
In her PhD thesis, Gadanho (1999) shows an impressive collection of 
experiments that investigate the relation between affect and adaptive behavior. 
Here we will discuss several of them. First and foremost, she shows that affect 
and emotions can be embedded into adaptive agent architectures in a vast amount 
of ways. These include internally generated emotions as reinforcement to the 
agent, emotion as interrupting triggers that initiate alternative behaviors when 
needed, affect-based learning rates, and affect-based exploration/exploitation 
tradeoffs. Experimental results also vary from positive to negative (in terms of 
behavioral and learning efficiency). Here we will focus mainly on affect as meta-
parameter setting, i.e., affect-based modulation of learning rate and affect-based 
control of exploration rate (Section 4.6 in Gadanho, 1999). 
The experimental setting used is a grid world with an agent that has a neural 
network robot controller. Every action has a neural network that learns to predict 
the value of that action in a certain situation. The networks learn with a learning 
rate η. An action-selection module selects actions, using a temperate parameter T, 
based on the predictions of the neural networks. The grid world contains walls 
(avoid), lights (reinforced) and different starting locations (to vary where the 
robot starts). The goal of the agent is to optimize reward over time. The agent can 
have four potential emotions, fear, happiness, sadness and anger, based on the 
agents internal drives, hunger, pain, body-temperature, restlessness and eating. 
Emotions are elicited continuously during the behavior of the robot. For the 
current discussion it is not necessary to go into the details of the emotion 
elicitation model used. 
In the emotion-modulates-learning-rate case, the intensity of the agent’s 
dominant emotion is used as gain (multiplication) factor for the learning rate 
learning η. This gain is equal to 0 if there is no dominant emotion. Experimental 
results are difficult to interpret. There does not seem to be a generic learning 
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benefit. This is obvious, as the agent can only learn when it experiences an 
emotion. Therefore learning will always be slower. However, the results have to 
be interpreted differently (Gadanho, 1999). One could say that the agent saves 
learning resources by only learning if its emotion indicates a significant situation. 
Indeed, in the long run, the agent does learn appropriate food finding behavior, so 
it is not hindered by slower learning. However, it might be that different tasks 
benefit more from affect-based learning rate modulation than the task used by 
Gadanho. Consider the following. In a task where the environment can suddenly 
change (unlike the task used by Gadanho), an increase in “fear” (e.g., due to 
running around and not eating) could trigger the start of an intensive learning 
period. Once the task has been learned again, fear would drop, and the agent 
would stop learning. While being “bored” (i.e., neutral emotion) the agent will not 
learn. This is good, as it therefore cannot unlearn previously learned behavior 
either. In this scenario, it is clear that affective modulation of the learning rate is 
also useful for adaptation in general, not just for saving learning resources. This 
thought experiment should, however, be investigated experimentally. 
In the emotion-modulates-exploration-rate case, the intensity of the agent’s 
dominant emotion is used to control the Boltzmann temperature. The best results 
in terms of learning performance are found when a negative dominant emotion is 
coupled with an increase in temperature. This means that when the agent is 
feeling bad, it starts to explore. This is exactly the same relation we have found in 
our studies, and as such there seems to be some convergence on the negative 
affect=exploration relation. Further, we have extended the studies by Gadanho in 
the following way. We have studied in more detail the exact behavior of this 
relation, including many alternative relations between affect and exploration. We 
have explicitly grounded the relations to the psychological affect and learning 
literature. Finally, we have explicitly developed several learning tasks (candy 
task, switch task) that enable to better investigate the potential of affective 
modulation. 
Morgado and Gaspar (2005) take a slightly different approach. Theirs is more 
related to our work on affect-bounded thought (Chapter 4), instead of affect-based 
regulation of exploration in learning (Chapter 3; Gadanho, 1999; McMahon et al., 
2006). They present a theoretical framework that explicitly defines a strong, 
dynamic relation between emotion and cognition. We focus on one aspect of their 
framework as this aspect relates strongly to our approach: affective bounding of 
cognitive effort. Affect is derived from how well the agent is doing, analogous to 
our approach. However, it is defined slightly different. Affect—Emotional 
Disposition as they call it—is defined as a point in a two dimensional space. The 
dimensions are change in achievement potential (δP, achievement potential is the 
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degree to which an agent can change the current state of affairs in the direction of 
the goal) and change in goal conduciveness (δF, goal conduciveness is the degree 
of cooperation of the environment regarding goal achievement of the agent). This 
means that if an agent has a certain goal, and it is steadily moving towards it, 
affect will be slightly positive overall, as there are no changes in goal 
conduciveness but there is a constant positive change in achievement potential. 
Why? Because the agent gets closer and closer and therefore its potential to 
change the situation to achieve the goal gets larger and larger (assumed that 
certainty equates potential, hence being close to a goal means a high level of 
certainty about being able to get to your goal). 
In their framework, behavior is understood as the reduction of the difference 
between the current situation (referred to as observation) and a goal situation 
(referred to as motivator). Both observation and motivator are defined as 
coordinates in a cognitive space, referred to as cognitive elements. The 
dimensions of this cognitive space are equal to the many different qualities a 
cognitive element can have. For example, dimensions could include “intensity of 
sunlight”, “outdoor temperature”, “sea and waves”, “having interesting books 
around” and “cocktail availability”. If the current situation is described by a 
cognitive element having low values on all of these dimensions, while a motivator 
cognitive element (a goal) exists that has high values on all of these dimensions, 
one needs a sun-and-beach vacation. The distance between the observation and 
motivator points thus indicates how much behavior is needed in order to get to a 
goal state.  
Affect relates to cognition and behavior in the following way. Decrease of 
distance between the points defining current situation and goal state relates to an 
increase in achievement potential, and increase in speed with which the agent 
moves towards the goal state relates to increase in goal conduciveness. If I book 
my vacation and am on the road, my potential to achieve my goal increases, and 
there is a sudden increase of the goal-achieving speed (acceleration of my 
observation cognitive element in the cognitive space with respect to the motivator 
element). As such, positive affect relates to positive δP and δF, while negative 
affect relates to negative δP and δF.  
Affect influences information processing by regulating attentional effort of 
the agent in two ways. Affective signals are integrated over time into a dynamic 
threshold ε. If a cognitive element has an activation value (let’s call this its 
saliency) that is higher than the threshold ε, it is considered in the thought process 
of the agent. Second, a similar threshold ω is used to control the amount of 
processing the agent has available before it needs to act. Affect thus controls what 
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cognitive elements enter working memory, as well as how long these elements 
can stay there for active contemplation. It should be clear that there is a strong 
analogy with our approach. With regards to affect-based control of resources, the 
key differences are: 
First, we have defined affect in terms of average reward signal changes, while 
Morgado and Gaspar (2005) exclusively define affect in terms of goal-orientation. 
This is rather limited, as it assumes a purely cognitive interpretation of affect 
elicitation and it needs a representation of a future goal. For their purpose this 
might be sufficient, but for modeling more down-to-earth effects on learning and 
adaptation (such as the influence of affect on exploration versus exploitation), 
defining affect in terms of goals is problematic. Representations of future goals 
might simply not be available. 
Second, we specifically—and more elaborately—relate our measure of affect 
to psychological studies that relate to the influence of affect on learning and 
information processing. While it is clear that our measure of affect is simple (and 
in many aspect simplistic), it is strongly grounded in psychological findings. This 
cannot be said of affect as per Morgado and Gaspar (2005). For example, it is not 
clear in their model what it actually means if δP and δF do not have the same 
sign, nor is it very clear how emotions relate to the four possible quadrants of δP 
and δF. 
Third, our approach focuses on the influence of affect-based control of the 
amount of processing (i.e., internal simulation) on the learning effectiveness of an 
adaptive agent, while Morgado and Gaspar (2005) focus on problem solving 
effectiveness by coupling their affect-based control mechanism to a standard 
planner. The planner was embedded into an agent that had to continuously plan 
routes to changing food location in order to maximize food intake. The main 
result of their experiment is that affect-based control can indeed make more 
efficient use of planning resources than non-affect-controlled planners. 
Regardless of the differences, their results are promising and complementary 
to ours. They show that even when starting from a very different theoretical point 
of view, affect-based control of information processing can be a useful method to 
help resource-bounded agents adapt. 
5.2 Future Work 
The maximum total amount of simulation used in the setups in Chapter 4 could be 
fixed, while affect controls when to simulate. Now, experiments can be conducted 
to completely control for the generic effect of the positive influence of more 
simulation on learning. Arousal could control simulation by, e.g., controlling the 
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depth of anticipation (or the forgetting rate of the memory so that arousal 
influences the adaptation speed of the memory). 
Even though affective control of exploration versus exploitation seems 
promising for adaptive behavior and is compatible with psychological findings, 
our learning model is specific. This means that our claims are hard to generalize. 
A good way to further investigate the mechanisms of affective control introduced 
in this chapter is to use different learning architectures, such as Soar, or ACT-R. 
Using the ACT-R architecture, Belavkin (2004) has shown that affect can be used 
to control the search through the solution space, which resulted in better problem-
solving performance. Belavkin has an information-theoretic approach towards 
modeling affect that is related to the rule state of the ACT-R agent. A key 
difference is thus that our artificial affect is based on a comparison of 
reinforcement signal averages. Further we have explicitly modeled affect 
according to different theoretical views on the relation between affect and 
information processing and compared these different views experimentally. The 
“Salt” model by Botelho and Coelho (1998) relates to Belavkin’s approach in the 
sense that the agent's effort to search for a solution in its memory depends on, 
among other parameters, the agent's mood valence. 
As Soar has recently been extended with RL mechanisms, called Soar_RL 
(Nason & Laird, 2004), it is becoming a good candidate for adaptive behavior 
research. First, Soar is a well-understood architecture. Second, Soar allows many 
forms of planning, enabling a better comparison between affective control of 
planning versus forward internal simulation. We are currently investigating the 
affect-based control techniques introduced in Chapter 3 and 4 in Soar_RL 
(Hogewoning et al., 2007). 
Affective control should be investigated in other types of learning 
environments, as different environments have their own set of difficulties and 
particularities for action selection and learning, and imply different functions and 
benefits for emotion (Cañamero, 2000). Also, more complex and more realistic 
tasks should be used to test the affect-based mechanisms proposed in the previous 
two chapters. 
On the biological level, there is considerable evidence of the link between 
positive affect, adaptive behavior and dopamine (Ashby et al., 1999), as well as 
dopamine, RL, and adaptive behavior (Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Montague, 
Hyman & Cohen, 2004; Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997). Relating our model 
to this literature is a direction for future work. 
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Until now, we have used affect as an abstraction for how well the agent is 
doing. This abstraction is a long-term signal, based on the reinforcement the agent 
receives during the process of learning. We have experimented with controlling 
meta-parameters by means of artificial affect (exploration versus exploitation, 
Chapter 3; broad versus narrow thoughts implemented via internal simulation of 
potential interaction with the grid world, Chapter 4). Artificial affect was thus 
related to mood (long timescale, not directed at a specific situation). Furthermore, 
artificial affect was a signal originating from the agent itself.  
Affect can also be an abstraction for the positiveness versus negativeness of a 
current situation or object, as well as being elicited more directly by an external 
source (e.g., when used in affective communication). In this chapter we take such 
an approach. We thus part from the definition of affect introduced in Chapter 2. In 
this chapter, affect is a short-term signal communicated by a human observer to a 
learning simulated robot. The common part in this definition of affect and the one 
introduced in Chapter 2 is that affect still is an abstraction for positive versus 
negative.  
In this chapter we briefly present EARL, our framework for the systematic 
study of the relation between emotion, adaptation and reinforcement learning. 
EARL is a framework, currently a prototype, that embodies many of the ways in 
which affect can influence learning, when learning is conceptualized as 
Reinforcement Learning (RL). EARL enables the study of, among other things, (a) 
affect as reinforcement to the robot (both internally generated as well as socially 
communicated; this chapter), (b) affect as perceptual feature to the robot (again 
internally generated and social), (c) affect resulting from reinforced robot 
behavior (see also Chapter 2), and (d) affect as meta-parameters for the robot’s 
learning mechanism (Chapter 3 and 4). EARL can be seen as the concretization of 
the insights developed while researching the topics described in Chapters 2 to 5 of 
this thesis. 
In this chapter, we focus on one aspect of EARL: the ability to model 
communicated affect by a human observer used as reinforcement by the robot. In 
humans, emotions are crucial to learning. For example, a parent—observing a 
child—uses emotional expression to encourage or discourage specific behaviors. 
Emotional expression can therefore be a reinforcement signal to a child. We 
hypothesize that affective facial expressions facilitate robot learning, and compare 
a social setting with a non-social one to test this. The non-social setting consists 
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of a simulated robot that learns to solve a typical RL task in a continuous grid-
world environment. The social setting additionally consists of a human (parent) 
observing the simulated robot (child). The human’s emotional expressions are 
analyzed in real time and converted to an additional reinforcement signal used by 
the robot; positive expressions result in reward, negative expressions in 
punishment. We quantitatively show that the “social robot” indeed learns to solve 
its task significantly faster than its “non-social sibling”. We conclude that this 
presents strong evidence for the potential benefit of affective communication with 
humans in the Reinforcement Learning loop. 
6.1 Introduction 
In humans, emotion influences thought and behavior in many ways (Custers & 
Aarts, 2005; Damasio, 1994; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Rolls, 1999). For 
example, emotion influences how humans process information by controlling the 
broadness versus the narrowness of attention (see also Chapter 3 and 4). Also, 
emotion functions as a social signal that communicates reinforcement of behavior 
in, e.g., parent-child relations. Computational modeling (including robot 
modeling) has proven to be a viable method of investigating the relation between 
emotion and learning (Broekens, Kosters & Verbeek, 2007; Gadanho, 2003), 
emotion and problem solving (Belavkin, 2004; Bothello & Coehlo, 1998), 
emotion and social robots (Breazeal, 2001; for review see Fong, Nourbakhsh & 
Dautenhahn, 2003), and emotion, motivation and behavior selection (Avila-
Garcia & Cañamero, 2004; Blanchard and Cañamero, 2006; Cos-Aguilera et al., 
2005; Velasquez, 1998). Although many approaches exist and much work has 
been done on computational modeling of emotional influences on thought and 
behavior, none explicitly targets the study of the relation between emotion and 
learning using a complete end-to-end framework in a Reinforcement Learning 
context1. By this we mean a framework that enables systematic quantitative study 
of the relation between affect and RL in a large variety of ways, including (a) 
affect as reinforcement to the robot (both internally generated as well as socially 
communicated), (b) affect as perceptual feature to the robot (again internally 
generated and social), (c) affect resulting from reinforced robot behavior, and (d) 
affect as meta-parameters for the robot’s learning mechanism. In this chapter we 
present such a framework. We call our framework EARL, short for the systematic 
study of the relation between emotion, adaptation and reinforcement learning. 
                                                 
1 Although the work by Gadanho (2003) is a partial exception as it explicitly addresses 
emotion in the context of RL. However, this work does not address social human input and 
social robot output.  
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Here we specifically focus on the influence of socially communicated emotion 
on learning in a Reinforcement Learning context. We show, using our framework 
EARL, that human emotional expressions can be used as an additional 
reinforcement signal used by a simulated robot. 
The robot’s task is to optimize food-finding behavior while navigating 
through a continuous grid-world environment. The grid world is not discrete, nor 
is an attempt made to define discrete states based on the continuous input. The 
grid world contains walls, path and food patches. The robot perceives its direct 
surroundings as they are. We have developed an action-based learning mechanism 
that learns to predict values of actions based on the current perception of the agent 
(note that in this chapter we use the terms agent and robot interchangeably). Every 
action has its own Multi-Layer Percepton network (see also Lin, 1993) that learns 
to predict a modified version of the Q-value (Sutton & Barto, 1998). We have 
used this setup so that observed robot behavior can be extrapolated to the real 
world; building the actual robot with appropriate sensors and actuators would, in 
theory, suffice to replicate the results. We explain our modeling method in more 
detail in Section 6.5. 
As mentioned above, we study the effect of a human’s emotional expression 
on the learning behavior of the robot. In humans, emotions are crucial to learning. 
For example, a parent—observing a child—uses emotional expression to 
encourage or discourage specific behaviors. In this case, the emotional expression 
is used to setup an affective communication channel (Picard, 1997) and is used to 
communicate a reinforcement signal to a child. In this chapter we take affect to 
mean the positiveness versus the negativeness of a situation, object, etc. (see 
Rolls, 1999; Russell, 2003; and Broekens, Kosters & Verbeek, 2007, or Chapter 2 
for a more detailed argumentation of this point of view). The human observes the 
simulated robot while it learns to find food, and affect in the human’s facial 
expression is recognized by the robot in real time2. A smile is interpreted as 
communicating positive affect and therefore converted to a small additional 
reward (additional to the reinforcement the robot receives from its simulated 
environment). The expression of fear is interpreted as communicating negative 
affect and therefore converted to a small additional punishment. We call this the 
social setting. The non-social setting is a standard experimental Reinforcement 
Learning setup without human input.  
                                                 
2  In this chapter, affect is thus a short-term signal elicited by an external source, as 
opposed to affect defined in Chapter 2 where it is a long-term signal elicited by 
mechanisms in the agent itself based on its learning performance. 
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We hypothesized that robot learning (in a RL context as described above) is 
facilitated by additional social reinforcement. Our experimental results support 
this hypothesis. We compared the learning performance of our simulated robot in 
the social and non-social settings, by analyzing averages of learning curves. The 
main contribution of this research is that it presents quantitative evidence of the 
fact that a human-in-the-loop can boost learning performance in real-time, in a 
plausible learning environment. We belief this is an important result. It provides a 
solid base for further study of human mediated robot learning in the context of 
real-world applicable Reinforcement Learning, using the communication protocol 
nature has provide for that purpose, i.e., emotional expression and recognition. 
Therefore, our results suggest that robots can be trained and their behaviors 
optimized using natural social cues. This facilitates human-robot interaction. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 we explain in 
some more detail our view of affect, emotion and how affect influences learning 
in humans. In Section 6.3 we briefly introduce EARL, our complete framework. In 
Section 6.4 we describe how communicated affect is linked to a social 
reinforcement signal. In Section 6.5, we explain our method of study (e.g., the 
grid world, the learning mechanism). Section 6.6 discusses the results and Section 
6.7 discusses these in a broader context and presents concluding remarks and 
future work. 
6.2 Affect as Reinforcement 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, affect influences thought and behavior 
in a variety of ways. For example, a person’s mood influences processing style 
and attention, emotions influence how one thinks about objects, situations and 
persons, and emotion is related to learning behaviors as well as can be used to 
modify learning parameters in artificial learning agents. So, affect regulates 
behavior. 
Affect also regulates behavior of others. Obvious in human development, 
expression (and subsequent recognition) of emotion is important to communicate 
(dis)approval of the actions of others. This is typically important in parent-child 
relations. Parents use emotional expression to guide behavior of infants. 
Emotional interaction is essential for learning. Striking examples are children 
with an autistic spectrum disorder, typically characterized by a restricted 
repertoire of behaviors and interests, as well as social and communicative 
impairments such as difficulty in joint attention, difficulty recognizing and 
expressing emotion, and lacking of a social smile (for review see Charman & 
Baird, 2002). Apparently, children suffering from this disorder have both a 
Affect and Learning: Affect as Reinforcement 
 103 
difficulty in building up a large set of complex behaviors and a difficulty 
understanding emotional expressions and giving the correct social responses to 
these. This disorder provides a clear example of the interplay between learning 
behaviors and being able to process emotional cues. 
In this chapter we specifically focus on the influence of socially 
communicated affect on learning: we focus on the role of affect in guiding 
learning in a social human-robot setting.  We use affect to denote the positiveness 
versus negativeness of a situation. We ignore the arousal a certain situation might 
bring. Positive affect characterizes a situation as good, while negative affect 
characterizes that situation as bad (e.g., Russell, 2003). Further, we use affect to 
refer to the short term timescale: i.e., to emotion. We hypothesize that affect 
communicated by a human observer can enhance robot learning. In our study we 
assume that the recognition of affect translates into a reinforcement signal. Thus, 
the robot uses a social reinforcement in addition to the reinforcement it receives 
from its environment while it is building a model of the environment using 
Reinforcement Learning mechanisms. In the following sections we first explain 
our framework after which we detail our method and discuss results and further 
work. 
6.3 EARL: A Computational Framework to Study the Relation 
between Emotion, Adaptation and Reinforcement Learning. 
To study the relation between emotion, adaptation and Reinforcement Learning, 
we have developed an end-to-end framework. The framework consists of four 
parts: 
 An emotion recognition module, recognizing emotional facial expression in 
real time. 
 A Reinforcement Learning agent to which the recognized emotion can be fed 
as input. 
 An artificial emotion module slot, this slot can be used to plug in different 
models of emotion into the learning agent that produce the artificial emotion 
of the agent as output. The modules can use all of the information that is 
available to the agent (such as action repertoire, reward history, etc.). This 
emotion can be used by the agent as intrinsic reward, as metalearning 
parameter, or as input for the expression module. 
 An expression module, consisting of a robot head with the following degrees 
of freedom: eyes moving up and down, ears moving up and down on the 
outside, lips moving up and down, eyelids moving up and down on the 
outside, and RGB eye colors. 
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Emotion recognition is based on quite a crude mechanism using the face 
tracking abilities of OpenCV3. It uses 9 points on the face each defined by a blue 
sticker: 1 on the tip of the nose, 2 above each eyebrow, 1 at each mouth corner 
and 1 on the upper and lower lip. The recognition module is configured to store 
multiple prototype point constellations. The user is prompted to express a certain 
emotion and press space while doing so. For every emotional expression (in the 
case of our experiment neutral, happy and afraid), the module records the 
positions of the 9 points relative to the nose. This is a prototype point vector. 
After configuration, to determine the current emotional expression in real time, 
the module calculates a weighted distance from the current point vector (read in 
real-time from a web-cam mounted on the computer screen) to the prototype 
vectors. Different points get different weights. This results in an error measure for 
every prototype expression. This error measure is the basis for a normalized 
vector of recognized emotion intensities. The recognition module sends this 
vector to the agent (e.g., neutral 0.3, happy 0.6, fear 0.1). Our choice of weights 
and features has been inspired by work of others (for review see Pantic & 
Rothkrantz, 2000). Of course the state of the art in emotion recognition is more 
advanced than our current approach. However, as our focus is affective learning 
and not the recognition process per se, we contented ourselves with a low fidelity 
solution (working almost perfectly for neutral, happy and afraid, when the user 
keeps the head in about the same position). 
Note that we do not aim at generically recognizing emotional expressions. 
Instead, we tune the recognition module to the individual observer to 
accommodate his/her personal and natural facial expressions. 
The Reinforcement Learning agent receives this recognized emotion and can 
use this in multiple ways: as reward, as information (additional state input), as 
metaparameter (e.g., to control learning rate), and as social input directly into its 
emotion model. In this chapter we focus on social reinforcement, in particular on 
the recognized emotion being used as additional reward or punishment. The 
agent, its learning mechanism and how it uses the recognized emotion as 
reinforcement are detailed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. 
The artificial emotion model slot enables us to plug in different emotion 
models based on different theories to study their behavior in the context of 
Reinforcement Learning. For example, we have developed a model based on the 
theory by Rolls (1999), who argues that many emotions can be related to reward 
and punishment and the lack thereof. This model enables us to see if the agent’s 
situation results in a plausible (e.g., scored by a set of human observers) emotion 
                                                 
3 http://www.intel.com/technology/computing/opencv/index.htm 
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emerging from the model. By scoring the plausibility of the resulting emotion, we 
can learn about the compatibility of, e.g., Rolls’ emotion theory with 
Reinforcement Learning. However, in the current study we have not used this 
module, as we focus on affective input as social reward. 
The emotion expression part is a physical robot head. The head can express an 
arbitrary emotion by mapping it to its facial features, again according to a certain 
theory. Currently our head expresses emotions according to the Pleasure Arousal 
Dominance (PAD) model by Mehrabian (1980). We have a continuous mapping 
from the 3-dimensional PAD space to the features of the robot face. As such we 
do not need to explicitly work with emotional categories or intensities of the 
categories. The mapping appears to work quite well, but is in need of validation 
study (again using human observers). We have not used the robot head for the 
studies reported upon in this chapter. 
We now describe in detail how we coupled the recognized human emotion to 
the social reinforcement signal for the robot. Then we explain in detail our 
adapted Reinforcement Learning mechanism (such that it enabled learning in 
continuous environments), and our method of study as well as our results.  
6.4 Emotional Expressions as Reinforcement Signal. 
As mentioned earlier, emotional expressions and facial expressions in particular 
can be used as social cues for the desirability of a certain action. In other words, 
an emotional expression can express reward and punishment if directed at an 
individual. We focus on communicated affect, i.e., the positiveness versus 
negativeness of the expression. If the human expresses a smile (happy face) this is 
interpreted as positive affect. If the human expresses fear, this is interpreted as 
negative affect. We interpret a neutral face as affectless. 
We have studied the mechanism of communicated affective feedback in a 
human-robot interaction setup. The human’s face is analyzed (as explained above) 
and a vector of emotional expression intensities is fed to the learning agent. The 
agent takes the expression with the highest intensity as dominant, and equates this 
with a social reward of, e.g., 2 (happy), −2 (fear) and 0 (neutral). This is 
obviously a simplified setup, as the human face communicates much more subtle 
affective messages and at the very least is able to communicate the degree of 
reward and punishment. However, to investigate our hypothesis (affective human 
feedback increases robot learning performance), the just described mechanism is 
sufficient. 
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The social reward is simply added to the “normal” reward the agent receives 
from the environment. So, if the agent walks on a path somewhere in the grid 
world, it receives a reward (say 0), but when the user smiles, the resulting actual 
reward becomes 2, while if the user looks afraid, the resulting reward becomes 
−2.  
6.5 Method 
To study the impact of social reinforcement on robot learning, we have used our 
framework in the following experimental setup. 
A simulated robot (agent) “lives” in a continuous grid-world environment 
consisting of wall, food and path patches (Figure 6.1). These are the features of 
the world observable by the agent. The agent cannot walk on walls, but can walk 
on path and food. Walls and path are neutral (have a reinforcement of 0.0), while 
food has a reinforcement of 10. One cell in the grid is assumed to be a 20 by 20 
spatial unit object (let’s say 20 x 20 centimeters). Even though wall, path and 
food are placed on a grid, the world is continuous in the following sense: the 
agent moves by turning or walking in a certain direction using an arbitrary speed 
(in our experiments set at 3 spatial units per time unit), and perceives its direct 
surroundings (within a radius of 20 spatial units) according to its looking 
direction (one out of 16 possible directions). 
The agent uses a “relative eight-neighbor metric” meaning that it perceives 
features of the world at 8 points around it, with each point at a distance of 20 from 
the center point of the agent and each point at an interval of 1/4 PI radians, with 
the first point always being exactly in front of it (Figure 6.1). 
The state perceived by the agent (its percept) is a real-valued vector of inputs 
between 0 and 1; each input is defined by the relative contribution of a certain 
feature in the agent-relative direction corresponding to the input. For example, if 
the agent sees a wall just in front of it (i.e., the center point of a wall object is 
exactly at a distance of 20 units as measured from the current agent location in its 
looking direction) the first value in its perceived state would be equal to 1. This 
value can be anywhere between 0 and 1 depending on the distance of that point to 
the feature. For the three types of features, the agent thus has 3x8=24 real-valued 
inputs between 0 and 1 as its perceived world state s (Figure 6.1). Therefore the 
agent can approach objects (e.g., a wall) from a large number of possible angles 
and positions, with every intermediate position being possible. 
For all practical purposes, the learning environment can be considered 
continuous. States are not discretized to facilitate learning. Instead we chose to 
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use the perceived state as is, to maximize compatibility of our experimental 
results with real-world robots. However, Reinforcement Learning in continuous 
environments introduces several important problems for standard RL techniques, 
such as Q-learning, mainly because a large number of potentially similar states 
exist as well as a very long path length between start and goal states can occur 
making value propagation difficult. 
We now briefly explain our adapted RL mechanism. As RL in continuous 
environments is not specifically the topic of the chapter we have left out some of 
the rational for our choices. 
Figure 6.1. The experimental grid
world. The agent is the “circle with 
nose” in the top right of the maze, In 
this figure the agent is looking to the 
right. The 8 white dots denote the 
points perceived by the agent. These 
points are connected to the elements 
of state s (neural input to the MLPs 
used by the agent) as depicted. This is 
repeated for all possible features, in 
our case: path (gray), wall (black), and 
food (light gray), in that order (as depicted in the smaller representation of the neural 
network). The “e” denotes the cell in which social reward can be administered through 
smiling or expression of fear, the “1” and “2” denote key locations at which the agent has to
learn to differentiate its behavior, i.e., either turn left (“1”) or right (“2”). The agent starts at
“s”. The task enforces a non-reactive best solution (by which we mean that there is no 
direct mapping from reward to action that enables the agent to find the shortest path to the 
food). If the agent would learn that turning right is good, it would keep walking in circles. If
the agent learns that turning left is good, it would not get to the food 
 
The agent learns to find the path to the food, and optimizes this path. At every 
step the agent takes, the agent updates its model of the expected benefit of a 
certain action as follows. It learns to predict the value of actions in a certain 
perceived state s, using an adapted form of Q-learning. The value function, Qa(s), 
is approximated using a multilayer perceptron (MLP), with 3x8=24 input, 24 
hidden, and one output neuron(s), with s being the real-valued input to the MLP, a 
the action to which the network belongs, and the output neuron converging to 
Qa(s). As a result, every action of the agent (5 in total: forward, left, right, left and 
forward, right and forward) has its own network (see also Gadanho, 1999). The 
output of the action networks are used as action values in a standard Boltzmann 
action-selection function (Sutton & Barto, 1998). An action network is trained on 
the Q-value—i.e., Qa(s)← Qa(s)+α(r+γQ(s’)−Qa(s))—where r is the reward 
resulting from action a in state s, s’ is the resulting next state, Q(s’) the value of 
state s’, α is the learning rate and γ the discount factor (Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
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The learning rate equals 1 in our experiments (because the learning rate of the 
MLP is used to control speed of learning, not α), and the discount factor equals 
0.99. To cope with a continuous grid world, we adapted standard Q-learning in 
the following way: 
First, the value Qa(s) used to train the MLP network for action a is topped 
such that min(r, Qa(s’))<=Qa(s)<=max(r, Q(s’)). As a result, individual Qa(s) 
values can never be larger or smaller than any of the rewards encountered in the 
world. This enables a discount factor close to or equal to 1, needed to efficiently 
propagate back the food’s reward through a long sequence of steps. In continuous, 
cyclic, worlds, training the MLP on normal Q-values using a discount factor close 
to 1 can result in several problems not further discussed here. 
Second, per step of the agent, we train the action-state networks not only on 
Qa(s)← Qa(s) +α(r+γQ(s’) −Qa(s)) but also on Qa(s’) ← Qa(s’). The latter seems 
unnecessary but is quite important. RL assumes that values are propagated back, 
but MLPs generalize while trained. As a result, training an MLP on Qa(s) also 
influences its value prediction for s’ in the same direction, just because the inputs 
are very close. In effect, part of the value is actually propagated forward; credit is 
partly assigned to what comes next. This violates the RL assumption just 
mentioned. Note that the value Q(s’) is predicted using another MLP, called the 
value network, that is trained in the same way as the action networks using the 
topped-off value and forward propagation compensation. 
Third, for the agent to better discriminate between situations that are 
perceptually similar, such as position “1” and “2” in Figure 1, for each action-
network the agent also uses a second network trained on the value of not taking 
the action. This network is trained when other actions are taken but not when the 
action to which the “negation” network belongs is taken. In effect, the agent has 
two MLPs per action. This enables the agent to better learn that, e.g., “right” is 
good in situation “2” but not in situation “1”. Without this “negation” network, 
the agent learns much less efficient (results not shown). To summarize, our agent 
has 5 actions, it has 11 MLPs in total: one to train Q(s), 5 to train Qa(s) and 5 to 
train Q-a(s). All networks use forward propagation compensation and a topped-off 
value to train upon. The MLP predictions for Qa(s) and Q-a(s) are simply added, 
and the result is used for action selection. 
To study the effect of communicated affect as social reward, we created the 
following setup. First an agent is trained without social reward. The agent 
repeatedly tries to find the food for 200 trials, i.e., one run. The agent 
continuously learns and acts during these trials. To facilitate learning, we use a 
common method to vary the MLP learning rate and the Boltzmann action 
Affect and Learning: Affect as Reinforcement 
 109 
selection β derived from simulated annealing. The Boltzmann β equals to 
3+(trial/200)*(6−3), effectively varying from 3 (exploration) in the first trial to 6 
(exploitation) in the last. The MLP learning rate equals 
0.1−(trial/200)*(0.1−0.001) effectively varying from 0.1 in the first trial to 0.001 
in the last. We repeated the experiment 200 times, resulting in 200 runs. Average 
learning curves are plotted for these 200 runs using a linear smoothing factor 
equal to 6 (Figure 6.2). 
Second, a new agent is trained with social reinforcement, i.e., a human 
observer looking at the agent with his/her face analyzed by the agent, translating a 
smile to a social reward and a fearful expression to a social punishment. Again, 
average learning curves are plotted using a linear smoothing factor equal to 6, but 
now based on the average per trial over 15 runs (Figure 6.2). We experimented 
with three different social settings: (a) a moderate social reinforcement, rhuman, 
from trial 20 to 30, where the social reinforcement is either −0.5 or 0.5 (happy vs. 
fearful, respectively); (b) a strong social reinforcement, rhuman, from trial 20 to 25 
where social reinforcement is either −2 or 2, i.e., more extreme social 
reinforcement but for a shorter period; (c) a social reinforcement, rhuman, from trial 
29 to 45 where social reinforcement is either −2 or 2 while (in addition to settings 
a and b) the agent trains an additional MLP to predict the direct social 
reinforcement, rhuman, based on the current state s. The MLP is trained to learn 
Rsocial(s) as given by the human reinforcement rhuman. After trial 45, the direct 
social reinforcement from the observer, rhuman, is replaced by the learned social 
reinforcement Rsocial(s). So, during the critical period (the trial intervals 
mentioned) of social setting a, b and c, the total reinforcement is a composite 
reward equal to R(s)+rhuman. Only in setting c, and only after the critical period 
until the end of the run, the composite reward equals R(s)+Rsocial(s). In all other 
periods, the reinforcement is as usual, i.e., R(s). As a result, in setting c the agent 
can continue using an additional social reinforcement signal that has been learned 
based on what its human tutor thinks about certain situations. 
The process of giving affective feedback to a Reinforcement Learning agent 
appeared to be quite a long, intensive and attention absorbing experience. As a 
result, it was physically impossible to observe the agent during all runs and all 
trials in the entire grid world (after 2 hours of smiling to a computer screen one is 
exhausted and has burning eyes and painful facial muscles). To be able to test our 
hypothesis, we restricted social input to the cell indicated by ‘e’ (Figure 6.1). 
Only when the agent moves around in this cell (and is in a social input trial as 
defined by the social settings described above), the simulation speed of the 
experiment is set to one action per second enabling human affective feedback.  
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6.6 Results 
The results clearly show that learning is facilitated by social reward. In all three 
social settings (Figure 6.2a, b and c) the agent needs fewer steps to find the food 
during the trials in which the observer provides assistance to the agent by 
expressing positive or negative affect. Interestingly, at the moment the observer 
stops giving social rewards, the agent gradually looses the learning benefit it had 
accumulated. This is independent of the size of the social reward (both social 
learning curves in Figure 6.2a and b show dips that eventually return to the non-
social learning curve). This can be easily explained. The social reward was not 
given long enough for the agent to internalize the path to the food (i.e., propagate 
back the food’s reward to the beginning of the path). As soon as the observer 
stops giving social rewards, the agent starts to forget these rewards, i.e., the MLPs 
are again trained to predict values as they are without social input. So, either the 
observer should continue to give social rewards until the agent has internalized 
the solution, or the agent needs to be able to build a representation of the social 
reward function and use it when actual social reward is not available. We have 
experimented with the second (social setting c): we enabled the agent to learn the 
social reward function. Now the agent uses actual social reward at the emotional 
input spot (‘e’, Figure 6.1) during the critical period, and uses its social reward 
prediction when social input stops. This is the third social setup. Results clearly 
show that the agent is now able to keep the benefit it had accumulated from using 
social rewards (Figure 6.2c). These results show that a combination of using 
social reward and learning a social reward function facilitates robot learning, by 
enabling the robot to quicker learn the optimal solution to the food due to the 
direct social reward as well as keep that solution by using its learned social 
reward function when social reward stops. 
   
 Figure 6.2a. Results of the learning experiment 
where the social setting a is compared with the 
non-social setting. In social setting a, social input 
is given between trial 20 and 30, where the social 
reward is either −0.5 or 0.5 (happy vs. fearful, 
respectively). On the x-axis the number of times 
the food is found is shown (trials); on the y-axis
the average number of steps needed to find the 
food is shown. 
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 Figure 6.2b. Results of the learning experiment 
where the social setting b is compared with the 
non-social setting. In setting b, the social input is 
given between trial 20 and 25 where social reward 
is either −2 or 2, i.e., more extreme social rewards 
but for a shorter period. Axes are as in the 
previous figure. 
 Figure 6.2c. Results of the learning experiment 
where the social setting c is compared with the 
non-social setting. In setting c, social input is 
given between trial 29 to 45, where social reward 
is either −2 or 2. The agent trains an additional 
MLP to predict the social reward. Axes are as in 
the previous figure. 
6.7 Conclusion, Discussion and Further Work 
Our results show that affective interaction in human-in-the-loop learning can 
provide significant benefit to the efficiency of a Reinforcement Learning robot in 
a continuous grid world. We believe our results are particularly important to 
human-robot interaction for the following reasons. First, advanced robots such as 
robot companions, robot workers, etc., will need to be able to adapt their behavior 
according to human feedback. For humans it is important to be able to give such 
feedback in a natural way, e.g., using emotional expression. Second, humans will 
not want to give feedback all the time, it is therefore important to be able to define 
critical learning periods as well as have an efficient social reward system. We 
have shown the feasibility of both. Social input during the critical learning periods 
was enough to show a learning benefit, and the relatively easy step of adding an 
MLP to learn the social reward function enabled the robot to use the social reward 
when the observer is away.  
We have specifically used an experimental setup that is compatible with a 
real-world robot: we have used continuous inputs and MLP-based training of 
which it is known that it can cope with noise and generalize over training 
examples. We believe our results can be generalized to real-world robotics. 
However, this most certainly needs to be experimented with. 
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Many interesting computational approaches exist that study emotion in the 
context of robots and agents, of which we mention one explicitly here as it is 
particularly related to our work: the adaptive, social chatter bot Cobot (Isbell et 
al., 2001). Cobot learns the information preferences of its chat partners, by 
analyzing the chat messages for explicit and implicit reward signals. These signals 
are then used to adapt its model of providing information to that chat partner. So, 
Cobot effectively uses social feedback as reward, as does our simulated robot. 
However, there are several important differences. Cobot does not address the 
issue of a human observer parenting the robot using affective communication. 
Instead, it learns based on reinforcement extracted from words used by the user 
during the chat sessions in which Cobot is participating. Also, Cobot is not a real-
time behaving robot, but a chat robot. As a consequence, time constraints related 
to the exact moment of administering reward or punishment are less important. 
Finally Cobot is restricted regarding its action-taking initiative, while our robot is 
continuously acting, with the observer reacting in real-time. 
Future work includes a broader evaluation of the EARL framework including 
its ability to express emotions generated by an emotional model plugged into the 
RL agent. Further, it is interesting to experiment with controlling meta parameters 
(such as exploration/exploitation and learning rate) based on the agent’s internal 
emotional state or social rewards, as has been done in the discrete grid-world case 
in Chapter 3 and 4. Currently we use simulated annealing-like mechanisms to 
control these parameters. 
Further, the agent could try to learn what an emotional expression predicts. In 
this case, the agent would use the emotional expression of the human in a more 
pure form (e.g., as a real-valued vector of facial feature intensities as part of its 
perceived state s). This might enable the agent to learn what the emotional 
expression means for itself instead of simply using it as reward. 
Finally, a somewhat futuristic possibility is actually quite close: affective 
Robot-Robot interaction. Using our setting, it is quite easy to train one robot in a 
certain environment (parent), make it observe an untrained robot in that same 
environment (child), and enable it to express its emotion as generated by its 
emotion model using its robot head, an expression recognized and translated into 
social rewards by the child robot. Apart from the fact that it is somewhat dubious 
if such a setup is actually useful (why not send the social reward as a value 
through a wireless connection to the child), it would enable robots to use the same 
communication protocol as humans. 
Regarding the “usefulness” argument just put forward, it seems to apply to 
our experiment as well. Why didn’t we just simulate affective feedback by 
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pushing a button for positive reward and pushing another for negative reward (or 
even worse, by simulating a button press)? From the point of view of the robot 
this is entirely true, however, from the point of view of the human—and therefore 
the point of view of the human-robot interaction—not at all. Humans naturally 
communicate social signals using their face, not by pushing buttons. The process 
of expressing an emotion is quite different from the process of pushing a button, 
even if it was only for the fact that it takes more time and effort to initiate the 
expression and that the perception of an expression is the perception of a process 
and not of a discrete event (like a button press). In a real-world scenario with a 
mobile robot in front of you it would be quite awkward to have to push buttons 
instead of just smile when you are happy about its behavior. Further it would be 
quite useful if the robot could recognize you being happy or sad, and gradually 
learn to adapt its behavior even when you did not intentionally give it a reward or 
punishment. Abstracting away from the actual affective interaction patterns 
between the human and the robot in our experiment would have rendered the 
experiment almost completely trivial. Nobody would be surprised to see that the 
robot learns better if an intermediate reward is given halfway its route towards 
food. Our aim was to investigate if affective communication can enhance learning 
in a Reinforcement Learning setting. Taking out the affective part would have 
been quite strange indeed. 
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In this chapter we take a theoretical approach towards computational modeling of 
emotion. Affect in this chapter is thus interpreted in a broader sense, as in related 
to emotion. This is different from the interpretations of affect presented in Chapter 
2 to 6. To avoid any potential misunderstanding, in this chapter we use the term 
emotion, not affect. We present a formal way in which emotion theories can be 
described and compared with the computational models based upon them. We 
apply this formal notation to cognitive appraisal theory, a family of cognitive 
theories of emotion, and show how the formal notation can help to advance 
appraisal theory and help to evaluate computational models based on cognitive 
appraisal theory: the main contributions of this chapter. Although this chapter is 
quite different from the others, it fits within the general approach: that is, the use 
of computational models to evaluate emotion theories. As such it can be viewed 
as a high-level analysis of issues associated with computational modeling of 
emotion. 
Cognitive appraisal theories (CATs) explain human emotions as a result of the 
subjective evaluation of events that occur in the environment. Recently, 
arguments have been put forward that discuss the need for formal descriptions in 
order to further advance the field of cognitive appraisal theory. Formal 
descriptions can provide detailed predictions and help to integrate different CATs 
by providing clear identification of the differences and similarities between 
theories. A computational model of emotion that is based on a CAT also needs 
formal descriptions specifying the theory on which it is based. In this chapter we 
propose a formal notation for the declarative semantics of the structure of 
appraisal. We claim that this formalism facilitates both integration of appraisal 
theories as well as the design and evaluation of computational models of emotion 
based on an appraisal theory. To support these claims we show how our 
formalism can be used in both ways: first we integrate two appraisal theories; 
second, we use this formal integrated model as basis for a computational model 
after identifying what declarative information is missing in the formal model. 
Finally, we embed the computational model in an emotional agent, and show how 
the formal specification helps to evaluate the computational model. 
7.1 Introduction 
Computational models of emotion are used in a wide variety of artificial 
emotional agents. In general, such a model is based on a cognitive appraisal 
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theory (CAT) (note that the model of affect and affective feedback we have used 
in Chapter 2 to 5 are not based on cognitive appraisal theory). CATs explain 
human emotions as a result of the subjective evaluation of events. However, such 
theories typically lack the necessary detail to base a computational model upon 
(Gratch & Marcella, 2004). As a result, it is difficult to evaluate if the 
computational model correctly implements the theory. 
Further, to advance the field of appraisal theory, it is essential that cognitive 
appraisal theories can be integrated and compared with each other. Thus, building 
computational models of emotion and advancing the field of appraisal theory are 
in need of a representation of appraisal theory that enables systematic analysis. 
This is the focus of our chapter. 
More specific, we propose a formalism to describe the structure of appraisal. 
That is, we propose a formal notation for the behavior of processes that play a role 
in appraising a situation, how these processes are linked to each other, what the 
resulting emotions could be, etc. In this chapter we show that different cognitive 
appraisal theories can be described using the same formal notation, that such 
formal representations can be used to compare and integrate CATs and that the 
formal representation can be used to systematically analyze computational models 
of emotion. 
Such formal description of a specific CAT can be used, for example, to prove 
that the happy expression on the face of a child, that just noticed it arrived at a 
large rollercoaster park with extremely exciting rollercoasters and a couple of 
flags, must be due to an appraisal of the situation that involves the expectancy of 
intrinsic pleasantness. If I would have a robot, the formalism can be used in 
approximately the same way. While developing the robot, I would use the 
formalism to understand why it shows a certain emotion. Assuming a specific 
CAT, the formalism can be used to decide whether its artificial emotion of fear is 
potentially correct after I have proposed to go to a rollercoaster park. At first, I 
might be tempted to start to debug the robot, but the formal description of the 
CAT on which its emotions are based can show me that its emotion might be 
genuine as it potentially results from a negative appraisal of the rain (reflecting its 
fear to rust).  
This informal introduction gives some intuition for the need and use of formal 
representations of appraisal theory. In this chapter we propose a formalism to 
describe the structure of appraisal (Section 7.3) and we elaborate on two ways in 
which this formalism can be used: (1) we use it to integrate two different appraisal 
theories (Section 7.4), and (2) we use it to analyze a computational model of 
emotion we developed (Section 7.5). Before continuing the main line of this 
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chapter, we first give a cognitive definition of emotion, some more detail on the 
development and use of artificial emotional agents, and a more detailed 
description of the problem we address. 
7.1.1 Emotion 
In cognitive psychology, emotion is often defined as a psychological state or 
process that functions in the management of goals, needs, desires and concerns of 
an individual (we refer to these four terms as goals). This state consists of 
physiological changes, feelings, expressive behaviors, cognitive activity and 
inclinations to act (e.g., Roseman & Smith, 2001). Emotion is elicited by the 
evaluation of an event in relation to the accomplishment of the agent's goals. 
Thus, an emotion is a heuristic that relates events to the agent's goals (Oatley, 
1999). Additionally, emotions are used in non-verbal communication. 
7.1.2 Artificial Emotions 
Inspired by this heuristic and communicative aspect of emotion, computational 
models of emotion are embedded in a variety of intelligent agents. The 
development of artificial emotional agents is useful, and can be applied to a wide 
variety of domains. These domains include electronic tutors (Heylen et al., 2003), 
human-robot interaction (Breazeal, 2001; Chapter 5), virtual agents in VR training 
environments (Henninger et al., 2002), agents targeted at decision-making and 
planning (Coddington & Luck, 2003) and adaptive agents that use emotion or 
affect to control learning parameters (Belavkin, 2004; Chapter 3-4). For example, 
research shows that a robot's emotional expression influences human caretaking 
behavior (Breazeal, 2001), of which the following is a nice anecdote. When 
human subjects interacted with Kismet (the emotional robot) and Kismet reacted 
sad or distressed to the actions of the human, the subjects were visibly distressed 
and looked questioning to the researchers as if they wanted to say "am I doing 
something wrong?" A second example is a recent study by Partala and Surakka 
(2004) that shows that affective intervention in human-computer interaction has a 
positive effect on the human, both emotionally as well as in terms of the subject’s 
problem solving performance. Positive words resulted in smiling as well as better 
problem solving performance.  
7.1.3 Cognitive Appraisal Theory 
The majority of computational models of emotion embedded into intelligent 
agents are based on cognitive appraisal theory. Such theories of emotion attempt 
to explain why a certain event results in one emotional response rather than 
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another and why a certain emotion can be elicited by different events. The key 
concept of most CATs is that the subjective cognitive evaluation of events in 
relation to the agent's goals is responsible for emotion (Roseman & Smith, 2001). 
More generically one can say that events have to be evaluated as having personal 
meaning or relevance (van Reekum, 2000). This evaluation is called appraisal. It 
is generally accepted that physiological changes and other non-cognitive factors 
can influence the actual appraisal of events. Although previously most appraisal 
theories assumed that appraisal was a necessary and sufficient condition for 
emotion (Roseman & Smith, 2001), currently it is seen as an important 
component of emotion. 
7.1.4 How to Interpret Artificial Emotions in Relation to a CAT? 
The “brain” of artificial intelligent agents is often based on a belief-desire-
intention (BDI) architecture (Jennings, Sycara & Wooldridge, 1998). If cognitive 
evaluation of events in relation to the agent's goals is sufficient for emotion, then 
the addition of such an evaluation of events related to the beliefs, desires and 
intentions of an artificial agent is sufficient for computational emotions. This 
partly explains the current popularity of appraisal theories as basis for emotional 
agents.  
However, appraisal theories are currently described in a way that is 
insufficiently precise as a specification for a computational model of emotion 
(Gratch & Marsella, 2004). As a result, many computational models are inspired 
by structural theories of appraisal⎯i.e., theories that describe the structural 
relations between events, appraisal processes and emotions⎯and implemented 
using artificial intelligence mechanisms. During implementation, designers are 
forced to make many assumptions about the exact mechanisms of appraisal. This 
results in a large gap between the structural theory of appraisal and the resulting 
computational model of emotion. 
In addition to this, artificial agents have a more and more complex design. 
These agents are approaching a point at which inspection of the agent's program 
and internal state is no longer efficient to "debug" the agent’s design. We predict 
that in the future it will no longer be feasible to try to understand an agent's 
unexpected behavior by purely investigating its inner workings. Instead, a formal 
investigation of its behavior will be a necessary component of this process of 
understanding (Broekens & DeGroot, 2006), just like we need to ask a person 
about why he/she does something instead of only looking at neuroimaging data. 
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7.1.5 Advancing Appraisal Theory Needs Comparison and Integration 
Apart from the problem of using appraisal theories as basis for computational 
models, another problem⎯directly related to appraisal theory⎯exists. Although 
most appraisal theories share the assumption that cognitive appraisal is an 
important part of emotion, many different appraisal theories exist (Reisenzein, 
2001; Frijda & Mesquita, 2000; Smith and Kirby, 2000; Scherer 2001). 
Comparison between, and convergence of these theories is difficult, but important 
in order to advance the field of appraisal theory. Formalization of structural 
theories of appraisal can help to solve these problems in two different ways. First, 
formal descriptions facilitate comparison, convergence and integration of theories, 
because assumptions and relations between concepts are clarified (Wehrle & 
Scherer, 2001). Second, computational modeling of emotion is a powerful way of 
analyzing appraisal theories in a formal way (Wehrle & Scherer, 2001). Formal 
descriptions facilitate the evaluation of computational models, thereby 
contributing to the analysis of appraisal theories. 
7.1.6 Aim and Scope of This Chapter 
The main contribution of this chapter is an abstract-level, theory independent, set-
based formalism that can be used to describe the structure of appraisal as describe 
by a cognitive appraisal theory. This formalism addresses the two issues 
introduced above. 
 First, how can we advance cognitive appraisal theory? We argue that our 
formalism facilitates comparison and integration of CATs. We use our 
formalism as a tool to integrate the Stimulus Evaluation Check theory 
(Scherer, 2001) and Appraisal Detector Model (Smith & Kirby, 2000), two 
prominent and recent CATs. Our formalism can be used to describe the 
behavior of the processes involved in appraisal. It does not address the issue 
of how to formally describe and reason about what a certain emotion is in 
terms of specific beliefs, desires and intentions of a BDI agent (e.g., Meyer, 
2004). 
 Second, how to formally specify a structural appraisal theory, so that the 
resulting formal description can be used as basis for the specification and 
evaluation of the emotional behavior of an artificial agent? We argue that our 
formalism narrows the gap between appraisal theory and computational 
model, and we show how such a formal specification can be used as basis for 
a computational model of emotion we have developed. We also show how 
this specification helps to evaluate the computational model. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, we introduce the relation 
between computational models, structural theories of appraisal and process 
theories of appraisal. Then we introduce the actual formalism in Section 7.3. 
While the introduction of Section 7.3 is essential for understanding the rest of the 
chapter, the parts that detail the formalism are recommended to the 
mathematically oriented reader. Less mathematically oriented readers will find 
Section 7.4—showing how the formalism can be used as a tool to facilitate the 
integration of appraisal theories— as well as Section 7.5—demonstrating how a 
formal description of a structural model of appraisal can be used as basis for a 
computational model—more interesting. Section 7.6 discusses issues around 
formalization, and related approaches. 
7.2 Appraisal Theory: Structure, Process and Computation 
A common classification of CATs is based on a structural versus a process-based 
description (Roseman & Smith, 2001). Structural theories of appraisal (also called 
black-box models or structural models) describe the structural relations between: 
 the environment of an agent and perception of this environment: perception; 
 the agent's appraisal processes that interpret the perceived environment in 
terms of values on a set of subjective measures, called appraisal dimensions. 
An appraisal dimension influences emotion and can be considered as a 
variable⎯e.g., agency or valence⎯, used to express the result of the appraisal 
of a perceived object⎯e.g., a friend. This process of evaluation is called 
appraisal; 
 the processes that relate these values to the agent's emotions: mediation. 
Process theories of appraisal describe, in detail, the cognitive operations, 
mechanisms and dynamics by which the appraisals, as described by the structural 
theory, are made and how appraisal processes interact (Reisenzein, 2001). In other 
words, a structural theory of appraisal aims at describing the declarative semantics 
of appraisal, while a process theory of appraisal complements this description 
with procedural semantics. In this chapter we adopt the terms structural model 
and process model respectively, and use appraisal theory/model when referring to 
cognitive theories/models of appraisal in general. 
A computational model is a model that is composed of operations that 
unambiguously control the behavior of a device. These operations may use 
available input data. If there is a sequence of such operations that maps a specific 
input to a specific behavior (output), an algorithm is said to exist for that 
mapping. The devices are essentially serial, but parallel execution can be either 
simulated in one such device using threading, or effectuated using multiple 







communicating devices. In this chapter, we define a computational model as a 
structured collection of interacting algorithms that operate serially or in parallel, 
with operations that are eventually reducible to the Turing machine level. 
 
Figure 7.1. Three possible 
mappings between structural, 
process and computational models 
of emotion. 
 
In Broekens and DeGroot (2006) we have analyzed the relation between 
cognitive appraisal theory and computation. We have argued that it is useful to 
have a theory-independent formal notation to describe structural appraisal theories 
(i.e., the behavior of processes that play a role in appraising a situation, how these 
processes are linked to each other, what the resulting emotions could be, etc.). For 
clarity, we summarize the conclusion here. 
In general, there is a generic-to-specific relation between structural, process 
and computational models. Structural models are the basis of computational- and 
process models, and process models are also the basis of computational models. 
In this case "basis of" usually means that a model A that is the basis of a model B 
contains less details than model A, and therefore different model B instantiations 
are possible based on model A (Figure 7.1). Although this is true in general, in 
Broekens and DeGroot (2006) we have argued that the difference between a 
structural, process and computational description is also one of kind, not just of 
different degrees of detail; all three models are equally important for cognitive 
appraisal theory. We have also shown that a formal description of the structural 
model is needed for the following reasons: 
 to advance appraisal theory. A formal description facilitates comparison, 
convergence and integration of appraisal theories, and the process of 
formalization helps theory refinement; 
 to build computational models of emotion based on structural theories of 
appraisal. First, process models of appraisals should coexist with 
computational models, not take their place. Second, before designing 
computational models at the algorithmic level, declarative information is 
needed on the processes that are responsible for perception, appraisal and 
mediation as defined by the appraisal theory. Third, objective information is 
needed to evaluate the consistency between computational model and 
appraisal theory, and reuse of this information seems very useful. We need a 
declarative description of the processes that are responsible for an agent's 
emotion, in order to evaluate if the agent's unexpected emotion resulting from 
an experimental situation is due to a problem in the agent's architecture, or 
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due to a mismatch between our interpretation of the situation and the agent's 
interpretation. 
Typically, a common formal notation should enable formal description of a 
structural model such that this description includes the following data (of which 
many are also relevant to process models; Reisenzein, 2001): 
 What is the nature and level (van Reekum, 2000) of processes; deliberative, 
automatic, innate? 
 What is the relation between (results of) perception and appraisal processes.  
 When and how are these processes activated? Are there thresholds? Can 
activation be sub-threshold? 
 What kind of input and output (representations) a certain process 
needs/produces? 
 Does a process continuously output results or periodically (how often)?  
 How many and what perception, appraisal and mediating processes exist? 
 Is information activation binary or gradual? E.g., how strongly must a certain 
event be perceived for it to be input for a certain appraisal process? 
 What is the number of different appraisal dimensions, their activation range 
and the responsible processes? 
7.3 A Set-Based Formalism for the Structure of Appraisal 
In this section we introduce the basic concepts of the formalism we propose to 
describe structural theories of appraisal. Later sections explain its use in some 
detail. Our formalism is set-based and built around sets of perception processes, 
appraisal processes and mediating processes (Figure 7.2). The notation used for 
these three types of processes and the accompanying terminology are borrowed 
from Reisenzein (2001). The external world, W, is the set of all events and objects 
that can respectively occur and reside in the environment. Perception processes, 
the set P, filter, select and translate information from the external world, and 
produce mental objects⎯representations of the external world suitable for 
appraisal. We define the set of mental objects produced by the perception 
processes, the set O, as the current content of working memory. Appraisal 
processes, the set A, evaluate the mental objects produced by the perception 
processes and assign a combination of appraisal dimension values, the set V, to 
these objects. Mediating processes relate appraisal information to emotions. Thus, 
mediating processes, the set M, relate appraisal dimension values to emotion-
component intensities, the set I. 
Perception processes also perceive the agent's current appraisal dimension 
values and current emotion components. These two kinds of information are 
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translated to mental objects. Since in our formalism only perception processes can 
put information in working memory, the emotion-component intensities, I, and 
appraisal information, V, must be perceived before the agent is able to use these 
two kinds of information in appraisal. This is consistent with the idea that 
appraisal is a cognitive evaluation of perceived objects in working memory. 
Additionally, the separation between cognitive emotional information⎯i.e., V and 
I perceived by P⎯and non-cognitive emotional information⎯I influencing 
A⎯enables the specification of appraisal processes that are biased by a specific 
combination of emotional feedback (i.e., none, non-cognitive, cognitive, or both). 
This enables, for example, explicit specification of appraisal structures involved 
in coping, re-appraisal and strategic use of emotions. This ability is important for 
the completeness of our formalism. 
To describe the structural relations between elements in the sets of 
perception, appraisal and mediating processes, our formalism allows the 
specification of process dependencies. For example, some process dependencies 
can be defined as excitatory relations, while others can be defined as inhibitory 
relations between processes. 
The concepts of the formalism are detailed in the rest of this section. To 
facilitate understanding of the formalism, we demonstrate its use by showing how 
the static (hypothetical) appraisal structure of a baby can be defined. The baby can 
be exposed to a barking dog or its mother, resulting in different emotions. 
Figure 7.2. Graphical overview of the assumed structure of appraisal underlying our 
formalism. Dotted arrows denote potential inputs for processes, while normal arrows 
denote potential process dependencies. The external world contains events that can be 
perceived. Perception processes perceive event, appraisals and emotion-component 
intensities and map these to mental representations (including beliefs, goals, etc.). 
Appraisal processes appraise these representations in the context of the current emotion-
component intensities, by mapping them to appraisal dimension values (e.g., an object is 
moderately arousing and moderately goal conducive), which are again mapped to emotion-
component intensities by mediating processes (e.g., the current set of appraisals results in 
a smile and a feeling of excitement). For details see text. 
Affect and Learning: Affect and Formal Models 
 126 
7.3.1 World, Perception Processes and Objects of Appraisal 
Definition 7.1.1: W={w1,…,wn} is the set of all observable objects and events in 
the environment of the agent1.  
Definition 7.1.2: O⊆PO is the current content of working memory, assuming that 
PO={po1,…,pon} is the set of all potential mental objects with poi=(t, 
any_object_name), poi∈PO and t∈OT, OT being the set of mental object types as 
defined in Definition 7.1.3.  
Definition 7.1.3: OT={t1,…,tn} is the set of type names—(O)bject (T)ypes—used 
to specify mental object types (e.g. belief, desire, goal, plan, etc.). 
Definition 7.1.4: If we define V as the set of appraisal dimension values (see 
Definition 7.2.2) and I as the set of emotional-response-component intensities 
(see Definition 7.3.2) then P={p1,…,pn} is the set of all perception processes 
available to the agent, with pi:Ρ(W∪V∪I)→Ρ(PO), pi∈P such that ∀o∈O ∃p∈P 
∃x∈Ρ(W∪V∪I) with o∈p(x). In words, a perception process pi typically maps a 
portion of the agent's environment, several of the agent's current appraisal 
dimension values and several of its emotional-response-component intensities to 
one or more mental objects. These objects are the ones that can be in working 
memory2. Thus, we assume that if an object is in working memory then there 
must be a perception process producing it. 
In our baby example the baby's world initially contains two objects: mom and 
dog, represented by two distinct noise levels m and d, W={m, d}. The baby can 
perceive these objects with her only perception function called hear, ph, that 
perceives noise levels m and d. P={ph}, with ph({m})={pom}, ph({d})={pod}, 
ph({m, d})={pom, pod} and for all other inputs x, ph(x)=∅. Thus ph maps m and d 
to mental objects PO={pom, pod}. The set OT contains one element, OT={belief}, 
thus pom=(belief, mom) and pod=(belief, dog). The baby has two beliefs, mom is 
here and the dog is here. The set O is empty; we thus assume that the baby has not 
perceived anything. 
 
                                                 
1 Note that we use n as a finite but arbitrary number to denote multiple elements in a set. 
When i is used as element index, we mean for any 1≤i≤n. Two sets both with n elements 
do not necessarily have the same number of elements. When they do, another subscript is 
used, e.g., m. Also, Ρ(S) is used to denote the powerset of set S. 
2 Note that different perception processes could perceive the same object at the same 
time, even if they use different information. For example, an agent both smells and sees a 
person. 
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7.3.2 Appraisal Processes, Appraisal Dimensions and Values 
Definition 7.2.1: D={d1,…,dn} is the set of appraisal dimensions, containing 
elements like suddenness and pleasantness. 
Definition 7.2.2: V={v1,…,vn} is the set of current appraisal dimension values with 
vi=(o, d, r), vi∈V, and o∈O, d∈D and r∈[-1,1]. In words, vi is a tuple of a one-
dimensional appraisal result attributed to one mental object, or, vi is the result of 
appraising an object in terms of one appraisal dimension. 
Definition 7.2.3: A={a1,…,an} with ai:Ρ(O∪I)→Ρ(V), ai∈A such that ∀v∈V ∃a∈A 
∃x∈Ρ(O∪I) with v∈a(x). Again in words, ai is an appraisal process that interprets 
mental objects in the context of emotional-response-component intensities and 
attributes appraisal dimension values to other mental objects3. Appraisal can be 
biased by the current emotion, explaining I in the powerset of the input for the 
appraisal processes. Also, some appraisal processes may be relevant to emotion 
only through their relation with other appraisal processes. In this case these 
“indirect” appraisal processes assign only zero values to evaluated mental objects. 
To continue our baby example, the baby has two appraisal processes, pleasure 
and arousal. Both assign tuples of values [-1,1] and appraisal dimensions to 
mental objects. There are two appraisal dimensions with almost the same name as 
the appraisal processes. Thus A={ap, aa} and D={pleas, arous}. The dog produces 
noise, so the baby appraises the dog as arousing and unpleasant. So, 
ap({pod})={(pod, pleas, -0.5)} and  aa({pod})={(pod, arous, 0.5)}. For all other 
inputs x, ap(x)=∅ and aa(x)=∅. The set V currently is empty, as O is empty. Here, 
we ignore the formal description of the soothing voice of the baby’s mother, as 
such things tend to defy all attempts at formalization.  
7.3.3 Formalizing the Mediating Processes 
Definition 7.3.1: E={e1,…,en} is the set of possible components of the emotional 
response, like certain subjective feelings, facial expressions, physiological 
reactions and action tendencies. 
                                                 
3 Note that the mental objects to which an appraisal value is attributed are not necessarily 
the same as the objects used in the appraisal process. Also note that the introduction of 
appraisal value r introduces a problem if different appraisal processes produce a result on 
the same appraisal dimension. For example, if two appraisal processes produce the same 
(object, dimension, value) tuple then only one is in the set V (per the definition of sets). 
However, this could mean that the total intensity of the appraisal dimension is invalid. 
Since the appraisal value is from the set of real numbers [-1, 1] we assume that this never 
happens, as it is always possible to pick a real number close enough to another one but 
different. 
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Definition 7.3.2:  I={i1,…,in} is the set of emotional-response-component 
intensities with ii=(e, r), ii∈I, r∈[-1, 1] and e∈E (note that we slightly overload 
notation here by using subscript i with variable i). In words, ii is the intensity of 
one specific emotional-response component, e.g., a heart rate of 0.5 (on some 
scale). Appraisal theories typically assume that appraisal dimension values, not 
emotional-response-component intensities, are attributed to objects. This explains 
the lack of a mental object in ii. 
Definition 7.3.3: M={m1,…,mn} with mi: Ρ(V)→Ρ(I), mi∈M such that ∀i∈I ∃m∈M 
∃x∈Ρ(V) with i∈m(x). In words, mi produces emotional-response-component 
intensities based on appraisal dimension values4. Note that the definitions of mi 
and ai follow a common appraisal conception that appraisals are directed at 
objects, but emotions can be objectless. 
Our baby has three emotions: calm, distressed and neutral, E={calm, dis, 
neut}. The baby has one mediating process M={me} that relates V (the set of 
assigned appraisal dimension values) to I (the set of emotion component 
intensities) in the following way:  
me({ (od, pleas, -0.5), (od, arous, 0.5) }) = { (calm, 0), (dis, 0.5), (neut, 0) }. For 
all other inputs x, me(x)=∅. This means that if and only if the baby appraises a 
situation as arousing and negative, the resulting emotion is distress with intensity 
0.5. Again, I is empty as V is empty; we assume the baby is currently not 
appraising something. 
7.3.4 Dependency between Processes 
Our formalism represents processes connected to each other via different kinds of 
guarded dependencies. To be able to define the notation for dependency relations 
between processes, we first define guards and dependency types. 
Definition 4.1: The set G={g1,…,gn} of guards is a set of second-order predicates 
over the elements of the sets P, O, A, D, V, M, E and I, and over the variable r, 
being the actual value of elements in the set V and the intensity of the emotional 
response components of the set I. This allows the definition of conditional 
dependencies between processes. 
Definition 4.2: The set LT={n1,…,nn} is a set of dependency type names—(L)ink 
(T)ypes—used to identify the nature of the dependency between two processes 
(e.g., inhibitory, causal, correlation, information flow, parallelism, etc.). Again we 
slightly overload notation by using nn. 
                                                 
4 Same as previous note but for elements in M. 
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Definition 4.3: Let L be the set L={l1,…,ln} with L⊆PP×PP×G×N and 
PP=P∪A∪M. The elements of L define dependencies—(L)inks—between 
processes constrained by the following. For a tuple (p, q, g, n), with p, q∈PP, 
g∈G and n∈N, processing in q is influenced in the way described by n only if the 
guard g is true and process p is active itself5. 
For our baby, there are four dependencies L={l1, l2 , l3, l4} between the 
perception, appraisal and emotion generation processes. These dependencies 
define a causal activation relation: 
 l1=(ph, ap, (∃x x∈O), activation),  
 l2=(ph, aa, (∃x x∈O), activation), 
 l3=(aa, me, (∃x x∈V ∧ x=(d, i) ∧ i<>0), activation), d∈D 
 l4=(ap, me, (∃x x∈V ∧ x=(d, i) ∧ i<>0), activation), d∈D 
These dependencies thus define that if and only if the baby hears something 
(has perceived an object, i.e., ∃x x∈O) the appraisal processes must be activated, 
after which mediating processes are again activated. 
7.3.5 Data Constraints 
The activation conditions of processes can be defined using the above mentioned 
dependencies and guards. To allow the specification of data constraints that must 
hold according to the theory, we define a set H of constraints, again containing 
second-order predicates. For example, if an appraisal intensity greater than 0.5 for 
the novelty dimension exists, there must be an emotional-response-component 
intensity greater than 0 for the orientation response. These constraints also allow 
formalization of what should happen when there are two appraisal values for the 
same appraisal dimension, e.g., the baby hears a large and a small dog, both 
appraised as arousing resulting in two appraisal values loading on the same 
appraisal variable. Now a data constraint can be used to specify that both values 
should be, e.g., added. These data constraints are global, and not attached to 
process dependencies, like the guards used to represent activation conditions.  
                                                 
5 Note that when a structural theory only mentions the type of the dependencies between 
processes without mentioning any activation conditions, G can be defined as G={true}, so 
that all dependencies have a guard that is always true and only the type of dependency is 
used. Second, although we could extend the formal notation by allowing multiple guards or 
types per dependency, this does not add expressive power to the notation itself since the 
sets N and G can be filled by an arbitrary number of conjunctions. When actually using the 
formalism to describe an appraisal theory, multiple guards and types per dependency are 
definitely allowed to simplify the resulting description of the model. 
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Definition 7.5.1: The set H={h1,…,hn} of guards is a set of second-order predicates 
over the elements of sets P, O, A, D, V, M, E and I, and over the variable r, being 
the actual value of elements in the set V and the intensity of the emotional 
response components of the set I. 
7.3.6 What Does the Baby Example Tell Us? 
We have formally described the “structural theory” for our baby’s hypothetical 
appraisal structure. For example, if we see the baby crying, we can prove that the 
baby must be appraising the situation as arousing and unpleasant. We can thus use 
the formal description to analyze structural relations between emotion processes 
of our baby. Now imagine a baby (or agent) with a much more complex appraisal 
structure. If we see it crying while we are trying to make cuddling noises, we 
might be surprised about this unexpected reaction. However, the formal appraisal 
structure could be used to, e.g., investigate an alternative possibility: our cuddling 
noises are appraised as unpleasant and arousing. This would mean, e.g., that the 
formal model predicts high skin conductance and increase in heartbeat. This is a 
verifiable hypothesis, and can now be tested. In short, we can use the formal 
description to evaluate, in a systematic way, whether an emotion is expected or 
not according to a certain structural theory. 
Now, imagine that our theory actually cannot explain why the baby cries (e.g., 
because skin conductance is predicted to be high but is low in reality), and that a 
second theory exists that can. We can now formally compare these theories and 
make explicit the differences between both, so that we are able to explain why the 
second correctly explains the baby’s crying. The sets of processes and 
dependencies of one theory can be systematically compared with those of another. 
This is a much more verifiable, understandable and repeatable process than 
comparing textual representations of structural theories. Comparing theories using 
our formal notation is the topic of the next section. 
7.4 Using Formal Notation to Compare and Integrate Cognitive 
Appraisal Theories 
To show that the formal notation presented above can be used as a tool to 
compare and integrate different appraisal theories, we present a more serious 
example than our hypothetical baby. We use our formalism to integrate Scherer's 
(2001) Stimulus Evaluation Checks (SEC) model and Smith and Kirby's (2000) 
Appraisal Detector Model (ADM) process model. We call this model the SSK 
model (Scherer, Smith and Kirby). Our goal is to show the utility of formal 
notations in the domain of emotion theory and the power of our proposed notation 
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in particular. We do not argue that the model we present in this section is the best 
integration of both theories. For the same reason we have limited ourselves to 
parts of both theories, the model we present here is not to be interpreted as a 
complete integration of all aspects of both theories. 
7.4.1  Scherer’s SEC Model  
This model is based on the idea that appraisal processes evaluate stimuli in a 
certain sequence (for simplicity, in this chapter stimulus and event are assumed to 
be the same). Five different types of appraisal processes exist related to the 
evaluation of novelty, pleasantness, goal/need conduciveness, coping potential 
and norm/self compatibility. These appraisal processes exist at three levels, the 
sensory-motor level, the schematic level and the conceptual level. Appraisal 
processes take different forms depending on the level they operate on. An 
overview of these forms is given in Table 7.1. For the current integration we 
restrict ourselves by excluding norm/self compatibility. 
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Table 7.1. Overview of the stimulus checks related to novelty, pleasantness and coping 
potential existing at the sensory-motor, schematic and conceptual level (Scherer, 2001). 
In general, sensory-motor level appraisal processes are related to biological 
needs and drives and to biological mechanisms, and are mostly genetically 
determined. Schematic-level appraisals are based on learned knowledge organized 
into schemas. Conceptual level appraisal processes are based on propositional-
symbolic, cortical mechanisms that require consciousness (Scherer, 2001). Higher 
levels are used to appraise the situation if lower levels seem inadequate to 
evaluate the stimuli. 
As mentioned above, stimulus checks are sequential, and this sequence is 
roughly based upon the following steps (ignoring, again for simplicity, the last 
step related to normative significance). We also refer to these steps as levels of 
processing. 
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 Relevance detection: The stimulus is checked for novelty, innate 
pleasantness/unpleasantness and goal/need relevance. If it is found to be 
either novel, or pleasant/unpleasant or relevant to the current needs or goals of 
the agent, attention is directed to the stimulus (i.e., the orientation response; 
orienting towards the source of the stimulus) and further processing is 
initiated. 
 Implication assessment: The stimulus is checked for its cause (what caused 
it), agency of the cause (who did it), its goal conduciveness (is it good for 
me), its discrepancy between what the agent expected and what actually 
happened and finally its urgency. This step needs considerable processing 
resources at the schematic and conceptual level, while the first step is largely 
operating at the sensory-motor level. 
 Coping potential determination: The stimulus is checked to evaluate if the 
agent is able to control the stimulus or its consequences, and if the agent has 
enough power to actually effectuate this control (power can have many 
different sources like physical strength, money, friends, etc.). Finally, if 
coping potential is limited, the agent evaluates whether it can afford to adjust 
to the situation. Coping is a process that needs massive processing resources 
at all three levels. 
Although these steps are inherently parallel and evaluated continuously, they 
are sequential in the sense that the later steps are only deployed to the maximum 
if earlier checks indicate that this is necessary. Later checks are fully activated 
only when earlier checks achieve “preliminary closure” (Scherer, 2001), that is, 
the check has to come to an intermediate stable conclusion about stimuli. 
An important aspect of the SEC model is that a SEC is a continuous process 
that depends on, and changes the results of other SECs (including itself) and that 
the current state of all SECs is represented in appraisal registers (Scherer, 2001). 
We call this state the appraisal state. This state continuously synthesizes 
appraisal information from the SECs and is compatible with the concept of 
appraisal integration proposed by Smith and Kirby (2000). We do formalize the 
appraisal state, but we do not formalize all recursive connections between the 
SECs. 
A second important aspect of the SEC model is that this appraisal state has a 
direct effect on all subsystems of the agent. For example, on information 
processing (the central nervous system), system regulation towards the novel 
situation (central nervous system, endocrine system and the autonomic nervous 
system) and action selection (the sensory-somatic nervous system). In the 
specification of the integration of both models we restrict ourselves to this 
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appraisal state and do not go into the details of the effects of this state on the 
subsystems, therefore we do not formalize the action tendencies, physiological 
changes and expressive behaviors that are associated with the different appraisal 
states. 
7.4.2 Smith and Kirby’s ADM 
We present a short overview of Smith and Kirby's ADM. In this model the 
appraisal state (or appraisal integration) is produced by the appraisal detectors. 
The definition of such detectors is the central feature of the ADM (Smith & 
Kirby, 2000). These detectors continuously integrate the appraisal results 
originating from three different modes of processing: stimulus perception, 
associative processing and reasoning. These detectors do not appraise stimuli 
themselves. Stimulus perception outputs appraisal information to the detectors 
based on the evaluation of pain, intrinsic pleasure, and other biologically 
important survival information. In contrast, the latter two modes are considered to 
be cognitive modes. Associative processing outputs appraisal information based 
on learned combinations of information and appraisal results. Associative 
processing is fast, continuous, and autonomous. It can be unconscious and is 
based on spreading activation paradigms. Associative processing can use any kind 
of information (e.g., sensations, images, sounds, and emotions). The reasoning 
mode outputs appraisal information based on deliberative thought processes. 
These processes are costly and slow, but powerful and able to re-appraise 
remembered situations and reflect upon the current appraisal state. Reasoning 
actively generates appraisal information for the appraisal detectors and 
corresponds best to “active posing and evaluating of appraisal questions” (Smith 
& Kirby, 2000). Furthermore, the more cognitive the mode, the more resources it 
needs. It should be clear that these modes are compatible with the levels of 
appraisal as described in the SEC model.  Furthermore, the appraisal integration is 
responsible for the emotional response, which is also compatible with the 
appraisal registers in the SEC model. 
The ADM explicitly defines a feedback relation between the emotional 
response and the two different modes of cognitive processing. This feedback 
relation allows these modes to use emotional information for processing. 
Associative processing uses this information in learning and remembering, while 
reasoning uses this information to reflect upon and reappraise the situation. 
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7.4.3 Summary of Both Models 
The ADM assumes three modes of information processing (stimulus perception, 
associative processing and reasoning). These modes generate appraisal 
information that is subsequently integrated into a “global” representation of the 
current appraisal state. This appraisal state is responsible for the emotional 
response. This state also feeds back to two of the three modes, namely the 
associative processing and reasoning modes, in order to use this emotional 
information for learning and reasoning respectively. The SEC model assumes 
three different levels of appraisal (sensory-motor, associative and conceptual) in 
which a large amount of different stimulus checks are present. These checks 
evaluate the stimuli in a specific order and depend on one another. The results of 
these checks are accumulated into appraisal registers, which⎯when the results 
are sufficiently stable⎯subsequently initiate next appraisal steps and the 
emotional response. 
7.4.4 Formal Integration: the SSK Model 
We now present the specification of a potential integration of the Stimulus 
Evaluation Check model and the Appraisal Detector Model, as an example of how 
our formalism can be used to integrate appraisal theories. For clarity, the 
specification is presented in a graphical form (Figure 7.3). To get an idea of the 
actual set notation, see the boxed text in Section 7.5.2 in which a simplified 
version of the SSK model is fully specified. This specification is used as basis for 
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Figure 7.3. Graphical representation of the formal SKK model. See main text for 
explanation. Note that the boxes in the above figure denote processes. Connections 
between the boxes thus define process dependencies. Appraisal dimensions and 
emotional-response components are not represented in this figure (appraisal processes 
and mediating processes are, but in our formalism appraisal dimensions (D) and processes 
responsible for appraising on those dimensions (A) are not the same). Lastly, colors 
correspond to different appraisal steps (green: relevance; orange: implication; red: coping). 
Figure a represents all processes having incoming dependencies related to stimulus 
perception or outgoing dependencies related to the relevance check. Figure b represents 
the same but now for schematic reasoning or implication, while Figure c represents the 
same but now for conceptual reasoning or coping. Note that some appraisal processes 
receive input from all three types of processing, and as such are appraisal processes that 
can function on all three levels of processing (e.g., goal/need relevance). 
Before describing the integrated model, some naming issues have to be 
resolved. When we use the term perception process, we refer to one of the three 
processing modes of the Appraisal Detector Model, to one of the three levels of 
appraisal in the SEC model and to an element pi∈P in our formal notation. When 
we use the term appraisal process, we refer to a single stimulus check in the SEC 
model and to an element ai∈A in our formal notation. When we use the term 
mediating process we refer to the appraisal detector/integrator in the Appraisal 
Detector Model, to the processes that check for preliminary closure of the 
temporal appraisal result in the SEC model and to an element mi∈M in our 
formal notation. 
We base our integration on two common architectural concepts of the models: 
(1) the separation of appraisal into three distinct levels of information processing 
and (2) the appraisal registers/detectors. In our integration we focus on processes 
(perception, appraisal and mediation) and their dependencies. 
We first formalize appraisal dimensions. For clarity, we limit ourselves to the 
strict minimum of data to be formally specified, in our case the set of appraisal 
dimensions. To demonstrate the use of dependency guards with second-order 
conditions relating to these dimensions, we need to include in our formal 
description at least these appraisal dimensions. The set of appraisal dimensions is 
defined based on the appraisal registers described in the SEC model, excluding 
those related to the norm/self compatibility check: 
D={novelty_dim, intrinsic_dim, relevance_dim, conduciveness_dim, 
urgency_dim, control_dim, power_dim} 
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We continue with the perception processes. Regarding perception processes, 
we first define the three processing levels as perception processes, and connect 
these perception processes to the appraisal processes as defined by the SEC 
model. This is consistent with both models. The set P is represented by the white 
boxes in Figure 7.3 and equals: 
P={stimulus perception, schematic, conceptual} 
Second, the SEC model assumes that certain checks have input from different 
levels of processing. For example Goal/Need relevance, Urgency and Power use 
input from all three levels of processing. The ADM specifically assumes that 
appraisal information can come from different levels. Although the models do not 
exactly define how the appraisal processes are distributed over the three levels of 
processing, together they give enough guidelines to formalize the connections 
between perception and appraisal. These connections are shown by the black 
arrows in the graphical representation of the specification. These connections 
define excitatory dependencies between the perception processes and appraisal 
processes. This connection topology thus defines the dependencies between 
modes of processing / levels of appraisal on the one hand and appraisal processes 
on the other. Additionally two excitatory dependencies are defined between the 
perception processes: one dependency between stimulus perception and 
schematic, the other between stimulus perception and conceptual. This reflects the 
general information processing architecture of the Appraisal Detector Model, 
which prescribes that perceived stimuli are processed further by the associative 
and reasoning mode. We do not define guard conditions for these dependencies, 
although several exemplary guards based on the SEC model are shown in Section 
7.5.2 (boxed text). 
An important characteristic of both models is that appraisal processes can 
evaluate continuously. In our model, continuous evaluation can be initiated by the 
perception processes, and is independent of the previous appraisal check. This 
aspect is represented by the dependencies between the perception processes and 
the appraisal processes in the three appraisal checks. Perception processes thus 
influence processing of appraisal processes directly, but only according to the 
structural relations defined in the SEC model. 
Now we formalize the appraisal processes. The colored boxes represent 
appraisal processes (excluding the rightmost three boxes, to which we will return 
shortly). The green boxes represent those appraisal processes that are part of the 
first step of the stimulus checking process as defined by the SEC model. The 
yellow boxes represent the second step and the red boxes the third step (recall that 
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we did not include the fourth, norm/self related step in our formal integration). 
The set of appraisal processes is thus defined as follows: 
A={elements of the set of stimulus checks in the first 3 steps of the SEC model} ∪ 
{agency, suddenness, familiarity, predictability} 
We have included the appraisal process agency, because the SEC model, 
when determining whether the cause of an event is due to the action of an agent, 
implicitly assumes the existence of this process. Also, we included suddenness, 
familiarity and predictability, the three sub checks responsible for the result of the 
novelty check. We have explicitly included these sub checks as separate appraisal 
processes because in the SEC model each of them operates on a different level of 
appraisal. Therefore, these processes need to be formally connected to different 
perception processes. 
Connections originating from appraisal processes define excitatory 
dependencies. The topology of these connections defines the structural 
dependencies between appraisal processes, consistent with the SEC model. For 
clarity, the color of a connection represents the appraisal step to which the 
dependency’s originating appraisal process belongs. For instance, the green 
connection from suddenness to novelty represents an excitatory dependency 
originating from an appraisal process in the first appraisal step. 
We continue with formalizing mediating processes. The three rightmost 
colored boxes represent mediating processes. The set M contains the following 
elements: 
M={relevance detector, implication detector, coping potential detector} 
These mediating processes are positioned between the different levels of 
appraisal. Mediating processes are activated by the appraisal processes of one 
level and activate appraisal processes of the next level, through excitatory 
dependencies. This connectivity explains their role: mediating processes detect 
when appraisal information is such that the next appraisal step should be activated 
in full glory. For example, if the novelty appraisal process outputs appraisal 
information that characterizes high novelty, the relevance detector will activate 
the appraisal processes to which its connections point. 
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Remember that all connections can be guarded, although for clarity we did not 
define most of the guards. In principle this allows connections to activate based 
on evaluation of second-order logic conditions. For example, we could define the 
following guard for the dependency between novelty and relevance detector: 
(∃x x∈V ∧ x=(o, d, i) ∧ i>t ∧ d=novelty_dim), 
with novelty_dim∈D and t∈[0, 1] an arbitrary threshold. This guard checks the 
existence of a novelty_dim value greater than an arbitrary threshold t. Only if this 
value exists, the guard will be true, and thus the connection is active. Now the 
novelty appraisal process excites the relevance detector. 
Finally we formalize process feedback. To formally represent the influence of 
mediating processes on processing modes, we have defined dependencies 
originating from the mediating processes ending at the schematic and conceptual 
perception processes. The influences are represented by six thick connections 
between the mediating processes and the perception processes. In the ADM, the 
emotional response feeds back to the associative and reasoning modes. The 
mediating processes in our formalism generate emotional response component 
intensities (elements in the set I). These component intensities formally represent 
the emotional response, and are available to all perception processes. Since the 
ADM defines this relation as data flow, perception processes are not activated 
through an excitatory dependency. We have defined a different type for these 
dependencies, called information_available. This means that when the guard of 
the dependency is true, the target process is informed of the fact that new 
information is available. 
7.4.3 Summary 
Integration and comparison are important reasons to formalize appraisal theories 
(Wehrle & Scherer, 2001). Therefore, a formalism for structural models should 
facilitate integration and comparison. In this section we have shown how our 
formalism can be used to integrate theories of appraisal. We have based our 
integration on two common architectural concepts of the models: (1) the 
separation of appraisal into three distinct levels of information processing and (2) 
the appraisal registers/detectors. We believe the integration was greatly facilitated 
by the formalism's ability to describe in detail the processes, their conditional 
dependencies based on second-order predicates and the appraisal dimensions. 
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7.5 Using Formal Notation to Develop and Evaluate a 
Computational Model of Emotion 
To show the power of our formalism as basis for computational models of 
emotion, we describe a computational emotional agent that has been based on a 
simplified version of the SSK model. We have emotionally instrumented an 
existing version of the arcade game PacMan. This version was downloaded from 
the internet (Chow, 2003). We assume that the reader is familiar with the game of 
PacMan. First, we present the specification that was used as basis for the 
appraisal mechanisms implemented in PacMan. Then we show how this 
specification can be used to fill in missing declarative information that is critical 
to the development of a computational model. Finally, we show how our formal 
model helped us to debug our emotional PacMan-agent. 
7.5.1 Why PacMan? 
PacMan-like environments have been used in emotion research, both in the 
appraisal-theoretic domain (Wehrle & Scherer, 2001) as well as the virtual agent 
domain (Broekens & DeGroot, 2004a). Apart from being useful in the domain of 
emotion research (Wherle & Scherer, 2001), PacMan (Figure 7.5) is also a 
suitable environment to test emotional instrumentation for several reasons. First, 
PacMan provides a simple environment that allows for meaningful emotional 
instrumentation related to different levels of appraisal. This allows us to start with 
appraisal processes related to sensory-motor perception only (e.g., eating dots, 
being eaten by ghosts) and then extend this to appraisal processes related to the 
schematic level (e.g., eating fruit and ghosts related to the goal of collecting 
points). Second, PacMan is an environment enabling broad emotional coverage. 
Many different emotions make sense. Eating ghosts, eating dots, losing a life, 
being chased, chasing, etc. are all different situations imbuing different emotions 
in humans. Third, PacMan is an “action-packed” environment, which allows us to 
test the computational model’s appraisal behavior under continuous-time 
constraints. This facilitates studying the process of appraisal.  
7.5.2 Generating a Formal Description for the Computational Model. 
Before we introduce our formal description of PacMan’s appraisal structure we 
have to stress again that the point we want to make is that formal specifications of 
structural models are important for the development of computational models of 
emotion. More specific, the formal notation presented in this chapter is a powerful 
one. Consequently, the goal of this experiment was not to design a believable or 
“full-blown” emotional agent. 
Affect and Learning: Affect and Formal Models 
 141 
We have used a simplified version of the SSK model as basis for our 
computational emotional agent. First, we ignore the conceptual perception 
process since our PacMan agent is incapable of high-level cognitive processing. 
Second, several appraisal processes in the SSK model are ignored, because (1) 
these made no sense in light of the simplicity of the PacMan environment, or (2) 
because we could not design simple appraisal processes directly related to those 
mentioned in the formalism without providing the underlying mechanisms in 
more detail. Omitted processes are: adjustment, expectation discrepancy, outcome 
probability check, predictability and attribution. Third, since our PacMan agent is 
unable to use its emotions in any way, the feedback from the mediating processes 
to the perception processes is ignored. Note that our formal description of the 
SSK model enabled us to quickly evaluate what processes could or should be 
ignored in PacMan’s case. This task would have been much more difficult 
without such description. The resulting processes and their dependencies are 
depicted in Figure 7.4. 
Affect and Learning: Affect and Formal Models 
 142 
 
Figure 7.4. Graphical representation of the specification of PacMan's appraisal structure. 
 
 
Figure 7.5. PacMan screen shots: chasing fruit (left), chasing an edible ghost (right). 
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The formal set notation of the simplified SSK model applied to PacMan is defined 
as follows. Perception, appraisal and mediating processes (just the processes, not 
the formal description of their input-output relations): 
P = { stimulus_perception, schematic } 
A = { suddenness, familiarity, novelty, intrinsic_pleasantness, relevance, conduciveness, urgency,  
 control, power } 
M = { relevance_detector,implication_detector, coping_potential_detector } 
 
Mental object types, mental objects, appraisal dimensions and emotion 
components: 
OT= { belief } 
PO= { (see_ghost, belief), (lost_ghost, belief), (eaten_by_ghost, belief), 
(see_edible_ghost, belief), (lost_edible_ghost, belief),  (eaten_ghost, belief), 
 (see_power, belief), (eaten_power, belief), (see_dot, belief), 
  (eaten_dot, belief), (see_fruit, belief), (lost_fruit, belief),  (eaten_fruit, belief) } 
D = { novelty_dim, intrinsic_pleasantness_dim, conduciveness_dim, relevance_dim, urgency_dim,  
 control_dim, power_dim } 
E = { } 
 
Link types, guards, data constraints and dependencies: 
LT= { activation } 
G = { true, guard1, guard2, guard3 } with: 
guard1 = ( ∃v1,v2,v3 v1,v2,v3∈V ∧ v1=(o,d1,i1) ∧ v2=(o,d2,i2) ∧ v3=(o,d3,i3) ∧ (|i1|+|i2|+|i3|)/3>0.15 ∧ 
d1=novelty_dim ∧ d2=intrinsic_dim ∧ d3=relevance_dim) 
guard2 = ( ∃v1,v2 v1,v2∈V ∧ v1=(o,d1,i1) ∧ v2=(o,d2,i2) ∧ (|i1|+|i2|)/2>0.25 ∧ d1=conduciveness_dim ∧ 
d2=urgency_dim) 
guard3 = ( ∃v1,v2 v1,v2∈V ∧ v1=(o,d1,i1) ∧ v2=(o,d2,i2) ∧ i1*i2>0 ∧ dx=control_dim ∧ dy=power_dim) 
H = { c1, c2} with: 
c1 = ((∃x)x∈V ∧ x=(y,d,i,t) ∧ i>0) if ((∃y)y∈O ∧ y=(c,j,t') ∧ j>0 ∧ t=t'), and 
c2 = ((∃z)z∈I ∧ z=(e,i',t'') ∧ i'>0) if ((∃x')x'∈V x'=(y',d,j',t''') ∧ j'>0 ∧ t''=t''')} 
L={ (stimulus_perception, suddenness, true, activation), 
 (stimulus_perception, intrinsic_pleasantness, true, activation), 
 (stimulus_perception, relevance, true, activation), 
 (stimulus_perception, conduciveness, true, activation), 
 (stimulus_perception, urgency, true, activation), 
 (stimulus_perception, power, true, activation), 
 (schematic, familiarity, true, activation), 
 (schematic, relevance, true, activation), 
 (schematic, conduciveness, true, activation), 
 (schematic, urgency, true, activation), 
 (schematic, control, true, activation), 
 (suddenness, novelty, true, activation), 
 (familiarity, novelty, true, activation), 
 (novelty, relevance__detector, true, activation), 
 (intrinsic_pleasantness, relevance_detector, true, activation), 
 (relevance, relevance_detector, true, activation), 
 (relevance_detector, conduciveness, guard1, activation), 
 (relevance_detector, urgency, guard1, activation), 
 (conduciveness, implication_detector, true, activation), 
 (urgency, implication_detector, true, activation), 
 (implication_detector, control, guard2, activation), 
 (implication_detector, power, guard2, activation), 
 (control, coping_potential_detector, guard3, activation), 
 (power, coping_potential_detector, guard3, activation) } 
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To construct a computational model that can execute, we have to fill in 
missing declarative information. We need to address several issues mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, issues that relate to computational aspects like process 
activation thresholds, process activity, and input/output constraints. Many of these 
questions are answered neither in the SEC model nor in the ADM. Consequently, 
answers are not available in the specification of the integration of both models. 
This is not intended as critique, but as an observation about the immediate 
applicability of appraisal theories as basis for computational models. This 
applicability is limited, as already mentioned by Gratch and Marsella (2004). Our 
observation lends formal support to this. We now describe how we added guards 
to fill in the missing details in a formal way. 
First, two appraisal processes, suddenness and familiarity influence the 
appraisal dimension novelty_dim. How does the novelty process integrate this 
information? In Scherer's SEC model (Scherer, 2001), references are made to the 
mechanisms that could be responsible for suddenness and familiarity, but this 
information is not detailed enough for a computational implementation of the 
integration of the results of these mechanisms. To stay consistent with the SEC 
mode, we assume that both suddenness and familiarity appraise mental objects in 
terms of the novelty_dim dimension. Whenever one of these processes is active, 
the novelty check is activated and integrates these two results into one value by 
adding-up. Dependencies between suddenness and familiarity on the one side and 
novelty on the other are therefore without guard. 
Second, what are the thresholds for the activation of the relevance and 
implication detectors? Or even more fundamentally, can we speak of a threshold? 
According to the SEC model, we can, since this model specifically mentions 
preliminary closure. However, no threshold or guideline for a threshold 
mechanism is given that is useful for an algorithmic approach (apart from the 
appraisal register values being relatively stable, which is about the same as 
preliminary closure). 
Since we do not have a numerical guideline, we assume the following: the 
relevance detector is activated by either one of the three appraisal processes: 
novelty, intrinsic pleasantness and need/goal relevance. Every outgoing 
dependency from the relevance detector to an appraisal process of the next 
appraisal step has a guard equal to: 
(∃v1, v2, v3 with v1, v2, v3∈V ∧ v1=(o, d1, i1) ∧ v2=(o, d2, i2) ∧ v3=(o, d3, i3) ∧ 
(|i1|+|i2|+|i3|)/3>0.15 ∧ d1=novelty_dim ∧ d2=intrinsic_dim ∧ d3=relevance_dim) 
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We assume all three tuples v1, v2 and v3 to exist. If not, we take their 
corresponding activation value to be equal to 0. Thus, this guard checks the value 
of the cumulative activation of the appraisal dimensions that are relevant to the 
relevance check. The value must be greater than an arbitrarily chosen threshold.  
The next guard is related to the implication detector. The Goal/Need 
conduciveness and urgency processes activate this implication detector. Every 
outgoing dependency from the implication detector to an appraisal process of the 
next level of appraisal has a guard equal to: 
(∃v1, v2 with v1, v2∈V ∧ v1=(o, d1, i1) ∧ v2=(o, d2, i2) ∧ (|i1|+|i2|)/2>0.25 ∧ 
d1=conduciveness_dim ∧ d2=urgency_dim) 
Again, we assume that the tuples v1 and v2 exist, and if they do not, we take their 
corresponding activation value to be equal to 0. Thus, this guard checks the value 
of the cumulative activation of the appraisal dimensions that are relevant to the 
implication check. 
A third missing detail is the exact relation between control and power. Also, 
how do these appraisal processes together influence the coping-potential 
detector? Only a descriptive guideline is given in the SEC model, stating that the 
evaluation of power only makes sense if the situation is controllable. Complete 
lack of control or complete lack of power both result in lack of coping potential. 
High control results in coping potential fully dependent on power. Assuming that 
both dimensions cannot attain negative values, this can be interpreted as a 
multiplication of the appraisal dimension values for power_dim and control_dim. 
Coping potential is activated when the product between power_dim and 
control_dim is above a certain threshold. We defined the following guard attached 
to the dependency between the power appraisal process and coping-potential 
detector: 
(∃v1, v2 with v1, v2∈V ∧ v1=(o, d1, i1) ∧ v2=(o, d2, i2) ∧ i1×i2>0 ∧  
d1=control_dim ∧ d2=power_dim) 
Again we assume that both tuples v1 and v2 exists, and if one of them (or both) do 
not, we take their corresponding value to be equal to 0. 
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Fourth, what is, in the context of PacMan, a sensory-motor perception process 
and what is a schematic perception process? According to the Appraisal Detector 
Model the sensory-motor mode of processing reacts to inherently pleasant and 
painful stimuli or facial expressions and the SEC model states that this level of 
appraisal relates to stimuli having to do with basic needs, available energy and 
direct sensory processing⎯like sudden movements. Both models give a clear 
guideline, and we think that it is feasible to use this guideline in our domain. We 
have done this in the following way. The sensory-motor perception process reacts 
to events related to the survival of the PacMan agent. One can think of eating dots 
(PacMan is assumed to live of dots), being eaten by a ghost and perceiving dots 
and ghosts (see Table 7.2). The schematic perception process reacts to events that 
relate to the goal of collecting points (Table 7.3).   




Dimension Checking criteria 
Suddenness novelty_dim Moving objects (ghosts and fruit) are evaluated equally 








relevance_dim Events related to dots and non-edible ghosts respectively 
have values relative to the amount of hunger PacMan has 
and the amount of lives left (hunger is simulated based on 
the last time PacMan ate a dot). 
Need 
conduciveness 
conduciveness_dim Based on all events related to non-edible ghosts and dots.  
Urgency urgency_dim Based on whether the event implies a moving object. Seeing 
a non-edible ghost is urgent. 
Power power_dim The power-pill time left is an indication of the amount of 
power left. 
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Table 7.3. PacMan appraisal related to the goal of gathering points 
Appraisal process Dimension Checking criteria 
Familiarity novelty_dim Seeing a dot is more common than seeing a ghost, and 
seeing a ghost is more common than a power-pill which again 
is more common than fruit. 
Goal relevance 
(points) 





conduciveness_dim Seeing an edible ghost, eating a ghost, seeing and eating fruit 
are positive, while losing an edible ghost and losing a fruit are 
negative.  
Urgency urgency_dim Based on whether the event implies a moving object. Seeing 
an edible ghost and a fruit both are equally urgent. 
Control control_dim Based on whether the event allows to be controlled. All 
moving objects allow control to a certain degree, but fruit and 
edible ghosts allow for more control than non-edible ghosts. 
Seeing a power-pill also implies control. 
Power power_dim Power is completely determined based on the power-pill time 
that is left. 
7.5.3 Verification of the Computational Model 
We have instrumented PacMan by building a simple system that generates mental 
objects based on the current game situation. The decision support system is based 
on the SSK model and has two processes, the sensory-motor perception process 
and the schematic perception process. Mental objects are appraised based on the 
appraisal processes and their relations as described in the SSK specification. 
These appraisal processes produce appraisal dimension values, as specified in 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3. These values are continuously integrated and the result is 
maintained in an appraisal state that is modeled as a vector with cardinality equal 
to the number of different appraisal dimensions (7 in our case, see boxed text in 
Section 7.5.2). This integration simply consists of adding appraisal values that 
belong to the same appraisal dimension and storing the result in the appraisal 
state. 
The experiment itself consists of a human player controlling the instrumented 
PacMan agent who plays the first level of the PacMan game (by eating all dots), 
loses a life two times during the game, and eats several ghosts. When we ran the 
experiment, the result was contradictory. Although certain situations obviously 
should have a strong implication to the PacMan agent, the stimulus checks of the 
coping appraisal step were not activated, but should have according to the formal 
description. This lack of activation can be seen in Figure 7.6a, for 9000 ≤ t ≤ 
13000. In these situations PacMan was seeing a ghost and seeing and eating dots. 
However, the implication in this situation is below the arbitrarily defined 



































































































threshold of 0.25, while other clearly less important situations are above this 
threshold (e.g., around t=27000 where PacMan only sees a ghost). 
 
Figure 7.6a. PacMan 
using bi-polar 
variables. Time in 
milliseconds is on the 
x-axis. Appraisal 
dimension activation is 
on the y-axis. Coping 




stays below its 
threshold. 
 
Figure 7.6b. PacMan 
without bi-polar 
variables. Coping 
potential is activated 
around t=10000, as a 
result of higher 
activation of the 
implication detector. 
 
We can explain these contradictory results by examining the formal 
specification. The appraisal process conduciveness can produce both positive and 
negative appraisal values for the appraisal dimension conduciveness_dim. When 
these values are integrated by the implication mediating process, they cancel each 
other instead of together contributing to a high implication situation. 
Subsequently the guard of the implication mediating process is not true, so the 
next appraisal step (coping) is not activated, resulting in the contradictory result. 
The underlying reason for this is that the above mentioned appraisal 
dimension is bi-polar (i.e., can have negative and positive values) and thus 
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switches meaning when it switches sign. Consequently there is only a small 
difference between, for example, a situation in which highly conducive and non-
conducive events happen and a situation in which nothing happens at all. In other 
words, this dimension cannot represent “mixed-emotions”. Because of the formal 
structural specification of the SSK model, we were able to exactly identify this 
issue. After the introduction of an extra appraisal dimension, an extra appraisal 
process that checks stimuli related to non-conduciveness, and a link between that 
process and implication, the new results are as expected. Coping potential is 
activated but low since PacMan has not eaten a power-pill recently (Figure 7.6b, 
between 9000 ≤ t ≤ 13000).  
7.5.4 Summary 
Our formalism helped to develop a computational model based on the SSK 
model. It facilitated (1) filling in of computational details, and (2) making 
computational assumptions explicit. Further, the formal description helped us to 
verify and validate our computational model with respect to the SSK model. We 
could identify what was in our case a problem using bi-polar appraisal 
dimensions. Note that we do not claim anything about bi-polar appraisal 
dimensions per se. We claim that our formalism is useful for the specification and 
verification of a computational model. 
7.6 Discussion 
We first discuss several formalization issues. Then we discuss related and future 
work. 
7.6.1 Some Drawbacks of Formalization. 
Two warning remarks regarding formalization have to be made. First, the focus 
on strict definitions can be a disadvantage of formalization when used as a tool for 
psychological theory refinement. Formal modeling forces a theorist to commit to 
certain definitions for the concepts in a theory. In and of itself such commitment 
can be an advantage because it helps to refine and clarify theories (Mallery, 
1988). However, such commitment can also be a disadvantage when unclear 
bounds of the concept to be formalized result in either a too strictly formalized 
concept⎯producing a formal representation that does not cover all of the 
concept⎯, or a too loosely formalized concept⎯producing a formal 
representation that is not better than the non-formal representation. It could be 
argued that this is not a disadvantage of formalization, but a lack of specificity of 
the theory. The theory lacks clear definitions. However, appraisal theories⎯like 
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many theories of psychological processes⎯generally include concepts with such 
open bounds for good reasons. 
A second, more important, disadvantage is that formal specifications risk 
living their own lives. This is all right if the probability is high that a formal 
specification covers everything the theory describes. As discussed above, exactly 
this is far from certain. However, as formal notations have many benefits (clarity, 
preciseness, etc.) the formal description of a cognitive appraisal theory might (by 
some) be interpreted as a substitute for the actual theory. This could result in 
overly strict interpretations of that theory, eventually leading to wrongly rejecting 
a phenomenon as consistent with the theory, based on results from an experiment 
with a computational model that is based on a formal specification. Rejecting a 
phenomenon based on a formal description of a psychological theory should thus 
always be done with care. The inverse, the acceptance of a phenomenon as 
supporting a theory, is less problematic since the formal specification of the 
theory generally is stricter than the theory itself. 
7.6.2 Related Work. 
We briefly discuss four approaches to the formalization of emotion theory. The 
choice for these four examples is not arbitrary; they each represent a different way 
in which formalization can be used in this context. 
First, Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti (2002) have defined a formalism to describe 
how emotions can influence agent decision making. Their formalism defines 
emotions as different modes of decision making. Their formalism allows the 
definition of personalities of others, where a personality can be seen as the 
potential transitions between emotional states. This approach is different and in a 
way complementary to ours. While their approach takes the emotion as a given 
and formalizes the influence this emotion has on decision making, our approach 
formalizes the structure of appraisal in order to, for example, describe the 
interactions between perception, appraisal and emotion mediating processes that 
generate the emotion in the first place. 
Second, Meyer (2004) proposes a formalism based on modal logic to formally 
describe how specific emotions relate to the belief, desire and intention structure 
of an agent. This approach differs from ours in the sense that it tries to formalize 
an emotion in terms of specific sets of beliefs, desires and intentions, while our 
approach tries to formalize the appraisal theory on which the computational 
model is based by describing the processes and their structural relations. 
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Third, the GATE environment is a black-box modeling environment aimed at 
theory comparison (Wehrle & Scherer, 2001). This tool allows researchers to 
specify the theoretical relation between appraisal dimension intensities and 
emotional-response components⎯using mathematical formulas and 
parameters⎯and quickly compare the results of experiments with the theoretical 
predictions. A large database is attached to the tool, in which experimental results 
are stored. The database can be filled automatically with the results of 
questionnaires that are filled in by subjects. Data from this database can be used 
to compare experimental data with theoretical predictions derived from various 
theories. GATE contains a large set of analysis functionality to facilitate this 
comparison. The main differences between GATE and our approach are our 
theory independent, set-based formalism and our focus on the specification and 
verification of computational models. Our formalism allows the definition of the 
declarative semantics of the different processes, their inputs, outputs and 
interactions. If time is introduced (see future work) in our formalism it enables 
specification of the relation between the sub-processes involved in appraisal and 
specification of evolution of the structure of appraisal during development of an 
agent. Since we use a set-based notation, a formal specification developed with it 
can be systematically and automatically evaluated for consistency with a 
computational model or appraisal theory. 
Fourth, Reisenzein (2000) proposes a meta-level formal representations for 
the emotion theory of Wundt. His approach is very similar to ours, in that it 
attempts to formalize the emotion theory at a structural level using a set-theoretic 
notation. Important differences are that his approach is more systematically based 
upon the structuralist approach (Westmeyer, 1989), and that our formal notation 
has explicitly been developed to also facilitate development of computational 
models. However, a closer comparison of both approaches is needed in the future. 
This is specifically interesting as the structuralist approach towards formalization 
is by no means restricted to the formalization of cognitive theories. This would 
indicate that our approach could be extended to less cognitively-oriented theories 
of emotion. 
7.6.3 Future Work. 
Our current version of the formal notation describes the static structure of 
appraisal. Future work should include time. Time is needed in order to model the 
evolution of a structural model. For example, we might want to formalize the 
relation between different developmental stages from child to parent (Lewis, 
2001), or formalize the evolution of an appraisal over a shorter time period. 
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Further, to formalize the difference between conscious and unconscious 
influences (Zajonc, 2000), we need to separate the mental objects, our set O, in 
subsets of objects. Every subset now contains objects with different activation 
strength. This strength represents whether an object is conscious or not. 
Also, future work includes the addition of long term memory to our 
formalism. It is difficult to formalize reappraisal (Levine, Prohaska, Burgess, Rice 
& Laulhere, 2001) or coping (Lazarus, 2001), without the LTM construct. 
Finally, a comparison between the structuralist approach towards theory 
formalization and our approach is planned. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Integration of appraisal theories is important for the advancement of appraisal 
theory (Wehrle and Scherer, 2001). We have proposed a formal notation for the 
declarative semantics of the structure of appraisal, and argued for the need to have 
such a formalism. We have shown that this formalism facilitates integration 
between appraisal theories. We have illustrated this by integrating (in a simplified 
way) two appraisal theories; the Stimulus Evaluation Check model by Scherer 
(2001), and the Appraisal Detector Model by Smith and Kirby (2000) into one 
model, the “SSK model” (Section 7.4). The process of integration was greatly 
facilitated by the ability provided by the formalism to specify in detail the 
perception, appraisal and mediating processes, their conditional dependencies 
based on second-order logic and the appraisal dimensions.  
We have shown that our formalism is a first step to narrow the gap between 
structural models of appraisal and computational models. To this end we have 
used our formalism as intermediate specification of structure and completed the 
translation process from appraisal theory to computational model by developing a 
computational model of emotion based on the “SSK model”. We have shown that 
our formalism helped development in the following way (Section 7.5): filling in 
of computational details, and making computational assumptions explicit was 
greatly facilitated by the formal description of the “SSK model”. Moreover, it 
helped us to verify and validate our computational model with respect to the 
“SSK model”. 
To summarize, our formalism for the structure of appraisal can be used to 
further advance cognitive appraisal theory as well as to facilitate development and 
evaluation of computational models of emotion based on cognitive appraisal 
theory.  
8 
Summary and Conclusion 
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Here we give a concise overview of the results presented in the different 
chapters of this thesis, and relate these to each other. 
8.1 Affect, Mood and Information Processing 
Action selection has been defined as the problem of continuously deciding what 
next action to select in order to optimize survival (Tyrell, 1993). In a 
Reinforcement Learning (RL) context, action selection is the process of selecting 
the next action from a set of actions proposed by a model of interaction with the 
world, such that the model can both be learned by means of interaction and be 
used to optimize received reward. In our case the RL mechanism is a model-based 
Reinforcement Learning method (see Kaelbling et al., 1996). An agent can select 
actions in a variety of ways, such as greedy (take the best proposed action) or 
random (take any action). This is an important issue in robot learning: when 
should the action-selection mechanism explore versus exploit. We have shown 
(Chapter 3) that this action-selection trade-off can be partly controlled by artificial 
affect, when artificial affect is defined as a measure that keeps track of how well 
the agent is performing compared to what the agent is used to. If the agent 
performs well, artificial affect is positive and action selection can be greedy, 
reflecting the relation “good performance—keep doing what you do” (exploit). If 
the agent performs badly, artificial affect is negative and action selection must be 
more random, reflecting the relation “bad performance—try new stuff” (explore). 
By doing so, we have shown that computational modeling can give insights into 
the possible relations between affect and learning on a meta-level. Artificial affect 
can be used to control learning parameters. 
The type of agents used in the experiments just mentioned is reactive. Agents 
do not have an abstraction of thought. They behave using an input-output 
mapping: states go in; actions come out (via the value function that learns value-
state-action mappings and the action-selection mechanism that subsequently 
selects one action from the set of proposed actions). However, thoughts, like 
actions, have to be selected in some way too. We have shown that thought-
selection can also be controlled up to a certain extent by artificial affect (Chapter 
4). Thought in this case is interpreted as internal simulation of behavior (Hesslow, 
2002). The agent can internally simulate potential interactions with the world. In 
our experiments, simulation is bounded to one imaginary step ahead, however 
multiple possibilities exist for that one step (different actions are possible, and 
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different states could result from those actions). The agent has to choose between 
selecting only several good thoughts (the agent is in a good mood and thinks 
greedy) or a lot of diverse thoughts including thoughts that are evaluated as bad 
(bad mood, the agent thinks “explorative”). Again, there is a trade-off between 
exploration (internally simulate all potential next interactions) and exploitation 
(internally simulate the option that is perceived as best). Note that in our 
computational studies, the agent can not really explore mentally, as it can only 
think of things it has already encountered, explaining the quotes around 
exploration. 
We have shown that internal simulation in this sense is beneficial to the 
learning performance of an agent, and that artificial affect can be used to control 
thought selection. Internal simulation of all possible options results, in all 
experiments, in the best learning performance when compared to no simulation, 
some simulation, or affectively controlled simulation. However, internal 
simulation of all options every step is a waste of effort. Sometimes, the learned 
world model and value function are very good; simulation is actually not needed 
and the agent can just use a purely reactive mode of operation. In other cases, the 
learned model is bad; the agent should try to look ahead in a broad sense in order 
to predict possible consequences of its actions. Artificial affect can control this 
trade-off. When positive artificial affect is coupled to less, but greedy, internal 
simulation and negative artificial affect is couple to more, “explorative”, internal 
simulation, the resulting amount of internal simulation that is needed for a 
learning performance comparable to one resulting from simulation of all options 
every step is reduced. To be more precise, coupling artificial affect to internal 
simulation, in the way just mentioned, enables a learning agent to have about the 
same learning performance gain compared to an agent that simulates all possible 
interactions every step, but using considerably less internal simulation. This 
means that agents that “feel good” can think ahead in the narrow sense freeing 
mental resources for other things, while agents that “feel bad” should think ahead 
in a broad sense fully using mental resources to plan ahead. This is compatible 
with the psychological literature on human mood, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4.  
An interesting issue that has not been discussed yet is that the most beneficial 
relation between artificial affect and action selection on the one hand, and 
artificial affect and simulation selection on the other is the same, i.e., positive 
relates to narrow and negative relates to broad. This is important for the 
Simulation Hypothesis (Hesslow, 2002). One of the cornerstones of this 
hypothesis is evolutionary continuity (Hesslow, 2002). It must be possible to 
move, in the evolutionary process, from agents that act reactively to agents that 
think and act. Our finding that the direction of the most beneficial relation 
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between artificial affect and thought selection and artificial affect and action 
selection is the same is an indication that at the level of behavior modulation this 
continuity exists. However, one has to be very careful with such conclusions, as 
computational models are complex, large structures containing many choices. We 
return to this point, made in Chapter 7, in Section 8.3. 
In the studies reported upon in Chapter 3 and 4, we have used a definition of 
affect that relates to the positiveness versus negativeness of mood. It is a long-
term signal originating from the relative success of the agent. As such, we have 
used artificial affect as a meta-level signal: artificial affect is used to control 
learning parameters, not as reward. However, the latter is certainly possible 
(Chapter 6 and Section 8.2).  
8.2 Affect, Emotion and Reinforcement 
When affect is related to the positiveness versus negativeness of a situation in a 
short-term, object/situation-directed sense, it relates more to emotion than mood. 
As such, artificial affect can be used to tell the learning agent something about the 
current situation, instead of about its general situation. Further, affect can be 
elicited by external factors, such as communicated emotional expressions, instead 
of originate from the agent itself. We have taken this approach in Chapter 6, and 
we have shown that communicated affect can help learn an artificial agent. More 
precise, a human observer reacts affectively (by means of emotion recognition 
from facial expressions) to a simulated robot while that robot learns. This 
affective reaction is translated to a positive or negative reward. The reward is used 
by the robot in addition to the rewards it gets from interacting with the world. 
This interaction helps the robot to learn a grid-world task. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that affective interaction 
facilitates robot learning: we have quantitatively shown that a simulated robot 
learns quicker with social reward than without social reward. However, for this 
beneficial effect to last, the robot has to learn an additional social reward function 
that predicts, based on world-state input, the social reward given by the human. If 
not, the agent simply forgets the social reward when the human stops giving it. 
This is not a problem if the task has been learned completely, because now the 
agent already has an optimal model. However it is a problem if the agent is left 
over to itself after a short social training period. The latter situation is the more 
plausible and more desirable one. It is more efficient (the human has to observe 
the robot less often), and it is better related to parent-child interaction: children 
are not monitored all the time, but in phases. In a non-monitored phase, the child 
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has to try to find out for itself what to do with the guidance given during a 
monitored phase. 
8.3 Formal Models and Computational Limitations 
It is interesting to note that affect defined as the positiveness versus the 
negativeness of a situation (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002) is actually a very useful 
abstraction in the context of Reinforcement Learning. It can be used in many 
ways, as has been shown in this thesis. However, we have to be careful, again, 
about conclusions drawn from computational experiments, specifically related to 
the meaning of the modeled concepts. It can be argued that the way we model 
affect is quite limited, which is most certainly the case considering the wide 
variety of emotions and moods that exist in humans. In relation to Reinforcement 
Learning this definition (and our derived definition of artificial affect) might be 
adequate, but this does not mean that we have modeled affect in its full glory, or 
that we can conclude anything about affect in general. Therefore, our psychology-
related claims and conclusions have to be interpreted in the context of 
Reinforcement Learning and instrumental conditioning. Our conclusions are 
about existence proofs of relations, for they appear beneficial to artificial agents 
that learn based on different computational models of instrumental conditioning 
(the versions of RL used in Chapters 3, 4 and 6). As such, they are relevant to 
experimental psychology. Experimental psychology has difficulties explaining the 
mechanisms behind relations. In this context, the mechanisms presented in this 
research are potential candidates that support relations between affect and 
learning found in the psychological literature. The conclusions should not be 
carried further than that. 
Concrete computer science related results include the control of learning 
parameters in artificial learning methods by means of abstractions of concepts 
borrowed from psychology. More specific, artificial affect has successfully been 
used to control exploration versus exploitation, and affect has been used as 
reinforcement in an interactive learning setup with a human in the loop. It is very 
well possible to use affect in a broader sense than the one studied in this thesis. 
For example, it is interesting to research how affect can be used to control the 
search through a solution space, as this is also a process of exploration (random 
jumps, multiple start positions) versus exploitation (hill-climbing). Further, 
arousal, the part of affect that defines the activity or action readiness of the 
organism—a part we have ignored completely in this thesis—can be modeled and 
then used to control other parameters. These parameters could be related to the 
amount of energy available to the agent. Such parameters include the likelihood 
of acting in the first place and the depth of the thought process. 
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As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, computational models are limited in 
their ability to conclude about natural phenomena. This issue has been dealt with 
related to emotion modeling in Chapter 7. We have shown that it is useful, in fact 
critical, to use formal models of emotion at an architectural level to advance 
emotion theory. The analysis has been focused on cognitive appraisal theory, 
explaining emotions as a result of the subjective evaluation of events in the 
context of beliefs, desires, and intentions of an agent (being natural or artificial). 
Our analysis showed that with the formal notation we developed it becomes easier 
to evaluate whether unexpected behavior resulting from a computational model is 
due to errors in the computational model or errors in the theory. This is an 
important issue, as computational models of emotion tend to get very complex 
and are inspired by many psychological theories (see, e.g., the impressive agent 
models by Gratch and Marsella, 2004 or Baars and Franklin, 2003). We have 
further shown that the formal notation can be used to integrate different cognitive 
appraisal theories, an important issue in the advancement of appraisal theory 
(Wehrle & Scherer, 2001). 
A very valid argument that could be put forward at this point is that we 
haven’t formally described the affect-learning relations studied in Chapter 3 to 6, 
and as such can not really draw strong conclusions from these studies. We can say 
two things about this.  
First, we did not formally represent the relations studied, and it would be 
interesting to find out if this is possible using the formalism developed in Chapter 
7. However, as argued in Chapter 7 and (Broekens & DeGroot, 2006), emotion 
psychologist have to also formally annotate the data resulting from, and proposed 
mechanisms derived from emotion studies. Without this annotation, the computer 
model can not be evaluated other than in ways done in this thesis or in the work 
by many other modelers. So, formal modeling by computer scientists is only half 
the solution, and in this case, half a solution is no solution as there is nothing 
formal to compare the computer scientist’s formal model with. More importantly, 
the formalism proposed in Chapter 7 is targeted towards cognitive appraisal 
theory, which is not used as underlying theory for the research in Chapter 3 to 6. 
We have taken this direction because the number of computational models of 
emotion based on cognitive appraisal theory is vast, and consequently a 
formalism targeted at this family of models and theories could have a larger 
impact.  
Second, we can definitely draw conclusions related to psychology from our 
studies, given that we extensively argued why we modeled affect in the ways we 
did, as well as how we used it to influence learning. Further, our conclusions 
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should be interpreted as mechanism existence proofs than can inspire 
psychological research, just as psychological research has inspired the modeling 
work in this thesis. Research can be done in many ways; sometimes the 
conclusions are clear-cut logical results, sometimes they are hypotheses made 
plausible. Our conclusions regarding computational results, such as better 
learning performance, fall into the first category: whatever the underlying 
mechanisms are or are not based upon, the result is objectively measurable. 
Conclusions related to the psychological implications of the studies presented in 
this thesis fall into the second category: given the computational results, the 
relations and mechanisms we have modeled become more plausible 
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Hier zal een korte samenvatting gegeven worden van de resultaten van het 
onderzoek gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift. 
Affect, Gemoedstoestand en Informatieverwerking 
Om te overleven moet elk wezen acties selecteren (“wat ga ik nu doen…”). 
Actieselectie is gedefinieerd als het probleem om te beslissen wat de volgende 
actie zal zijn zodanig dat de kans op overleving wordt geoptimaliseerd. 
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is een manier om leerprocessen op basis van 
positieve en negatieve terugkoppeling te modelleren door middel van 
computationele modellen. Een agent leert welke actie in welke situatie welke 
verwachte waarde heeft. Deze waarde wordt bepaald door de terugkoppelingen 
die er in de omgeving bestaan en door de ervaringen die de agent met deze 
omgeving heeft. In RL moet een mobiele agent dus steeds kiezen welke actie 
gedaan moet worden op basis van de waardes van de verschillende acties. 
Uiteindelijk wil die agent positieve terugkoppeling maximaliseren en negatieve 
terugkoppeling minimaliseren. 
Een probleem dat de lerende agent hierbij moet oplossen is exploratie versus 
exploitatie. Exploratie (trial and error) is het proberen van nieuwe acties en het 
leren van wat er goed en niet goed aan is. Exploitatie is het kiezen van acties die 
volgens wat je geleerd hebt de beste zijn. Deze twee processen moeten bij een 
lerende agent afgewisseld worden. Neem als voorbeeld boodschappen doen in een 
nieuwe stad. Eerst zoek je naar de kortste weg naar een supermarkt (exploratie), 
en nadat je dit een aantal keer hebt gedaan denk je te weten wat de kortste weg is. 
Vervolgens neem je altijd de route waarvan je denkt dat deze het kortst is 
(exploitatie). 
In Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 van dit proefschrift is er onderzocht hoe gemoedstoestand 
de keuze voor exploratie versus exploitatie kan beïnvloeden. Er is gebruik 
gemaakt van gesimuleerde robotjes. De robots moeten leren hoe ze door een 
doolhof kunnen navigeren. Ze moeten zo goed mogelijk de weg naar het doel 
leren. Je zou kunnen zeggen dat een gesimuleerde muis in een doolhof op zoek is 
naar kaas. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 is een model van gemoedstoestand (affect) voor dit soort 
lerende robotjes ontwikkeld. Dit model gaat ervan uit dat de robotjes een 
stemming kunnen hebben die varieert van goed tot slecht afhankelijk van hoe 
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goed het met ze gaat. Hoe goed het gaat hangt af van de gemiddelde hoeveelheid 
straf en beloning die ze krijgen, ten opzichte van wat ze gewend zijn. Dus, als ze 
steeds beter weten waar de kaas is (of, als wij steeds beter weten waar de 
supermarkt is), gaat hun stemming vooruit. Als ze echter steeds meer tijd nodig 
hebben om de kaas te vinden, of steeds vaker tegen de muur aan lopen (straf) 
terwijl ze door de doolhof bewegen, dan gaat hun stemming achteruit.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 hebben we dit model van gemoedstoestand gekoppeld aan het 
exploratiegedrag van de gesimuleerde robotjes. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat 
robotjes die gaan exploreren als ze zich slecht voelen en gaan exploiteren als ze 
zich goed voelen sneller het beste pad naar hun doel leren. Dit is niet altijd zo, 
maar vooral als het doel (de kaas) plotseling naar een andere plek in de doolhof 
wordt verplaatst. Robotjes gaan zich dan minder goed voelen (ze vinden het doel 
immers niet meer), en gaan daardoor exploreren (nieuwe dingen proberen). 
Hierdoor vinden ze het nieuwe doel sneller dan robotjes die gewoon door blijven 
lopen op het oude pad naar het doel. Als de affectieve robotjes de nieuwe plek 
hebben gevonden, gaan ze zich langzaam beter voelen. Hierdoor gaan ze meer 
exploiteren (goede acties kiezen op basis van wat ze geleerd hebben). Daardoor 
doen ze minder probeeracties (exploratie), waardoor ze sneller het beste pad leren 
dan robotjes die geen affectgestuurd exploratiegedrag hebben. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we verder gekeken naar een andere manier om 
gemoedstoestand te koppelen aan leergedrag. In dit onderzoek is de stemming van 
de lerende robot gekoppeld aan hoe de robot vooruit denkt. Vooruit denken is in 
dit geval het anticiperen op de mogelijke gevolgen van een actie, voordat de actie 
is uitgevoerd. Het is dus een soort van intern simuleren van gedrag om te 
voorspellen wat er zou kunnen gebeuren. De stemming (weer variërend van goed 
tot slecht) wordt nu gekoppeld aan de hoeveelheid positieve gedachten die de 
robot heeft. Als de stemming goed is, denkt deze alleen aan positieve gedachten; 
als de stemming slecht is, denkt de robot aan zoveel mogelijk. Dus, goed voelen 
betekent goed denken, en slecht voelen betekent breed denken. Uit dit onderzoek 
blijkt dat er geen positief effect is van affectgestuurd denken op de leersnelheid 
van de robot. Deze leert dus niet sneller waar het voedsel is. Wel hoeft de robot 
minder te denken om hetzelfde resultaat te behalen. Hieruit zou dus 
geconcludeerd kunnen worden dat het gunstig is voor de totale hoeveelheid 
benodigde denkinzet tijdens een leerproces om vooral breed over mogelijke 
consequenties na te denken als het minder goed gaat, maar vooral over positieve 
mogelijke consequenties na te denken als het goed gaat.  
Er is een grote kanttekening bij deze resultaten: het zijn computationele 
modellen! Ook zijn het modellen die getest zijn in simpele omgevingen: kleine 
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doolhofjes met maar een paar verschillenden objecten. Het is dus niet mogelijk 
om deze conclusies definitief te veralgemeniseren naar bijvoorbeeld menselijk 
gedrag. Wat wel gezegd kan worden is het volgende. Ten eerste, gemoedstoestand 
lijkt een nuttige toevoeging voor lerende robots: ze kunnen in sommige situaties 
op gunstige wijze gebruik maken van hun stemming. Ten tweede, de relaties die 
onderzocht zijn tussen gemoedstoestand en leren laten aan de cognitieve 
psychologie zien hoe (het mechanisme) gemoedstoestand en leren zouden kunnen 
samenhangen. Hier kan vervolgens weer verder onderzoek naar gedaan worden.  
Affect en Beloning  
In Hoofdstuk 6 is een iets andere aanpak gekozen voor de koppeling tussen affect 
en leren. In de eerdere hoofdstukken was affect een signaal dat door de robot zelf 
werd gemaakt, en dat samenhing met gemoedstoestand: “hoe gaat het nu met me 
ten opzichte van wat ik gewend ben”. Dit is een lange termijn interpretatie van 
affect. In Hoofdstuk 6 is onderzocht hoe affect als signaal door een ander 
gecommuniceerd wordt aan een lerende robot. Het is voor mensen heel belangrijk 
dat ze emoties kunnen herkennen van anderen. Deze kunnen je bijvoorbeeld 
vertellen dat je iets niet meer moet doen, of juist wel. Dit principe van leren door 
middel van emotionele uitdrukking is onderzocht, maar dan tussen mensen en 
robots. 
Er is onderzocht of een lerende robot beter leert als hij ook gebruik kan maken 
van een menselijke “ouder”. De ouder kijkt naar de gesimuleerde robot (weer in 
een doolhof, waar kaas in is verstopt) en de robot kijkt naar de ouder door middel 
van een webcam. De webcam vertaalt de gelaatsuitdrukkingen van de ouder 
(bijvoorbeeld een onderzoeker) naar een positief of negatief signaal. Dit signaal 
kan door de robot gebruikt worden als terugkoppeling. Het blijkt dat de robot 
beter leert als er een observerende ouder bij zit. De robot leert sneller wat de beste 
weg naar het doel is. Dit signaal werkt het best als de robot ook leert wanneer de 
ouder lacht of boos kijkt (de belangrijkste signalen die in ons model vertaald 
worden naar positieve of negatieve terugkoppeling). Dus, als de robot het signaal 
van de ouder alleen gebruikt om zijn gedrag aan te passen maar niet om ook een 
model op te bouwen van wat die ouder waarover vindt, dan helpt het signaal niet 
goed. Ook hier geldt weer: dit is een computationeel model, dus oppassen met de 
conclusies. 
Formele Modellen. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk (Hoofdstuk 7) is er een compleet andere benadering 
gekozen om inzicht te krijgen in emotionele processen. Er is voor een bepaald 
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type theorie van emotie, de appraisal theorie, een formele taal ontwikkeld die 
gebruikt kan worden om verschillende appraisal theorieën in op te schrijven. 
Appraisal theorieën gaan ervan uit dat emoties ontstaan door het vergelijken van 
een huidige situatie met toekomstige doelen en de actoren en hun rollen daarin. 
Als iets goed is voor mijn doelen, word ik blij, en andersom. Als iemand anders 
dat voor elkaar heeft gekregen ben ik die persoon dankbaar. Als ik het zelf heb 
gedaan ben ik trots. Als iemand anders iets doet dat slecht voor mij is word ik 
boos. Als er niemand verantwoordelijk voor is word ik verdrietig, etc. Het gaat 
hier te ver om precies uit te leggen hoe dit in zijn werk gaat; in Hoofdstuk 7 staan 
vele referenties naar de verschillende theorieën die er bestaan. 
Het idee achter de ontwikkelde formele taal is dat verschillende theorieën 
allemaal beschreven kunnen worden in dezelfde taal. Hierdoor wordt het veel 
makkelijker om ze met elkaar te vergelijken. Ook kan de formele beschrijving van 
een dergelijke theorie beter gebruikt worden als basis voor het maken van 
computationele modellen van emotie. Waarom? Omdat een computationeel model 
heldere, duidelijke definities nodig heeft, en een formele beschrijving van een 
theorie duidelijkere definities heeft dan een in taal opgeschreven theorie. In 
Hoofdstuk 7 wordt laten zien hoe twee verschillende theorieën samengevoegd 
kunnen worden nadat ze beschreven zijn in de ontwikkelde formele taal. 
Vervolgens wordt er een computationeel model gemaakt op basis van deze 
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Action selection. The process of selecting actions from a set of actions proposed 
by some model of the world in order to optimize survival. In Reinforcement 
Learning, actions have action values resulting from a combination of the 
reward function and the value function, and the action-selection process 
selects actions based on these action values. See Tyrell (1993). 
Affect. In psychology, affect is usually defined as a two-dimensional abstraction 
of emotion in terms of arousal and valence (pleasure). Arousal defines the 
individual’s activity level (e.g., physical readiness for action), while valence 
defines how positive versus negative a situation/object is to the individual. On 
the long-term timescale, affect relates to mood. On the short-term timescale 
affect relates to emotion. See Russell (2003), Gasper and Clore (2002), Ashby 
et al. (1999). 
Affect induction. In psychology, the process of experimental manipulation of 
affect, aimed at inducing experimental subjects with affect (often positive, 
negative or neutral) in order to measure, e.g., the influence of affect on 
cognition. See Ashby et al. (1999), Custers and Aarts (2005), Dreisbach and 
Goschke (2004). 
Agent. In this thesis, an autonomous learning entity being, e.g., an adaptive robot 
or simulated animal. See Jennings et al. (1998). 
Alternating-goal task. A specific grid world used in the experiments in this thesis, 
aimed at testing the ability of an agent to switch from one goal to a second, 
after interaction with the grid world has been optimized at finding the first 
goal. See Chapter 3.  
Anticipatory simulation. See, simulation selection. 
Appraisal. In cognitive appraisal theory, appraisal refers to the evaluation of a 
situation in terms of personal meaning or relevance. The result of this 
evaluation is often described in terms of appraisal dimensions. See van 
Reekum (2000). 
Appraisal dimension. An appraisal dimension influences emotion and can be 
considered as a variable—e.g., agency, relevance or valence—used to express 
the result of the appraisal of a perceived object or person. 
Arousal. See  affect. 
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Artificial affect. A computational model for affect. In this thesis, artificial affect 
describes how well an agent is doing compared to what it is used to. Arousal 
is ignored in this model. See Chapter 2. 
Artificial emotion. See computational model of emotion. 
Boltzmann. See temperature.  
Bottom up. Information processing focused on incoming stimuli. 
Candy task. A specific grid world used in the experiments in this thesis, aimed at 
testing the ability of an agent to first exploit a local optimum and then explore 
and exploit a global optimum. See Chapter 3. 
(Cognitive) appraisal theory. A cognitive theory of emotion assuming that 
emotion primarily results from an individual’s cognitive evaluation of a 
situation in terms of that individual’s believes, desires and intentions. See 
Arnold (1960), Scherer (2001), Frijda and Mesquita (2000), Smith and Kirby 
(2000), and many others. 
Computational model.  An abstraction of a system/phenomenon/theory described 
in terms of a collection of algorithms such that the resulting description is 
executable on a computer (i.e., reducible to operations at the Turing machine 
level). 
Computational model of emotion. A model of emotion executable by a computer, 
based on a psychological or neurobiological theory of emotion. Often such a 
model is embedded into an artificial agent (learning and non-learning agents), 
resulting in an artificial emotional agent.  
Conditioning. Learning to associate a reinforcement with a situation. See also 
instrumental conditioning. 
Credit assignment. In Reinforcement Learning, credit assignment is the problem 
of associating the right values to (sequences of) actions leading to rewarding 
or punished outcomes. Credit assignment is often seen as an optimization 
problem. The solution to this problem is a credit distribution over individual 
actions and states that, when actions with the highest credit according to the 
distribution are chosen, reflects the optimal behavior for an agent when the 
goal of that agent is to maximize cumulative monetary reward. See Sutton and 
Barto (1998). 
Cue inversion. In psychology, used to test, e.g., behavioral flexibility by 
switching the meaning of a cue in a cued situation with the meaning of a non-
cued situation. In this thesis the Cue-inversion-task measures how well an 
agent is able to cope with such a switch (Chapter 4). 
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Discounting. In learning, attributing less importance to future reinforcement as 
compared to current reinforcement. See Sutton and Barto (1998). 
Dynamic selection. The use of an action-selection strategy that is controlled or 
influenced by the agent itself, e.g., a Boltzmann β that is controlled by the 
agent’s artificial affect. See Chapter 3 and 4. 
Effort. The behavioral investment needed to complete a certain task. In our 
experiments effort is used for the number of steps the agent needs to finish 
one experimental run. Mental effort is the simulation investment, e.g., the 
number of internally simulated steps during one run. See Chapter 4. 
Emotion. Hard to define, but when forced, emotion refers to a set of—in 
animals—naturally co-occurring phenomena including facial expression, 
motivation, emotional actions such as fight or flight, a tendency to act, and at 
least in humans but possible in other animals as well, feelings and cognitive 
appraisal. An emotion is intense, short and directed at something. See Scherer 
(2001). 
Exploitation. Action selection (behavior selection) that is optimal (in terms of 
some criterion, e.g., cumulative reward) according to the knowledge the 
agent/animal/robot has of the world it interacts with. 
Exploration. Action selection (behavior selection) that is aimed at learning new 
knowledge about the world an agent/animal/robot interacts with. Explorative 
action selection is thus often not compatible with exploitative action-selection. 
Food. The abstraction of a goal often used in grid-world experiments. Food is 
thus a positively reinforced location in a grid world. 
Forgetting rate. In this thesis, the rate with which an agent forgets learned 
knowledge of the world due to not using the knowledge. See Chapter 4. 
Formalism of appraisal. In the context of Chapter 7, a formal description of a 
structural theory of appraisal. For all specific formalism-related definitions 
see Section 6.3.  
Gain. In Chapter 4, the amount of effort reduction a simulation strategy gives 
relative to no simulation, weighted by the amount of simulation effort needed 
by that strategy. Gain is a measure for the usefulness of a simulation strategy 
while controlling for the amount of simulation used by that strategy. 
Greedy. In action selection, the selection of the best action out of a set of actions. 
Non greedy refers to a selection process whereby not specifically the best 
action is selected, but actions are selected by means of a stochastic process 
based on action values. 
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Grid world. A rectangular grid containing features at grid locations, such as food, 
walls, and water, with which a simulated robot or agent interacts. Features are 
perceived by agents inhabiting the grid world. In the discrete case agents can 
move from one grid position to another by executing actions. In the 
continuous case, an agent moves a certain amount of simulated distance in a 
certain direction. 
Human-robot interaction. As a subfield of human-computer interaction (HCI), 
human-robot interaction (HRI) studies the (potential) interaction patterns 
between humans and robots, as well as resulting (potential) societal changes. 
Instrumental conditioning. A natural learning mechanisms by which animals learn 
behavior by trying actions in context and associating reward and punishment 
with these actions. As a result, rewarding actions are repeated, while punished 
actions are avoided. The instrumental part refers to the reinforcement being 
contingent upon an animals action. 
Interactron. In the learning model in Chapter 4, a node that models that a current 
state-action pair follows a history of state-action pairs. 
Learning rate. In Reinforcement Learning, a numerical value that defines how 
quickly values of states and actions are updated according to new reward 
experiences. See Sutton and Barto (1998). 
Maze. In instrumental conditioning, maze often refers to a typical maze-like 
experimental environment for an animal (such as rats in a T-maze, a maze in 
the shape of a T in which the rat has to learn to make a choice). In 
Reinforcement Learning, see grid world. 
Markov decision process. A state-transition process that is described by states and 
state transitions, whereby the probability for any state transition is entirely 
defined by the previous state. 
Mental effort.  See effort. 
Meta-learning. The process of learning about learning parameters, e.g., how 
should an agent adapt its learning rate, action-selection process, etc. 
Model-based Reinforcement Learning. See Reinforcement Learning. 
Model-free Reinforcement Learning. See Reinforcement Learning. 
Mood. Mood shares many characteristics with emotion, but in contrast to emotion 
is not intense, is of long duration and is not specifically directed at an object 
or person. 
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Process model. A theory of appraisal that describes, in detail, how the process of 
appraisal evolves over time, what appraisal processes are activated and when, 
how the flow of information is between processes, etc. A process model 
describes the cognitive operations, mechanisms and dynamics by which 
appraisals, as described by a structural model, are made and how appraisal 
processes interact. See Reisenzein (2001), and Chapter 7. 
Probabilistic learning. See Reinforcement Learning. 
Punishment. A discouragement for action, a negative reward. 
Q learning. A specific model-free version of Reinforcement Learning (see 
Kaelbling et al., 1996). 
Reinforcement (signal). See reward and punishment. 
Reinforcement learning. A computer model for task learning that solves the credit 
assignment problem by propagating reinforcement back from the end to the 
beginning of action sequences. This process is called value propagation. 
Model-based Reinforcement Learning uses a world model to propagated 
values, while model free does not use such a model but uses sampling. See 
Sutton and Barto (1998). 
Reversal learning. In instrumental conditioning, the process of unlearning a 
previously learned behavior. 
Reward. An encouragement for action. In Reinforcement Learning the reward of 
an action and/or state refers to the immediate reward/punishment of that 
action and/or state.  
Reward function. In Reinforcement Learning, a given function that maps 
states/actions to their rewards. 
Run. In Reinforcement Learning experiments, a sequence of trials, usually long 
enough to conclude convergence (i.e., the agent has learned a certain solution 
to a certain problem and does not improve any further with more training). 
Sampling. In Reinforcement Learning, the process of acquiring a sufficient 
amount of experiences with the environment in order to build up a balanced 
value function, without the need for a world model. See Kaelbing et al. 
(1996). 
Simulation. In computer science simulation refers to modeling a 
system/phenomenon/theory by means of a computational model (a program). 
The program runs and predicts potential outcomes and behaviors of the 
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system. In the context of the Simulation Hypothesis, see Simulation 
Hypothesis. 
Simulation Hypothesis. The Simulation Hypothesis proposes that conscious 
thought is internal simulation of behavior (i.e., an organism’s simulation of 
interaction between that organism and the environment). See Hesslow (2002). 
Simulation selection. In the context of the Simulation Hypothesis, the process of 
continuously selecting potential next behavior for internal simulation such 
that action selection is assisted not hindered. See Chapter 4. 
Simulation strategy. A certain implementation for simulation selection, such as, 
simulate only the predicted state-action pair that has the highest value (greedy 
simulation selection). See Chapter 4. 
Social reward. In this thesis, used for the reward administered to a robot, deduced 
from the emotional expression of an observing tutor. The term is used to 
discriminated between reward resulting from behavior in the grid world and 
reward resulting from the interpretation of an emotional expression. See 
Chapter 6. 
Somatic Marker (Hypothesis). A somatic marker is a bodily signal that functions 
as a value signal to the organism. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis states that 
decision making is influenced by these markers, enabling the organism to 
quickly prune through a large space of potential next behaviors. See Damasio 
(1996). 
State. A mathematical abstraction for a situation in which an agent can be. 
Static selection. The use of a fixed strategy for selecting actions or simulations, 
such as a using a fixed Boltzmann β value for action selection. See Chapter 4. 
Stochastic selection. See Greedy. 
Structural model. In the context of appraisal theory, a theory of appraisal 
describing the declarative semantics of appraisal, i.e., the type of processes 
involved in appraisal, the relation between the processes, the appraisal 
variables, etc. See Reisenzein (2001), and Chapter 7. 
Switch-cost. An agent’s goal-switch cost defined in terms of search effort 
associated with a forced switch from a well-known goal to a new goal. See 
Chapter 3. 
Switch-to-invest task. A grid world used in the experiments in this thesis that tests 
how an agent copes with a sudden change in the world, where the change 
consists of the placement of a negatively reinforced “roadblock” just before 
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the food spots. The world thus tests the ability of the agent to suddenly make 
an investment. See Chapter 4. 
Task learning. See instrumental conditioning. 
Temperature. In action selection, a numerical factor that defines the greediness of 
action selection by controlling the landscape of the Boltzmann distribution 
over the action values. The term temperature refers to the fact that the 
temperate parameter in the Boltzmann distribution models the amount of 
noise in the distribution. See Chapter 3. 
Top-down. Goal oriented or cognitively filtered information processing. 
Transition function. In Reinforcement Learning, a probabilistic function that maps 
state-action pairs to next states. The next state is a potential result from 
executing the action in the state denoted by the state-action pair. As such, the 
transition function is a model for (the behavior of) the world under influence 
of the actions of the agent. See Kaelbling et al. (1998). 
Trial. In Reinforcement Learning experiments, the period between the agent’s 
start location and the goal location. A trial thus varies in the amount of steps 
needed. At the start of the learning process, trials are long, while at the end of 
the learning process trials are short (if convergence is reached).  
Valence. See affect. 
Value. In Reinforcement Learning the value of an action and/or state refers to the 
cumulative future reward a certain action and/or state predicts. 
Value function. A function, learned using Reinforcement Learning mechanisms, 
that maps states/actions to their values (in contrast to rewards, which are 
usually given by the reward function for a certain task). 
Value propagation. See Reinforcement Learning. 
Winner-Take-All. A selection process in which the final selection is based on the 
option with the highest value (or the strongest representation). 
Working memory. A capacity-limited short-term memory in which active 
maintenance of perceived or remembered situations and features is needed. 
See Baddeley (2000). 
World model. See transition function. 
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